COLOM'S VICTORY GIVES RURAL VOTERS A NEW VOICE

C O N F I D E N T I A L GUATEMALA 002221 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT PLS PASS TO USAID FOR LAC/CAM - K. SIENKIEWICZ E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM GT SUBJECT: COLOM'S VICTORY GIVES RURAL VOTERS A NEW VOICE Classified By: Ambassador James M. Derham for reasons 1.4 (b&d). Introduction -------------- ¶1. (C) Alvaro Colom won the November 4 election as rural voters came out in large numbers, and for the first time prevailed over the candidate favored by voters in Guatemala City. The decentralization of voting tables favored Colom's rural voters, and his emphasis on social issues appears to have had a greater appeal, in the end, than Perez Molina's virtually single-minded focus on security. The final outcome of 52.8% to 47.2% belies the extent of Perez Molina's defeat in the countryside. Colom won all of Guatemala's 22 departments except Guatemala City and neighboring Baja Verapaz. The following is an analysis of why Colom won, and Perez Molina lost. The Wrong Message for the Countryside -------------- ¶2. (C) Throughout the campaign, Perez Molina maintained laser-like focus on the single issue that polls indicated was of greatest concern to Guatemalans -- crime. Polls here, however, have often displayed an urban bias. Rampant, violent crime afflicts the country's urban areas to a much greater degree than it does rural areas. Perez's "Firm Hand" ("Mano Dura") motto resonated much less with rural voters, many of whom are more concerned with economic opportunity, health care and education than they are with crime. Some voters perceived Perez Molina as either unable or unwilling to address economic and social issues. ¶3. (C) Asked by a reporter why he lost, Perez Molina responded that his party needed to do more work in the countryside to win rural supporters. He acknowledged that his relatively new party did not have the well-established rural machinery that UNE does. In his analysis of the election results, Colom said that his support from rural mayors was "real, and not just a series of photo opportunities." In the first-round mayoral election, Colom's party won 102 mayoralties compared to only 39 for Perez Molina. Decentralization Empowered Rural Voters -------------- ¶4. (U) The 2007 elections saw an increase in the number of polling stations, from 8,885 in 2003 to 13,756 in 2007. The new polling stations were mostly established in rural areas, with the intention of reducing rural people's travel time (often on foot) to their voting stations. Improved access undoubtedly resulted in more rural people voting than otherwise would have been the case. Rural voters voted overwhelmingly for Colom. The Mouse that Roared -------------- ¶5. (C) Colom frequently came across in his public speaking engagements as fumbling, timid, and insecure in the early stages of the campaign. However, in October his rhetorical performances improved dramatically. He started raising his voice, looking into the camera, and responding to Perez Molina's accusations by leveling his own. In response to Perez Molina's criticism that his was a "Weak Hand" (in contrast to Perez Molina's "Firm Hand"),Colom deftly stoked voters' fears about a return to Guatemala's violent past under another general-turned-president. Colom's later speeches were laced with specific proposals for addressing social and economic ills, in contrast to his earlier speeches in which he offered only references to "comprehensive plans." Qin which he offered only references to "comprehensive plans." Colom did not ignore the security issue, but his call to confront security problems intelligently contrasted with Perez Molina's more simplistic approach. Perez Molina's rare discussion of poverty alleviation and job creation compared poorly with Colom's apparent mastery of economic issues. Calculating that, as supposed front-runner, he had nothing to gain by continuing to debate Colom late in the campaign, Perez Molina declined the last scheduled debates. Many observers have characterized this as a mistake. Colom's Turn to Win -------------- ¶6. (C) With re-election prohibited, Guatemala's presidential elections often result in the second-place finisher in the previous election then going on to win. Many argue that, following his 1999 defeat and second-place finish in 2003, this year was Colom's turn to win. Furthermore, during the four years since his last loss, Colom invested in relationships with the country's influential business class to reassure them that his presidency would not be far-left, or otherwise harm their interests. That Colom is from an affluent family, and is a successful businessman in his own right, alo helped allay upper class fears. His selection o VP candidate Rafael Espada, a heart surgeon with close ties to many of Guatemala's elites, also helped in this respect. Some observers believe that, while Colom successfully mollified many center-right voters, left and center-left voters remain fearful of Perez Molina. Conclusion -------------- ¶7. (C) Colom acknowledged his debt to rural voters by saying in his victory speech that his government "will have a Mayan face." The 2007 election will force future governments and presidential contenders to give greater priority to the pressing needs outside Guatemala City. Derham