Natural Gas in South China (Part 1 of 2): Delayed LNG Plans

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 GUANGZHOU 000418 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS USDOC FOR 4420/ITA/MAC/MCQUEEN USDOC FOR 1003/ITA/OUS/OC USDOC FOR 6310/ITA/TD/OIEM/KMURPHY/HBURROUGHS/KHOLLANDE R USDOC FOR 6000/ITA/TD/RPACE TRANSPORTATION FOR FEDERAL RAILWAY ADMINISTRATION/KROHN USDOE FOR OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY - MOURAD USDOE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS/DPUMPHREY/RSPRICE USDOE FOR FOSSIL POLICY AND ENERGY/MSMITH/ADUCCA USDOE FOR MSINGER/GRUDINS/JNAKANO STATE FOR EAP/CM, EB/TRA, AND EB/ESC/IEC STATE ALSO PASS USTR FOR CHINA OFFICE USPACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ENRG EPET ECON EMIN SENV CH SUBJECT: Natural Gas in South China (Part 1 of 2): Delayed LNG Plans Getting Back on Track REF: (U) THIS DOCUMENT IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED AND INCLUDES BUSINESS SENSITIVE INFORMATION. IT SHOULD NOT BE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT CHANNELS OR IN ANY PUBLIC FORUM WITHOUT THE WRITTEN CONCURRENCE OF THE ORIGINATOR. IT SHOULD NOT BE POSTED ON THE INTERNET. ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Recent progress in negotiations with Indonesia and other LNG suppliers suggest that the Chinese government has adjusted its expectations and renewed its interest in putting LNG projects back into the energy mix in South China. The government's unwillingness earlier to adjust negotiation strategies and conclude supply contacts in response to higher prices and shifting market conditions resulted in delays of most LNG projects. The Chinese government still requires CNOOC to purchase a portion of the rights to the fields from which it sources gas and this means that CNOOC will continue to pursue oil and gas fields in places where many major Western oil companies are unable to do business and in locations where government-to-government influence can be better used to the company's advantage. After years of planning discussions and negotiations, on September 28, 2006, the Dapeng Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminal in Shenzhen became the first LNG terminal in China to start commercial operations. Although one of at least 11 announced LNG projects spanning the coast of China, only two other terminals, one in Fujian Province and one near Shanghai, have broken ground. This is the first of two cables looking at natural gas in South China. END SUMMARY. LNG in South China, A Brief History -------------- ¶2. (U) After research in the early 1990s showed Guangdong Province's electric power usage was going to exceed its capacity to generate, provincial government discussions focused on ways to meet the rising �00A;demand for energy. Early solutions focused on building nuclear power plants and importing power from western provinces. However, in 1994 proposals began to surface about ways to bring LNG into the energy mix for the province. ¶3. (U) The following sequence of events is illustrative of the time it takes to bring a project to the fore: -- 1998: Guangdong Province won State Council approval for a pilot LNG project to be located in Shenzhen. -- 2001: British Petroleum was chosen as the foreign partner to work with the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) on the project. -- October 2002: a supply purchase agreement (SPA) was signed between the Guangdong LNG project and Northwest Shelf Australia LNG - a partnership which includes BHP Billiton, British Petroleum, Chevron, Japan Australia LNG MIMI (A 50-50 joint venture between Mitsubishi and Mitsui),Shell, and Woodside Energy - for supply. -- Late 2003: Construction on the terminal began -- May 2006: the Dapeng LNG Terminal received its first shipment of LNG. The terminal is currently the only operating LNG terminal in all of China and capable of processing 3.75 million tons per year (MMt/y) of LNG. An additional LNG terminal in Putian, Fujian, wholly owned by CNOOC, is under construction and will be in operation by the end of 2008. For Dapeng, The Finances Work -------------- ¶4. (U) Dapeng LNG negotiated its SPA in October 2002 at a time when the LNG market favored buyers. Many countries had large offshore discoveries and were seeking to finance development projects by signing long-term SPAs. In the case of Dapeng, the Chinese government received multiple supply offers and bidding became very GUANGZHOU 00000418 002 OF 005 competitive. The deal that was ultimately signed with the Northwest Shelf Australia LNG partnership was a 25-year take-or-pay contract with a ceiling price linked to $25 per barrel of oil (BBL). Correspondingly, Dapeng sold its entire supply to 11 customers: four new gas-fired power plants, one plant that converted from oil to gas, and six municipal local distribution companies (LDC) including Hong Kong at the same 25-year take-or-pay terms with prices that guaranteed supply and operating costs plus a profit. ¶5. (U) Given the seeming no-lose situation of Dapeng and government support for a network of LNG terminals and pipelines up the coast, CNOOC quickly tried to replicate its success in South China announcing similar plants in Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shanghai as well as a second Guangdong terminal in Zhuhai. In an effort not to lose out on LNG entirely, the two other Chinese oil majors, Sinopec and PetroChina, announced plans to open LNG terminals of their own. PetroChina won initial government approval for terminals in Jiangsu, Hebei, and Lioaning provinces and Sinopec for Shandong and Tianjin. An eleventh project located in Guangxi province is also under consideration. All projects initially announced first phase capacities of between 2.5 and 3.5 MMt/y and with the exceptions of the Liaoning, Tianjin, and Guangxi terminals, all were originally Qcted to be in operation between 2008 and 2010. Additionally, the second phases of the Dapeng and Fujian terminals, doubling their initial size, were also announced for completion by 2010. Slow to Adjust to Higher Prices -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The Dapeng terminal was not the only project to win an early supply purchase agreement. The Fujian terminal also secured a 25-year deal for 2.6 MMt/y from the Tangguh field in Indonesia at what was originally to be a ceiling price of around $26/BBL. After the terms were agreed to, world oil and gas prices rose substantially and Indonesia sought to renegotiate the price of the deal. This new uncertainty about supply caused CNOOC to delay construction and has pushed back the opening of the terminal by 18 months. On March 16, a representative from the Indonesian Consulate confirmed that CNOOC has agreed to a 50% price increase to $39/BBL for the SPA and the terminal should get its first shipment in 2009. With the exception of the CNOOC Shanghai terminal, none of the rest of the initially announced terminals has signed an SPA and all will be delayed indefinitely until LNG supply is secured. ¶7. (SBU) After successfully reaching the first two agreements which included price ceilings and sub-market prices, the Chinese government instructed CNOOC to sign future deals only at the same terms. When prices quickly rose and LNG supply began to tighten in the Pacific, buyers from Japan, Korea, and the United States reacted much faster to the changing conditions. With sellers now in control of the market, ceiling prices have been replaced in deals with escalator clauses and prices for long-term SPA do not carry the discount they had in the past. CNOOC could not agree to such terms and in places like the Australian Northwest Shelf, where CNOOC hoped to also supply Dapeng Phase II from, all new production was sold to other parties. Fields in Australia will not likely be able to accommodate any new SPAs until 2012 at the earliest. Customer Mix Not Optimal -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The Chinese response to higher gas prices is due to a distorted mix of customers. According to Mr. Thomas King, President of Guangdong Dapeng LNG Company, 64% of the Dapeng terminal's gas is going to power producers. Even with contract prices capped at $25/bbl, the power generated from LNG fired plants is between two and three times the cost of power generated from domestic coal fired plants. Mr. Shi Enzhe, General Manager of CNOOC Gas and Power, confirmed that the Fujian LNG terminal will supply 70% of its LNG to GUANGZHOU 00000418 003 OF 005 power plants as well. Moreover, all but one of the power plants supplied by the two LNG terminals are newly built. Only one, the Meishi power plant in Shenzhen, is being converted from heavy fuel oil to LNG. ¶9. (SBU) Due to the over-weighted proportion oQer generators as purchasers, a move in gas prices from under $4 per million British thermal units (MMBtu) to approximately $6/MMBtu, as has recently occurred with the renegotiated SPA for the Fujian terminal, has had a drastic effect on the economic viability of projects without government financial support. Mr. King stated an ideal customer mix for Dapeng would be 33% power generators, 33% industrial and commercial customers, and 33% residential customers. A heavier weighting of industrial and residential customers makes LNG projects feasible at far higher prices because the fuels these users substitute are propane, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG),heavy fuel oil, and diesel, all of which have prices closely correlated to the market price of oil as opposed to cheap domestic coal. ¶10. (SBU) Both Mr. Shi and Mr. King commented that industrial and commercial users' desired adoption rate is faster than Dapeng can currently handle. Due to supply issues, Dapeng is currently operating at only 30% capacity and much of the current supply is taken by the power customers and Hong Kong. There is a waiting list for industrial users to convert to LNG and hook up to Dapeng. The wait is further compounded because the six municipal LDCs supplied by Dapeng must work with the city governments to convert and expand the existing gas distribution systems. The cost of conversion for industrial customers must be paid for by the customer. The average conversion project so far has cost 200,000 RMB ($25,873 USD). Since Dapeng's LNG price is a 30% discount from current LPG or fuel oil prices, the average payback for conversion projects has been just three months time. ¶11. (SBU) For residential customers, the wait may be longer. Mr. Yan, Junfang of the Shenzhen Municipal Development and Reform Bureau said that Shenzhen has currently converted 130,000 homes to LNG. Mr. Wu Hong, Deputy Director of the Guangzhou Municipal Development and Reform Commission, stated that Guangzhou has only converted 40,000 homes but should complete 200,000 more homes this year and finish converting the cities entire network by the end of 2008. In the majority of these conversions, lines for LPG already existed that were capable of supplying LNG as well. The LDC and government pay the cost to install one new LNG stove and water heater for each residence. As few new gas lines are being built, the reach of LNG in both cities will likely top out at less than 10% of the total population. Recent Trends Suggest LNG an Option Again -------------- ¶12. (SBU) While CNOOC and Dapeng representatives were very reticent to discuss pricing issues, Professor Zeng Lemin from the Guangdong Techno-economy Research and Development Center, a government think tank associated with the Guangdong Department of Science, spoke openly about pricing issues. Mr. Zeng is Chief of the Institute for Energy and has consulted on many LNG project feasibility studies. Zeng estimated the price to Dapeng at 0.8 RMB/cubic meter ($3 USD/MMBtu). Representatives from Meishi power plant confirmed they pay 1.6 RMB/cubic meter ($5.79 USD/MMBtu) including distribution costs. Zeng stated residential and industrial customers pay 3.8 RMB/cubic meter ($13.76 USD/MMBtu). Zeng continued that in China today LNG prices above 2 RMB/cubic meter ($7.24 USD/MMBtu) to the terminal would be unable to compete. Yet the Chinese government has given CNOOC greater flexibility to negotiate new deals with a new contract cap of approximately $6 USD/MMBtu, not coincidentally the ceiling price of the renegotiated Indonesia-FQian deal and the reported contract price of the Malaysian SPA between Petronas and GUANGZHOU 00000418 004 OF 005 CNOOC to supply the Shanghai LNG terminal. ¶13. (SBU) At $6/MMBtu, the Chinese have moved much closer to the world price for long-term gas contracts but the desire for ceiling prices still remains an issue in new contract negotiations. Zeng stated as long as the LNG market is tilted toward sellers, ceiling prices will either be unavailable or significantly higher. Zeng speculated that China might enter into deals with higher ceiling prices once infrastructure to currently oil-dependent industrial users is further developed. These customers could still view market-priced LNG as a less expensive and cleaner alternative to fuel oil and diesel. But Where will The Gas Come From? -------------- ¶14. (SBU) One thing that emerged from the Dapeng LNG deal was CNOOC and the Chinese government's frustration in dealing with a large Western joint venture. Northwest Shelf Australia LNG has six main partners from five different countries. CNOOC, perhaps feeling it could deal better with one partner directly and better leverage government-to-government involvement in deal negotiation, has since negotiated mainly with other national oil companies and government organizations such as Pertamina and BP MIGAS in Indonesia and Petronas in Malaysia. Zeng said that new LNG supply deals are being explored with both of these countries as well as with Brunei and Qatar. ¶15. (SBU) The Chinese government still requires CNOOC to purchase a portion of the rights to the fields from which it sources gas. With the market currently favoring LNG sellers, there is little motivation for large Western integrated oil companies to sell pieces of profitable fields. As such, CNOOC will continue to pursue oil and gas fields in places where many major Western oil companies are unable to do business and locations where government-to-government influence can be better used to the company's advantage. And How Will it Move? -------------- ¶16. (SBU) Pipelines are another issue. As part of phase one of Dapeng, a 379 km series of pipelines was built to transport gas between the cities of Shenzhen, Huizhou, Dongguan, Guangzhou, Foshan, and Hong Kong. The pipeline primarily runs east-west and traverses rivers 14 times. The chosen routing goes through minimally populated areas where possible. CNOOC's Putian terminal also will include a pipeline that will span the coast of Fujian province from Fuzhou in the north to Zhangzhou in the south also supplying the cities of Quanzhou and Xiamen. There is currently neither a plan to link the two pipelines together nor to link either pipeline to existing pipeline systems such as West-East pipeline that flows gas from Xinjiang to Shanghai. ¶17. (SBU) Both Mr. King of Dapeng and Mr. Shi of CNOOC Gas and Power commented that linking of pipelines would likely be covered in the 12th five year plan. The long term goal is a nationwide network linking all of the coastal LNG terminals and offshore production with domestic supplies from Xinjiang and Sichuan. King further stated that difficulties will arise without technical management and broad accommodation for the different qualities of gas found inland, offshore, and the varied imports from overseas sources through the LNG terminals. ¶18. (SBU) Mr. Zeng was not as optimistic about the pipeline network, stating that current delays in LNG terminal construction would push completion of the Pearl River Delta's gas infrastructure to 2015. In his estimation, a coastal pipeline network linking Guangdong and Fujian would not be completed until well after 2020. GUANGZHOU 00000418 005 OF 005 Comment -------------- ¶19. (SBU) Guangdong's stated goal to raise natural gas use from the current level of about 3% of all energy to 10% by 2010 will not be met. Even the most optimistic projections for natural gas supply and LNG terminal construction would struggle to meet this goal by ¶2015. Furthermore, the desire to add LNG as a fuel for power generation solely to diversify from domestic coal or to improve the environment seems misplaced. Imported LNG will not be able to compete with the cost of Chinese coal and at current prices large scale investment in anti-polluting technologies for coal-fired plants would be more economically feasible. Until promising domestic gas sources (onshore, offshore, and alternatives such as coal-bed methane) are further developed, imported LNG is best used as a competitor for dirtier, higher-priced, imported energy sources such as fuel oil, LPG, and diesel. Unfortunately, without completed terminal networks and long-term guaranteed supplies, South China looks unwilling to invest much in expanding its currently limited distribution channels to these potential users. Note of Conversions -------------- ¶20. (U) In this cable, the following conversion factors were used in computing equivalents: 1 cubic meter natural gas = 35.3 cubic feet natural gas 1 MMBtu = 27.993 cubic meters of natural gas 1 ton of fuel oil = 6.66 barrels 1 ton of crude oil = 7.33 barrels 1 USD = 7.73 RMB GOLDBERG