Let's Make a Deal: Slow Start for Cross Border Emissions

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 GUANGZHOU 000377 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DOE FOR INTERNATIONAL/PUMPHREY DOE ALSO FOR EERE/DIXON USDOC FOR NOAA/OFFICE OF GLOBAL PROGRAMS/BUIZER USDOC ALSO FOR 4420/ITA/MAC/MCQUEEN, DAS LEVINE EPA FOR OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION/MCLEAN EPA ALSO FOR INTERNATIONAL/YANG AND THOMPSON STATE FOR EAP/CM, OES/OGC, OES/ENV AND OES/PCI/STEWART STATE ALSO PASS USTR FOR STRATFORD, CELICO and CHINA OFFICE USPACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: SENV ENRG PGOV CH SUBJECT: Let's Make a Deal: Slow Start for Cross Border Emissions Trading Pilot REF: A. 06 Hong Kong 3633 B. 06 Guangzhou 30165 (U) THIS DOCUMENT IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. NOT FOR RELEASE OUTSIDE U.S. GOVERNMENT CHANNELS. NOT FOR PUBLICATION ON THE INTERNET. ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The long-planned Guangdong-Hong Kong cross-border emissions trading pilot program was implemented on January 31, 2007. Despite years of cooperative planning between both regions' environmental protection bureaus, no deals have yet been struck. Furthermore, the plan has been met with criticism from Hong Kong lawmakers and potential participants due to the lack of transparency and uneven enforcement on the Guangdong side of the border and a limited participant pool. The Guangdong Environmental Protection Bureau had little to say in response to voiced concerns. The emissions trading framework as currently implemented does not appear to offer much help in meeting agreed upon emission reductions in the Pearl River Delta by the target of 2010. There have been no deals involving emission credits so far and prime Guangdong candidates have not even begun to engage potential Hong Kong purchasers. End Summary. Emissions Trading Framework Genesis -------------- ¶2. (U) In April 2002, Hong Kong and Guangdong province signed a joint declaration on air quality for the Pearl River Delta (PRD). The agreement put forth targets for emission reductions of 40% for sulfur dioxide, 20% for nitrogen oxide, and 55% for particulates and volatile organic compounds from 1997 levels by the year 2010. Notably, carbon dioxide was left out of the reduction agreement. After setting up a joint team to look at emission monitoring techniques and emission reduction technology, the team introduced the idea of a cross-border emissions trading framework in late 2002 as a method to further help power plants meet the agreed upon targets. ¶3. (SBU) According to the Guangdong Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) policy discussions within the Guangdong government delayed the emissions trading plan from progressing for almost four years. In the meantime, the Guangdong EPB investigated and closely monitored the first sulfur dioxide trading scheme in China, a regional system where the first trades were between two power plants in Jiangsu province in July 2003. In early 2006, the Hong Kong-Guangdong plan began to move forward but implementation slipped until January ¶2007. Trading Framework Details -------------- ¶4. (U) The implemented emission trading framework is strictly voluntary and is open only to coal-fired power plants in Hong Kong or the Pearl River Delta in Guangdong province. All deals must include one plant in Hong Kong and one in Guangdong so mainland-only emission trades are currently not allowed. Amounts, durations, and prices are totally at the discretion of the parties involved in the deal with no limitations set by the framework. ¶5. (U) Once a deal is struck; the details must be reported to both the Guangdong EPB and the Hong Kong Environmental Protection Department (EPD). The corresponding EPB or EPD must evaluate that the power plant selling emission credits actually has enough emissions under the cap to complete the deal. After this approval, the power plant must have real-time emissions monitors installed if they are not already in place. As Guangdong's power plants are generally newer and all plants over 125 MW are required to have desulphurization scrubbers by 2010, the expected flow of emissions credits is from Guangdong to Hong Kong. Criticism Abounds in Hong Kong -------------- ¶6. (U) Criticism from Hong Kong lawmakers, media, and other GUANGZHOU 00000377 002 OF 003 potential stakeholders is that the framework's lack of transparency and uniform measurement systems could make the system prone to manipulation (reftel A). Revelations last summer that Hong Kong and Guangdong used different measuring scales to calculate emissions reinforced concerns about the lack of accountability on the Guangdong side. Additionally, the limited pool of participants on both sides excludes many of the worst sources of polluting emissions such as factories and therefore the framework won't do much to helpQhe problem. The overall concern is that Hong Kong is likely to pay Guangdong for emission reductions that might not even actually exist. Guangdong EPB Response Short on Answers -------------- ¶7. (SBU) During a meeting on March 2 with the Guangdong EPB, General Affairs Office Director Guo Han Yi, countered these criticisms stating that the framework was still just a pilot program and both sides recognized that it still has loopholes in it. Guo said that there are currently 16 shared monitoring sites, 3 in Hong Kong and 13 in Guangdong province, which can be seen by both the Guangdong EPB and Hong Kong EPD. Furthermore, any power plant participating in emissions trading would also have to be able to be monitored by both organizations. After over one month there have been no deals. Mr. Guo believed Guangdong Yudean Group, Guangdong's largest owner of power plants, and China Light and Power in Hong Kong were in discussions but since there was no requirement to report until a deal was made, he could not be sure. ¶8. (SBU) When asked about the limited pool of participants, Mr. Guo responded that over 50% of all sulfur dioxide emissions in both areas came from power plants. He further commented there were no plans to add in other fixed-point polluters such as factories. Asked, why carbon dioxide was not included in the trading framework or monitoring, Guo said that there was no national standard for carbon dioxide. Finally, Mr. Guo equivocated that the Guangdong EPB has confidence it can meet the reduction goals of the 2010 agreement with Hong Kong but until the mid-term evaluation report comes out later this year, he is unclear how far Guangdong has to go. Guangdong EPB would like to increase inspections and improve enforcement but he admitted that environmental challenges were growing at least as fast as the EPB's financial and human resources, making it difficult to stay ahead. Yudean Has Questions As Well -------------- ¶9. (SBU) On March 21 Conoff met with Mr. Zou Shang, Vice Chief Economist at Guangdong Yudean Group. Yudean produces 29% of the power for the Pearl River Delta. Mr. Zou stated Yudean owns 14 thermal power plants, 12 of which are coal-fired. All but one of the power plants with 300 MW or greater generating units have had desulphurization equipment installed. He further stated that it has been difficult to meet the yearly reductions of emissions in each plant, requiring significanQnvestment in equipment and closer monitoring of coal quality. The government has helped with tax incentives and low-interest loans to defray costs of pollution controls. ¶10. (SBU) Mr. Zou said Yudean currently had several power plants with available emission credits and had been given a copy of the framework but the company still had many questions about how trades would work and the company has requested further details. Furthermore, he confessed Yudean had not had any discussions with either China Light and Power or Hong Kong Electric and was not even sure if either company had a need to buy emission credits. Challenges Remain -------------- ¶11. (SBU) As some in Hong Kong have justifiably voiced, several issues still remain for the framework to be successful. Transparency is an issue. While there are shared monitoring GUANGZHOU 00000377 003 OF 003 stations in Guangdong, access to shared emissions monitors is not available in real time to the Hong Kong EPD, although it is to the Guangdong EPB, but is rather updated to a web site once each day. Moreover, numerous reports suggest the Guangdong EPB has in the past adjusted emissions caps and monitoring systems in efforts to make targets more reachable for power plants. As a case in point, the Hong Kong EPD freely revealed all emissions caps for each power plant in Hong Kong but the Guangdong EPB refused to reveal the same information about any power plants in Guangdong, stating it was a complex process that depended on too many variables to generalize and individual plant information was confidential. Yudean stated the company had no idea how the cap was calculated and it received a cap number each year for each plant but declined to provide specific cap numbers. ¶12. (SBU) Limitations in the participant pool and the lack of provisions to do intra-provincial trades will severely hamper the usefulness of the current framework. Hong Kong has only two coal-fired power plants while Guangdong has dozens. Many of the older, worst polluting power plants in Guangdong are currently over their caps and will continue to be serious polluters. This will leave the deals to only the newer plants who have already installed desulphurization technology. Once these deals are completed, the need for Hong Kong plants to buy additional credits should be minimal. Correspondingly the incentive for emissions trading opportunities to entice other Guangdong plants to install desulphurization technology ahead of regulated timetables will be minimized. Comment -------------- ¶13. (SBU) While some commendation is merited for an attempt to bring a market-oriented approach to help the Pearl River Delta region clean up its air, in its current form the implemented emissions trading framework is unlikely to put even the smallest dent in reducing emissions in the region. Without expansion of the program, the same market-based incentives that are being trumpeted as a positive step in reducing emissions for Hong Kong power plants will be quickly forgotten and reliance in Guangdong will remain on the current system of regulation by an already overburdened and non-transparent bureaucracy. ROCK