Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07GENEVA1060
2007-04-30 08:13:00
UNCLASSIFIED
US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

WHO: Meeting on Options for Increasing the Access of

Tags:  TBIO AORC 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3719
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 1921
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5658
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 7941
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 6281
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 2126
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RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3191
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6624
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA GA
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2206
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
UNCLAS GENEVA 001060 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR G, AIAG, OES, IO/T
HSC FOR RAJEEV YENKAYYA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: TBIO AORC
SUBJECT: WHO: Meeting on Options for Increasing the Access of
Developing Countries to H5N1 and other Potential Pandemic Vaccines


UNCLAS GENEVA 001060 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR G, AIAG, OES, IO/T HSC FOR RAJEEV YENKAYYA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: TBIO AORC SUBJECT: WHO: Meeting on Options for Increasing the Access of Developing Countries to H5N1 and other Potential Pandemic Vaccines ¶1. Summary. The World Health Organization (WHO) convened subject meeting April 25 to discuss strategies to expand access to influenza vaccines, including stockpiling options and increased vaccine production. Participants included representatives from donor countries, countries affected by the H5N1 virus, and vaccine manufacturers. Agreeing that scientific evidence and political commitments indicate stockpiles are feasible, the participants asked the WHO Secretariat to undertake further work on the details about how to create, maintain, fund and use an H5N1 vaccine stockpile resource, and to continue to consult with Member States and other partners on the development of a mechanism for broader access to pandemic vaccines. Ambassador John Lange, Special Representative on Avian and Pandemic Influenza (AIAG) led the U.S. delegation. End Summary. ¶2. Responding to calls from developing countries, particularly Indonesia, for greater access to adequate stocks of H5N1 and other pre-pandemic and pandemic influenza vaccines, the WHO Director-General, Dr. Margaret Chan, convened a meeting on April 25 in Geneva to address these concerns. In opening the meeting, the Director-General characterized the issue of a potential influenza pandemic as one of the biggest dilemmas in public health today. Noting the finite resources available for public health, Dr. Chan emphasized the universal threat a pandemic poses to health security, and re-emphasized the collective obligations WHO Member States have under the revised International Health Regulations (IHRs),which come info force on June 15, 2007. ¶3. Dr. David Heymann, WHO Assistant Director-General for Communicable Diseases, noted flu viruses had been freely shared for over fifty years for the production of seasonal flu vaccines, and stressed the importance of the Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN),with its 115 National Influenza Centers, and the WHO?s Global Pandemic-Influenza Action Plan to Increase Vaccine Supply as mechanisms in place to increase the availability of seasonal and pandemic influenza vaccine. Heymann reviewed a series of meetings that were leading up to the May 2007 World Health Assembly (WHA), which would consider resolutions on sample-sharing and access to vaccines. He noted particularly the January
2007 WHO Executive Board, which had adopted a draft resolution on virus sharing; the meeting on responsible practices for virus sharing and resulting benefits, held in Jakarta in March 2007; the April 17-18, 2007, meeting of the Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE),which had recommended that the WHO Secretariat should create an H5N1 vaccine stockpile for countries without capacity to produce influenza vaccines or the ability to purchase such vaccines; and the April 19-20, 2007, meeting of experts that reaffirmed the importance of GISN as a public-health resource, supported the draft WHO document on Best practice for sharing influenza viruses and sequence data, and called for the WHA to consider a draft resolution on access to vaccines. ¶4. Dr. Viroj Tangcharoensathien of the Ministry of Public Health of Thailand presented developing-country perspectives on increasing access to influenza vaccines. Noting U.S. and Japanese support for capacity-building in a number of countries, Thailand placed top priority on expanding vaccine production. Describing GISN as the backbone of the response to a potential pandemic, Thailand called on all countries to participate fully in GISN, share influenza viruses freely and without restriction, and adhere to the IHRs. Thailand asked development partners to provide increased resources, urged industry to carry out research and development (R&D) on better vaccines, and called on the WHO Secretariat to continue its work on standard operating procedures for virus transfer. (Comment: Dr. Viroj?s presentation was more balanced and fair than his colleagues? statements at the WHO Executive Board in January of this year. He admitted afterwards to have deliberately steered clear of intellectual-property issues. The more moderate discourse from the Thai delegation could reflect an attempt to put distance between the Thais and the Indonesians as Jakarta continues to renege on promises made to cooperate with the international community at large. End comment.) ¶5. The Developing Country Vaccine Manufacturers Network (DCVMN) and the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA) provided industry perspectives. Both committed to work with countries and the WHO leadership to address pandemic preparedness, and to develop approaches for funding, allocating and distributing potential vaccines. IFPMA said industry is investing in increased vaccine supply, and expects current production capacity to double in the next two to three years. IFPMA also noted vaccine manufacture is highly complex, is highly regulated, and must be compliant with good manufacturing practices - a validation process that can take many years. IFPMA said industry is prepared to contribute to global stockpiles once their scope and magnitude has been defined. DCVMN noted it is already providing the bulk of vaccines purchased by United Nations agencies, and, with support from the international community, could establish the capacity to produce H5N1 vaccines. ¶6. Switzerland provided an industrialized-country perspective on increasing access to vaccines. Noting it has already purchased enough H5N1 pre-pandemic vaccines for the entire Swiss population (although not mentioned, this purchase was from GlaxoSmithKline and Novartis),Switzerland said it had also entered into an advance purchase contract for one dose of pandemic vaccine for each Swiss citizen. Noting that a country?s first obligation is to its own people, Switzerland argued that having met that obligation first allowed it to then secure government funds to support global stockpiles, either through donations or financial contributions. To do this, Switzerland said it was exploring issues related to legal liability, differential pricing, and advance purchase commitments, and would continue to work with the WHO Secretariat on these issues. ¶7. Reacting to Switzerland?s presentation, Thailand said it had quickly calculated that it must have cost Switzerland USD20 per person to provide this vaccine coverage, a cost no developing country could afford. And, Thailand asked, if all the rich countries did the same, how many vaccine doses would be left for the rest of the world? ¶8. In the afternoon session, the Chair, Dr. Jean-Claude Manuguerra, head of the French influenza collaborating center at the Institut Pasteur, asked Member States for their views, although not all contributed to the discussion. The separate French delegation said international solidarity was essential, and that strict implementation of the IHRs would benefit all countries. Japan agreed stockpiles were one option to consider, but influenza-vaccine stockpiles were more complicated than other kinds. Much more information about the operation of such stockpiles was necessary to make a decision on their feasibility, and the WHO Secretariat should present that information to the WHA. Thailand said it could not support pre-pandemic stockpiles unless the WHO Secretariat provided a cost-benefit analysis of the proposal, and, because of the possibility of stockpiling the wrong vaccine, only if the vaccines provided cross-protection. The United Kingdom (UK) expressed support for the SAGE recommendations (SAGE is chaired by the UK) and GISN. Australia expressed support for the WHO?s ongoing work in this area, and suggested an expert group should address the technical issues that had been raised. China, whose expert was unable to attend because Switzerland had not issued the required visa, expressed support for the views of developing countries, and welcomed the forward-leaning positions taken by developed countries. China also supported the draft document on Best practice for sharing influenza viruses and sequence data. Indonesia, represented by Dr. Widjaja Lukito, an Adviser on public policy to the Minister of Health, was reserved, and seldom intervened, other than to promote the outcomes of the Jakarta meetings and to express appreciation for the support it had received from the WHO. ¶9. US Del expressed strong support for the WHO Secretariat?s work in this area, and called for accelerating the implementation of the Global Action Plan to Increase Vaccine Supply as the foundation to increase the availability of seasonal and pandemic-influenza vaccine globally. Noting the critical gap in access to vaccines, US Del recalled the U.S. Government?s contribution of USD10 million to the WHO Headquarters to expand the development and manufacturing infrastructure for influenza vaccine in developing countries. Echoing Thailand?s reference to GISN as the backbone of the global response, US Del stressed its support for the current framework for sample sharing, without any encumbrances. US Del expressed willingness to consider contributions to a WHO-managed pre-pandemic vaccine stockpile in the short term, either by committing a portion of the current USG domestic pre-pandemic stockpile or by providing financial support to a WHO-established stockpile, although the U.S. Government is unable to provide specific commitments at this time. In the long term, US Del said the United States is willing to consider contributions to a global virtual pandemic vaccine stockpile ? again without providing specific commitments now. Recalling Director-General Chan?s reference to the need to consider measures other than vaccines, US Del referred to the U.S. Community Mitigation Guidance and Pandemic Severity Index, both of which are described on the U.S. website www.pandemicflu.gov. US Del closed by reiterating the responsibility that all nations have to share data and virus samples, and stressed responding to a pandemic will demand the cooperation of the world community. ¶10. The meeting concluded with the adoption of Summary Points (see para 12) that reaffirmed that the work on virus-sharing, H5N1 vaccine stockpiles, access to pandemic vaccines and other means of strengthening pandemic preparedness must all be based on the IHRs, the overarching framework to ensure global health security. Despite attempts by Indonesia to include a reference to the Jakarta Declaration as guidance for improved access to vaccines, US Del was successful in limiting a reference to the Jakarta meeting to a footnote that listed other meetings (not included in para 12). ¶11. The WHO Secretariat will now set up expert groups to focus on the details of how to create, maintain, fund and use an H5N1 vaccine stockpile. The WHO leadership will continue to consult with appropriate partners and Member States on the development of mechanisms for broader access to pandemic vaccines. ¶12. Text of Summary Points: The International Health Regulations (2005) are the overarching framework to ensure global public health security and provide the basis for this work. The WHO Best Practices for Sharing Influenza Virus and Sequence Data document provides guidance, and conclusions from recent discussions and meetings1 can assist in attaining a goal that is internationally agreed upon: to improve access to H5N1 and pandemic vaccines as a means, among others, to strengthen pandemic preparedness. The current meeting focused on feasibility of vaccine stockpiles to complement production capacity building efforts. Scientific evidence and political will indicate that vaccine stockpiles may be feasible: H5N1 vaccines have been shown to be safe and immunogenic New data suggest lower antigen doses and cross protection are realistic expectations Based on scientific evidence reviewed, SAGE has recommended that WHO proceed to assess the feasibility of H5N1 vaccine stockpiles Realizing its potential, the Developing Country Vaccine Manufacturers Network has indicated its commitment to work on its mission with WHO and its Member States The International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association has indicated the same commitment and forecasts increasing manufacturing capacity in the next 3 to 5 years to meet potential growing demand Some Member States expressed commitment to work with WHO Next Steps Agree on the need to now focus on the details about how to create, maintain, fund and use such an H5N1 vaccine stockpile resource. WHO will continue to consult with appropriate partners and Member States on the development of mechanisms for broader access to pandemic vaccines. TICHENOR

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