TAJIK PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE - A PEEK INSIDE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001607 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/SCA, DS/ITA, DS/ICI/CI, DS/PII, DS/ATA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/8/2017 TAGS: ASEC TI SUBJECT: TAJIK PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE - A PEEK INSIDE CLASSIFIED BY: SETH E. GREEN, REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICER, DUSHANBE, STATE. REASON: 1.4 (b),(c) ¶1. (S/NF) The Regional Security Officer met November 7 with Major General Kasim GAFAROV, First Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB),to discuss future Anti-Terrorism Assistance training, such as VIP protection training and vital installation security courses. During the meeting, GAFAROV gave a long and detailed briefing on the Presidential Protective Service and the challenges they face. ¶2. (S/NF) GAFAROV described the creation of the Presidential Protective Service, some of the challenges they continue to face, and the type of assistance they are interested in. In 1993 the Presidential Protective Service was formed from a group of intelligence officers, who GAFAROV said were the only people capable and trustworthy of such an assignment. According to GAFAROV, the Israeli Government offered to train their new Presidential Protective Service, first administering a test to one hundred members to ascertain whether they had the "proper mindset." The Israelis concluded that none of them possessed the proper mindset and skills necessary to be protection specialists. However, GAFAROV explained that the security service couldn't simply reassign the officers, some of whom may have been relatives of important people and were given this prestigious assignment as a sign of respect. At this point, the Israelis discontinued VIP protection training and focused only on firearms skills. GAFAROV still believes that intelligence officers make the best protective security professionals because they need access to intelligence and threat information. He dismissed the notion that such information be made available to other law enforcement authorities in Tajikistan. ¶3. (S/NF) GAFAROV indicated that Tajikistan's State Committee on National Security (formerly Ministry of Security) learned VIP protection operations from the Russians during the Soviet times. Like the Russians/Soviets, the Tajiks send security service personnel to identify every occupant of every building along a given presidential route and collect extensive data in hand-written logbooks. Traffic policemen from the Ministry of Interior line the streets at intersections, clear the streets of traffic moments before the motorcade departs, and then the presidential limousine and two chase cars speed down the center of the street with a Ministry of Interior lead and trail car. GAFAROV acknowledged that everyone knows when the president is traveling somewhere, which route, when, and what vehicles make up the motorcade. ¶4. (S/NF) When Secretary of State Baker first came to Tajikistan in the early 1990s, GAFAROV was assigned as the coordinator from the then Ministry of Security. He was especially impressed with the route analysis conducted by the advance agents, the makeup of the motorcade, and setup of the command post. In 2004, the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security trained some members of the Tajik Presidential Protection Service in Almaty, Kazakhstan in the American style of protection. GAFAROV says that while some aspects of this methodology are not realistic for the Tajiks because they lack the financial resources, he believes that taking lessons from multiple countries will better help professionalize the Tajik Presidential Protective Service. ¶5. (S/NF) GAFAROV also lamented that his service has little influence on President Rahmon when it comes to his personal protection. Often, he said, the President will decide to walk into crowds of people during trips to the villages or the Afghan Border and order his security personnel not to accompany him. GAFAROV wanted to obtain some videos or training material to help them better brief President Rahmon on the potential consequences of ignoring his personal safety. ¶6. (S/NF) When the Regional Security Officer began inquiring about VIP protection training and the numbers of personnel on shifts that would require training, GAFAROV indicated that each shift of close-in protection for the President contained ten agents from the State Committee on National Security. During the President's visit to the Embassy for its dedication in June 2006, the President had approximately ten to twelve close-in agents for protection. GAFAROV seemed very interested in learning about how Diplomatic Security conducted motorcade formations, route analysis, and how to deal with impromptu stops DUSHANBE 00001607 002 OF 002 outside of the scheduled itinerary. ¶7. (S/NF) GAFAROV also lamented, as he commonly does, the lack of clear guidance for other Ministries on their "proper role." Specifically, he stated that often the Ministry of Interior wants to take a more active role in the protection of the President, and there is not clear legislative authority to define such roles. Additionally, he mentioned that various Deputy Ministers or other high ranking officials vie to be in close proximity to the President, and because of their rank and Central Asian deference, it is difficult for security officers to turn them away. This came to a head at the recent Summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States where the twelve Presidents from the former Soviet Union met. GAFAROV said he is trying to teach his officers to think more critically about protection and not get too overwhelmed by someone with higher rank. ¶8. (S/NF) GAFAROV has previously invited the Regional Security Officer to work directly with the Presidential Protection Service and conduct joint training with Post's Protective Security Detail. However GAFAROV has yet to agree to schedule this training. The Regional Security Officer will renew our offer to conduct joint training. Comments ======== ¶9. (S/NF) GAFAROV personally travels in advance of the President, personally plans each advance, directs each post, and then checks up on the implementation of his orders. ¶10. (S/NF) During the August bridge opening event at Nizhniy Pyanj, the Regional Security Officer observed the lack of professionalism from all elements of the Presidential Protection Service, State Committee for National Security's Counterterrorism team (Alpha),and Ministry of Interior support elements. The advance elements were intelligence officers from the region who lacked fundamental understanding of physical and procedural security, event planning, or the concept of concentric rings of security. As soon as GAFAROV left and went to sleep, his teams abandoned their posts leaving nobody to guard areas that had been swept by canine teams. When GAFAROV came to the command post during the event itself, and while President Rahmon was on stage speaking, American military personnel noted that Tajik snipers from the Alpha unit were asleep with their boots pointed up, hat over their faces, and rifles pointing in the air. ¶11. (S/NF) GAFAROV is leaving on November 9 to go to Khatlon region to personally prepare for the advance for President Rahmon's trip there next week. It is unclear if GAFAROV is micro-managing the protection of President Rahmon to get face time with the president, because he doesn't trust his staff, understands his staff's lack of competence, or whether it is simply his style. ¶12. (S/NF) Throughout the meeting, GAFAROV was charming, professional, lucid, and friendly. This stands in stark contrast to his behavior during a meeting last week with the GRPO Chief. Post believes that the relationship with the Regional Security Office seems less threatening and more straightforward to the State Committee on National Security, and that GAFAROV is therefore not being directed by his leadership to perform theatrics. ¶13. (U) The point of contact for this and all security related matters at Post is Regional Security Officer Seth Green.JACOBSON