PUTTING THE BRAKES ON TAJIKISTAN'S BACKSLIDING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 001149 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/8/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EINV EAID KDEM TI SUBJECT: PUTTING THE BRAKES ON TAJIKISTAN'S BACKSLIDING REF: A) DUSHANBE 1030; B) DUSHANBE 1116; C) DUSHANBE 764; D) DUSHANBE 1130 CLASSIFIED BY: TJACOBSON, AMBASSADOR, STATE, STATE. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: By comparison to some of its neighbors in Central Asia, Tajikistan does not stand out as particularly authoritarian, corrupt or incompetent. Yet even in this context, where the bar has been lowered considerably in terms of good governance, the Tajik government's policies and recent performance point to disturbing tendencies, especially in key areas of U.S. interest: democratic institution building, economic reform, and even security. This cable details the new challenges over the past six months or so and suggests general talking points for engagement with Tajik officials. End summary. ¶2. (C) Our engagement with Tajikistan has focused on strengthening Tajikistan's sovereignty, prosperity and stability; developing a strong partnership to tackle regional issues such as narcotics and terrorism; and developing Tajikistan's potential as a cornerstone of Central-South Asian integration and reform. However, our aspirations for Tajikistan do not always coincide with the Tajik government's own priorities. The policies, laws and practices of President Emomali Rahmon's government -- especially since his re-election last November -- paint a striking picture of a government more interested in strengthening political and economic power than implementing much-needed changes in the economy and governance. In particular, the government is reducing the operating space for civil society and non-governmental organizations. That is the bad news. ¶3. (C) The good news is that Rahmon and his administration still maintain an "open door" policy and are willing to engage all interested bilateral and multilateral missions. On occasion, they are responsive to international and diplomatic pressure. Recently, we have successfully influenced the government in several areas -- for example, convincing them to move towards a power purchase agreement with Afghanistan, to eliminate excessive monitoring requirements on international organizations, to compensate an American firm which had suffered $30 million in losses from a state-owned enterprise, and to rescind an order expelling the expatriate workers of a faith-based non-governmental organization. �A; ¶4. (C) When we apply diplomatic heat, especially in concert with other embassies, we sometimes get results. Unfortunately these interventions are becoming more and more necessary. We need Washington's full support in delivering a clear, straightforward message that the operating climate here -- for non-governmental organizations, for businesses and for foreign missions -- is not conducive to increased cooperation or investment. CIVIL SOCIETY ¶5. (C) Non-governmental organizations face increasing problems with the most routine issues, like vehicle license plates, registration, and visas. More importantly, in May, Parliament passed a restrictive law on public associations that, among other things, requires all organizations to re-register with the Ministry of Justice (ref d). While we cannot yet judge how the new law will be implemented, this process will allow the Ministry of Justice -- or the security services -- to trip up those civil society organizations that have fallen out of favor or that they perceive as threatening. ¶6. (C) Rahmon's administration has not eased up on National Democratic Institute or Internews. National Democratic Institute remains unregistered, and Ministry of Justice officials refuse to meet with the new director to discuss registration -- because the organization is unregistered. Foreign Minister Zarifi promised Ambassador that National Democratic Institute director Harry Bader would receive monthly extensions of his visa while the organization's status remains unresolved, but in fact the Foreign Ministry threw up various roadblocks in an effort to prevent Bader from staying in Tajikistan. Internews director Chuck Rice, who previously received one-year multiple-entry visas, now can only receive month-by-month visa extensions. In a moment of candor, Ismatulloh Nasredinov, head of the Europe and the Americas DUSHANBE 00001149 002 OF 004 Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told Pol/Econ Chief that Rice might get a visa if Internews would abandon community radio stations and instead do something "useful, like training local print journalists." The ministry has repeatedly rejected the re-registration of Millennium Development Partners, which provides micro-loans (and receives credit from USAID),and Action Against Hunger, demonstrating that it is not only U.S. democracy organizations that are under fire. ¶7. (U) Talking Point: A positive, open environment for civil society development is not simply important for the United States or International Community: it is essential for Tajikistan's long-term stability and development. Tajikistan has nothing to fear from local or international non-governmental organizations promoting democratic reform and economic development. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ¶8. (C) In the last six months, we have observed increasing government pressure on both Muslims and Christians. The government closed several unregistered mosques in Dushanbe and may shut down more. Post knows of at least one Imam from an unregistered mosque interrogated by the State Committee for National Security and fined twice for praying with local parishioners outside of his closed mosque. The government threatened to arrest an American citizen Jehovah's Witness and his wife for proselytizing (which is not against Tajik law), seized several shipments of the group's literature, and detained and harassed local church members. The Ministry of Education banned wearing the hijab in classrooms, even though under Tajik law there is no such dress code. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs consular department summoned the director of a Christian NGO in March and announced that its expat members had ten days to leave the country, but offered him no further explanation. Only with heavy intervention from the embassy did the ministry drop its demands. ¶9. (SBU) Most observers here, including Europeans, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and local religious leaders, see a definite, overt attempt to expand governmental control over religion, especially since the elections. There seems to be a particular bias against religions that are seen as "foreign" and Islam that is not state-managed. Even official Imams complain in private about government moves to prevent young people from coming to mosques and the outright governmental ban on women in mosques. ¶10. (SBU) Most worrying is the proposed new law on religion which would require large numbers of adherents as a pre-requisite for registration, prevent foreigners from playing a leading role in religious groups, ban proselytizing, prohibit young people from participating in religious organizations, and ban "religious" political parties. Analysts have said the new law as drafted would technically prohibit the Catholic Church and many Protestant denominations, which have foreign leadership, and make life extremely difficult for the Islamic Renaissance Party and even Orthodox Christians, which might not be able to register given the stringent requirements. ¶11. (U) Talking Point: While we understand the desire to fight extremism, pressuring religious organizations is likely to backfire. Demolishing mosques and banning Christian groups simply serves to drive legitimate religious practice underground and create more extremists. MEDIA ¶12. (SBU) Tajikistan's already timid, self-censoring press has little space in which to express itself in either print or electronic media. Tajikistan's limited domestic television broadcasts very little news, even the pro-government biased sort. Instead viewers are stuck with endless low-budget broadcasts of Tajik concerts and dancing. It is no wonder that the predominant viewer choice is to watch Russian satellite broadcasts, which carry little local content. Internews' six community radio stations remain in limbo after two years of waiting for registration and licensing that will likely not come. The Foreign Minister and other officials have openly questioned the value of community radio, noting that people need electricity more than news. The Commission for Licensing and Broadcasting rarely grants licensing for media stations; recent stations that have received licensing are supported by those DUSHANBE 00001149 003 OF 004 well-connected with the president's inner circle. In July Parliament passed amendments to the criminal code expanding slander laws to apply to the internet. If signed by the president, the government could use the legislation to curtail free speech even further. ¶13. (U) Talking Point: Free media is key to democratic development and real political discourse. Supporting professional, independent media is a much more effective way of fighting erroneous information on the internet than simply outlawing it. BORDER SECURITY AND COUNTERNARCOTICS ¶14. (C) Once the centerpiece of our bilateral relationship with Tajikistan, our experience with counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism cooperation is now a mixed picture, combining positive developments with new challenges. ¶15. (C) Ministry of Interior relations have generally rebounded after a lengthy reorganization and new appointments of key staff. We expect to expand our cooperation with this ministry in fighting crimes (including trafficking),terrorism, and narcotics. ¶16. (C) The National Guard remains the highly disciplined, effective organization it has been since coming under the command of General-Major Rakhmonaliev. ¶17. (C) The Ministry of Defense, with its Minister in power for over a decade, has changed neither for better nor worse. The Minister welcomes material support but shuns efforts to reform or reorganize the army. Lately, he has begun to focus on improving the education of the officer corps, but sees that as best affected by means of capital improvements to the ministry's educational facilities. The Ministry of Defense continues to play three-card monty with missions and organizations, changing focus depending on what looks likely to excite donor interest. One positive area of cooperation is that the security forces remain willing to participate in U.S. sponsored training programs. ¶18. (C) The Drug Control Agency has slowed its interdiction activities due to an influx of new recruits and organizational changes that were needed and recommended during this year's start-up of mobile interdiction teams. The retirement of key personnel and resulting brain drain from operational and intelligence sections left several regional offices with inexperienced and not well trained officers in charge. Improving the Drug Control Agency's long range capacity and capabilities is a slow but forward moving process, and General Nazarov remains a capable director of this key U.S. partner for fighting narcotics. With the new permanent presence of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration at Embassy Dushanbe, we are pressing Nazarov to expand information sharing, move beyond mere drug seizures, and cooperate on criminal investigations and prosecutions of drug-trafficking organizations. This remains a work in progress. ¶19. (C) The State Committee for National Security's assumption of control over the Border Guards in December 2006 has been a real disappointment. New Border Guard Director, General Major Mirzoev, lacks experience and law enforcement background, characteristics we took for granted with his predecessor, General Zuhurov. Mirzoev's inexperience has slowly but surely diminished the organization's ability to deal with its primary mission. Lack of command and control, a clumsy logistics system, weak leadership, and less transparent relationships with donors have derailed many projects or delayed them to the point that many are a year behind in contracting or development. Perpetual staff reorganizations, terminations, and transfers have sped this decline. With the generally pro-Russian Chairman of the State Committee for National Security (still referred to with nostalgia as the KGB) directing such policy shifts, the Border Guards' future is certainly dimmer than it was a year ago. The few bright stars in the lower to mid-level ranks are afraid to step forward in the current environment under the watchful eye of the KGB. ¶20. (SBU) The Tajiks rescinded a previous commitment to allow joint training of Afghan border forces at facilities and in programs funded by the United States and the European Union. The formal rationale for the refusal was that the presence of DUSHANBE 00001149 004 OF 004 Afghan forces at Tajik establishments -- now under the management of the State Committee for National Security -- violates Tajik law and threatens national security. The donors have argued that joint training would improve border security integration and help attract additional donor funding, including from the OSCE; but the policy decision, couched in legal terms, appears to be based on the security services' deep mistrust of Afghans, whom they consider criminals and extremists. Even Foreign Minister Zarifi told Ambassador August 9 that the Chairman of the State Committee and his deputies are steeped in a "backward Soviet mentality" especially concerning cooperation with Afghanistan. He claimed President Rahmon told him "don't bother trying to convince them (the security services),they'll never change." (Note: Zarifi himself is a KGB veteran and knows the current players well.) While information sharing on counter-terrorism has declined somewhat, the committee is generally willing to participate in U.S. Embassy assistance programs in which we have provided training, equipment, and improvements at their main academy, and has been helpful in matters related to Embassy security. ¶21. (U) Talking Point: Expanding our cooperation with the Border Guards will require both better communication and more transparency. Tajikistan has an important role to play in regional border security, and needs to cooperate better with Afghanistan in order to be effective. ECONOMICS ¶22. (C) Even though it desperately wants foreign investment, the Tajik government has failed to fight corruption effectively, failed to enforce rule of law or sanctity of contracts, and perpetuated a system of nepotism and cronyism. The registration and licensing laws that trap international non-governmental organizations in layers of bureaucracy ensnare businesses as well, so that only the most intrepid consider investing in Tajikistan. The Tajik government wants more mega projects -- something its friends from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization have been willing to finance -- but it does not see that without a solid base of small and medium enterprise, the state-driven economy cannot bring true prosperity to Tajikistan. In one recent case (reftel),the government has directed a privately owned U.S. company to sell its product to a specific local middleman at below market prices. ¶23. (U) Talking Point: True economic development is dependent on a vibrant unfettered private sector. To attract foreign investment and to improve the climate for Tajikistan's own small and medium sized businesses, the government needs to reduce regulation, improve transparency, and stop interfering in private business decisions. WHAT TO DO? ¶24. (C) Tajik officials would rather talk about economics than politics, and on more than one occasion have suggested that democracy can only come after people have electricity and water. Unfortunately, current government policies are not leading towards more power, cleaner water or other markers of economic prosperity, just as they are not creating more space for civil society. We must continue to remind Rahmon and his advisors of the link between free societies and growing economies. ¶25. (C) Subtlety does not work in delivering this message to the Tajik government. We have been most effective when we have spoken clearly and directly, spelling out the consequences of a certain policy or procedure. Our challenge lies in finding the right tone, one that avoids glossing over the things Tajikistan does not want to address -- like democracy -- without table-pounding or bullying. We hope that the upcoming visits from Washington will carry a clear, simple message: We see backsliding that will hurt Tajikistan in the long run, and we remain a partner to help Tajikistan move forward. JACOBSON