C-NE6-02072 SHIA IN QATAR QUIET ON POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000137 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017 TAGS: PREL KISL IZ IR QA SUBJECT: C-NE6-02072 SHIA IN QATAR QUIET ON POLITICAL ISSUES, BOTHERED BY QARADAWI REF: A. 06 STATE 196410 ¶B. DOHA 78 Derived from: DSCG 05-1, B,D. ¶1. (C) Summary. Shia amount to 5% of Qatari citizenry. They are well-represented in the business sector and also hold some important government positions, though not the most senior. Their mosques are un-regulated, and Sunni and Shia frequently pray together. Shia would like more official oversight of their institutions to provide a framework for working out issues. Unlike other GCC states, Qatar does not have a "Shia Court." Shia religious topics are not an option in local schools. But like the rest of Qatari society, Shia are not particularly active politically. There are no Shia NGOs. They may choose their own marji' -- religious authority -- and many here look to Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The Qatari Shia population is roughly 10,000, or approximately five percent of the citizen population. (This report does not look at Iranian or other Shia non-citizen residents of the country.) Estimates range from two to 10 percent, with the latter figure frequently quoted by Sunnis. There are no published statistics on the religious makeup of the country, however. We believe the five percent figure is reasonably accurate because our source, an active member of the community, was the only one to provide both a raw number and the percentage figure. ¶3. (C) Qatari Shia are of both Arab and Persian origin. Many crossed the Gulf in the early part of the 20th century following trading opportunities. The case of Hussein al-Fardan, one of the country's most prominent businessmen and a leader within the local Shia community, is illustrative. He described how his father came to Qatar, where Hussein was born, in the 1940s, engaging in pearl trading. Hussein al-Fardan is the only member of his family in Qatar, while he as several siblings in the Emirates and Bahrain. He told Pol/Econ Chief in a meeting December 20, 2006 that he is Arab and has no family or other ties to Iran. ¶4. (C) Qatari Shia are well-represented in the business sector; a number, such as al-Fardan and Nasser Suleiman Haider, own large conglomerates. Haider told Pol/Econ Chief January 15 that many Shia are in business rather than government because they followed in their fathers' footsteps. Shia are also represented in the government, including in advisory positions in the Amiri Diwan and senior positions in the Ministry of Interior. There are Shia professors at Qatar University, but they do not hold senior administrative positions. Similarly in the Qatari military, Shia have not advanced to senior ranks. ¶5. (C) Qatari Shia claim to benefit from better respect and freedom relative to Shia in other Gulf states and Saudi Arabia. Qatari Shia are happy here, "compared to other GCC countries," Nasser al-Haider said. "You can't tell who is Sunni and who is Shia" in Qatar, al-Fardan claimed. He also said that there are cases of marriage between Sunni and Shia. ¶6. (C) Ibrahim Mohamed Abdulaziz, who is active in the Shia community, told Pol/Econ Chief February 5 that Qatar's constitution and particularly the Amir's own vision make no distinction between Sunni and Shia citizens. Discrimination can occur at lower levels, he said. It is accepted by others if a minister or other senior officials don't promote Shia to higher positions. Abdulaziz cited a confrontation when renewing his passport recently in which a Yemeni clerk questioned whether Shia should be provided the service, and an incident in which his sister, based on high school grades, was assigned a slot in the (Sunni) Islamic Law faculty at Qatar University. He complained and she was give a slot in another department. Dr. Abdelhameed al-Ansari, a liberal Sunni professor of religion, said in the same meeting that Arab governments have not taken measures to correct negative perceptions of Shia in society such as were taken in the United States by government and civil society to combat racism. ¶7. (C) More seriously, Abdulaziz said his eight-year old son complained that fellow students called him a "kaffir" (unbeliever) at school. "Am I a Muslim?" he questioned his father. Abdulaziz cited heightened tensions in society between Sunni and Shia as the cause. He also noted that all Qatari students are required to study Sunni Islamic tradition in school; the Shia school of thought is not an option. In the meeting with Abdulaziz, Mohamed Abdulla Taymour, a Vice Principal of a charter school and also a Shia, criticized Wahhabi "ideas" -- which are not accepted as a school of jurisprudence -- for propagating the view that Shia are not Muslims. DOHA 00000137 002.4 OF 002 ¶8. (C) Qatar has between six and 10 Shia mosques. Al-Fardan brought the leading Shia cleric, Sheikh Nasser Kazim Zohair, to Doha from Iraq a number of years ago. Traditionally, the government gave the Shia imams a free reign, not overseeing them as it does the Sunni imams. The Shia community also maintains hussainiyas for studying Shia history and theology and celebrating weddings. According to al-Fardan, the community is working with the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Endowment to establish a system of oversight. According to al-Fardan, regularizing the Shia religious establishments will provide an official mechanism for dealing with any issues or disputes. Other Shia agreed that more official oversight is needed; Shia community leaders sent a letter to the previous Amir (more than a decade ago) requesting the establishment of a Shia ministry of religious affairs. There was no answer to the letter, and this is the only known official demand by Qatari Shia. ¶9. (C) Some local Shia claimed that the Qatari government had recently established a Shia (or Jaafari) court for the Shia community. In fact, according to Abdulaziz, the Qatari government established an office within the court system which advises judges on Shia matters. He said Qatar is the only Gulf Cooperation Council country that does not have a separate Shia court. ¶10. (C) Haider, the businessman, explained that Shia choose their own "marji'" or religious authority after undertaking an individual study of the various marji' and their rulings. He said the marji' could be Lebanese (Fadlallah),Iraqi (Sistani),or Iranian (Khameini). Other Shia we spoke to confirmed that the marji' was an individual choice; Abdulaziz said that there were four or five marji' options. His view that many Shia looked to Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani was confirmed by others. However, contacts stressed that any perception that Qatari Shia are not loyal citizens is misplaced. ¶11. (C) Qatari society is small, and Qatari families know each other. Shia here have said that traditionally their families have been able to seek favors and resolve disputes directly with the Qatari Amir. As the economy grows and the society changes, this traditional approach is becoming more rare, and it is difficult to re-create the Amir's degree of fairness and tolerance in new institutions and within new decision-makers. Al-Fardan is particularly supportive of the Amir even after he dealt harshly with his son for stock-market related fraud in 2004. ¶12. (C) Qatari Shia do not have a human rights organization or other NGOs. This is not necessarily reflective of the community, for civil society in Qatar is limited and weak. Like Sunni Qataris, they believe that their political and economic situation is better than that of citizens of neighboring Gulf states and they do not appear to engage in any type of political dialogue with Shia from other states. ¶13. (C) Local Shia have been particularly critical of prominent Sunni cleric Yousef Qaradawi, who has been calling for an end to violence in Iraq since the destruction of Shia holy sites in February 2006 triggered revenge against Sunnis. More recently, Qaradawi provoked Shia anger at the Conference of Islamic Schools of Thought (ref B) calling upon them to cease violence in Iraq and by accusing them of trying to convert Sunnis. Abdulaziz, in the meeting February 5, said that Qaradawi's attitude toward Shia is widely reflected in society and the press, where issues that affect Sunnis receive more sympathetic coverage. Comment -------------- ¶14. (C) Qatar's Shia have reason to be pleased with their situation. An atmosphere of tolerance prevails, wherein Shia and Sunni regularly pray together in mosques near the workplace, for example. Suspicion by Qatari and other Arab residents toward their Shia co-religionists appears to be growing, however. Tensions have heightened for emotional reasons since Saddam's execution, but there seems to be no rational explanation for the anti-Shia feelings of the typical Sunni in Doha. Sunni-Shia hatred appears to be a symptom of Arab society's lack of movement toward more tolerance. Sunni clerics' symbiotic relationship with undemocratic states is perhaps one explanation. RATNEY