QATARI MFA AND CENTRAL BANK VIEWS ON IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 001071

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2017
TAGS: PREL MNUC KNNP PARM EFIN IR QA
SUBJECT: QATARI MFA AND CENTRAL BANK VIEWS ON IRAN

REF: A. STATE 148605

B. STATE 149648

C. STATE 151038

D. DOHA 1067

E. DOHA 1050

DOHA 00001071 001.3 OF 002


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael A. Ratney,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ahmad
Al-Mahmoud told Charge November 14 that Iran's acquisition of
weapons of mass destruction would be a "disaster" for Qatar,
the U.S. and the region. Qatar agreed that a peaceful and
diplomatic resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue was in the
common interest, and Al-Mahmoud said it was important that
any additional sanctions on Iran have the support of the UN
Security Council. He advised against additional unilateral
sanctions by the U.S. While Qatar believed U.S. policy on
Iran was clear enough, Al-Mahmoud observed that some in the
region worried that the U.S. might cut a deal with Iran, in
order to gain Iranian support for U.S. efforts in Iraq, that
would not be in the interests of the region. Al-Mahmoud
predicted that the December GCC Summit in Doha would address
the Iranian issue in the final communique; he also said the
GCC states were determined to negotiate a free-trade
agreement with Iran on a collective basis, which Iran had
sought to undermine by approaching various members
individually. Separately, the Deputy Central Bank Governor
outlined the efforts of financial regulators to monitor money
transfers to and from Qatar. End Summary.


2. (C) Charge, accompanied by P/E Chief, delivered ref A,B,
and C demarches November 14 to Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs Ahmad Al-Mahmoud and sought Qatar's views on how we
move forward in pursuit of a diplomatic resolution of the
Iranian nuclear issue. Charge stressed the importance of
holding the Government of Iran to account for its behavior by
making it pay a price for its support of terrorism and the
development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and noted
that the U.S. was working closely with the P-5 and EU.
Drawing on CENTCOM Commander Fallon's conversation on Iran
with the Amir in late October (ref D),he also emphasized
that the recent U.S. actions were consistent with UN Security
Council resolutions and were part of a U.S. effort to achieve
a diplomatic resolution and avoid military confrontation.

IRANIAN WMD: DISASTER FOR THE ENTIRE REGION
--------------

3. (C) Al-Mahmoud thanked Charge for the U.S. consultation
and noted that he had told Secretary Rice in their last
meeting (at the GCC 2 in Sharm el-Sheikh) that U.S.
consultation with the GCC states was important to achieving
our mutual objectives on Iran. Al-Mahmoud said Qatar was
concerned about the possibility of military confrontation
with Iran and stressed that it was not in the interest of the
U.S. or Qatar for Iran to acquire WMD. Such an acquisition,
he declared, "would be a disaster for us and the region."
Like the U.S., Qatar was looking for a diplomatic and
peaceful resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue. Al-Mahmoud
observed that for the any additional sanctions to be
effective, the GCC states would need to be on board with the
approach, as would Russia and China. The sanctions, he said,
would need to be "clear and implemented by all parties,"
which was why Qatar believed any tightening of the current
sanctions against Iran would have to be done by the UN
Security Council (of which Qatar is a member). He commented
that additional unilateral sanctions imposed by the U.S. that
were different from those imposed by the UN would allow Iran
to play one set of sanctions against the other.


4. (C) Turning to what he was hearing in the region,
Al-Mahmoud told Charge regional players were increasingly
worried that the U.S. would cut a deal with Iran as part of
U.S. efforts to improve the situation in Iraq. Al-Mahmoud
stressed that U.S. policy in this regard was clear enough to
Qatar, but that the U.S. should know that other countries in
the region are privately expressing this concern. Qatar,
underscored Al-Mahmoud, is against having nuclear weapons in
the region, a point he emphasized in his November 13 meetings
with GCC Foreign Ministers, who were in Doha to prepare for
the December GCC heads of state summit. Asked if the Iran's
nuclear dossier would be on the agenda of the summit,
Al-Mahmoud said it would be discussed and a reference to it
would "probably" appear in the final communique.


5. (C) Al-Mahmoud said we would have a better idea of
Iranian intentions once the IAEA reviewed Iranian documents
related to the Iranian nuclear program. Al-Mahmoud
emphasized again that it was not in the interest of the
region for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. Charge told
Al-Mahmoud that the U.S. was not interested in secret deals

DOHA 00001071 002.2 OF 002


with Iran. The U.S. very much wanted a public deal whose
conditions the Iranian government would fulfill. Al-Mahmoud
responded that the U.S. should be cautious in its dealing
with Iranian officials; the Iranian government did not speak
with one voice. Referencing again Admiral Fallon's
conversation (ref D),Charge made clear that the U.S.
recognized this, adding that assurances from individual
Iranian officials was far from what the U.S. had in mind.
Al-Mahmoud offered that Khameini, in his personal view, was
the ultimate decision maker on foreign policy issues.

GCC COMMON APPROACH ON TRADE WITH IRAN
--------------


6. (C) Al-Mahmoud noted that Iran separately approached
Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar about signing bilateral free-trade
agreements. This occurred after the GCC had opened
discussions with Iran on a common GCC-Iran agreement.
Al-Mahmoud said the GCC states had since decided to make
clear the need to pursue a joint arrangement and not
country-by-country agreements. He closed the meeting by
stressing again that Qatar's interests are aligned with those
of the United States in finding a diplomatic solution to the
Iranian pursuit of WMD. Al-Mahmoud noted that the U.S. was a
major source of investment in Qatar and that all of us seek
to avoid war. That said, what Iran would do in the region
after acquiring WMD remained a concern for Qatar and the GCC
states. Charge thanked Al-Mahmoud for Qatar's views and
agreed that no one would gain from military conflict with
Iran.

INCREASED SCRUTINY OF BANKING TRANSACTIONS
--------------


7. (C) Separately, Deputy Central Bank Governor Sheikh Fahad
Bin Faisal Al Thani told Charge and Econoff November 14 that
Qatar was closely monitoring banking transactions with Iran.
(Note: See ref E for more information on the GOQ's
implementation of UNSCRs 1737 and 1747). Sheikh Fahad
confirmed that Bank Saderat maintained a "small assets"
branch in Qatar that is used primarily for retail banking
services, such as transfers by Iranian workers and
businessmen. Sheikh Fahad expressed more concern about
potential Iranian use of Qatari banks as a conduit of money
to entities of concern than about the Bank Saderat branch
itself. He reported that the Qatari Financial Intelligence
Unit was watching for potential transfers from Bank Saderat
to other institutions as an attempt to avoid sanctions. The
Sheikh added that the Central Bank and Ministry of Finance
were also looking at business and real-estate licenses being
issued to Qataris who might have partnerships with Iranian
individuals or entities with the goal of preventing Iranians
from using Qatari entities as fronts to obtain licenses.
These actions, he said, were consistent with GOQ efforts to
gain better visibility on money transfers to and from Qatar.

RATNEY