QATARI MFA AND CENTRAL BANK VIEWS ON IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 001071 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2017 TAGS: PREL MNUC KNNP PARM EFIN IR QA SUBJECT: QATARI MFA AND CENTRAL BANK VIEWS ON IRAN REF: A. STATE 148605 ¶B. STATE 149648 ¶C. STATE 151038 ¶D. DOHA 1067 ¶E. DOHA 1050 DOHA 00001071 001.3 OF 002 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael A. Ratney, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ahmad Al-Mahmoud told Charge November 14 that Iran's acquisition of weapons of mass destruction would be a "disaster" for Qatar, the U.S. and the region. Qatar agreed that a peaceful and diplomatic resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue was in the common interest, and Al-Mahmoud said it was important that any additional sanctions on Iran have the support of the UN Security Council. He advised against additional unilateral sanctions by the U.S. While Qatar believed U.S. policy on Iran was clear enough, Al-Mahmoud observed that some in the region worried that the U.S. might cut a deal with Iran, in order to gain Iranian support for U.S. efforts in Iraq, that would not be in the interests of the region. Al-Mahmoud predicted that the December GCC Summit in Doha would address the Iranian issue in the final communique; he also said the GCC states were determined to negotiate a free-trade agreement with Iran on a collective basis, which Iran had sought to undermine by approaching various members individually. Separately, the Deputy Central Bank Governor outlined the efforts of financial regulators to monitor money transfers to and from Qatar. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Charge, accompanied by P/E Chief, delivered ref A,B, and C demarches November 14 to Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ahmad Al-Mahmoud and sought Qatar's views on how we move forward in pursuit of a diplomatic resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue. Charge stressed the importance of holding the Government of Iran to account for its behavior by making it pay a price for its support of terrorism and the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and noted that the U.S. was working closely with the P-5 and EU. Drawing on CENTCOM Commander Fallon's conversation on Iran with the Amir in late October (ref D),he also emphasized that the recent U.S. actions were consistent with UN Security Council resolutions and were part of a U.S. effort to achieve a diplomatic resolution and avoid military confrontation. IRANIAN WMD: DISASTER FOR THE ENTIRE REGION -------------- ¶3. (C) Al-Mahmoud thanked Charge for the U.S. consultation and noted that he had told Secretary Rice in their last meeting (at the GCC 2 in Sharm el-Sheikh) that U.S. consultation with the GCC states was important to achieving our mutual objectives on Iran. Al-Mahmoud said Qatar was concerned about the possibility of military confrontation with Iran and stressed that it was not in the interest of the U.S. or Qatar for Iran to acquire WMD. Such an acquisition, he declared, "would be a disaster for us and the region." Like the U.S., Qatar was looking for a diplomatic and peaceful resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue. Al-Mahmoud observed that for the any additional sanctions to be effective, the GCC states would need to be on board with the approach, as would Russia and China. The sanctions, he said, would need to be "clear and implemented by all parties," which was why Qatar believed any tightening of the current sanctions against Iran would have to be done by the UN Security Council (of which Qatar is a member). He commented that additional unilateral sanctions imposed by the U.S. that were different from those imposed by the UN would allow Iran to play one set of sanctions against the other. ¶4. (C) Turning to what he was hearing in the region, Al-Mahmoud told Charge regional players were increasingly worried that the U.S. would cut a deal with Iran as part of U.S. efforts to improve the situation in Iraq. Al-Mahmoud stressed that U.S. policy in this regard was clear enough to Qatar, but that the U.S. should know that other countries in the region are privately expressing this concern. Qatar, underscored Al-Mahmoud, is against having nuclear weapons in the region, a point he emphasized in his November 13 meetings with GCC Foreign Ministers, who were in Doha to prepare for the December GCC heads of state summit. Asked if the Iran's nuclear dossier would be on the agenda of the summit, Al-Mahmoud said it would be discussed and a reference to it would "probably" appear in the final communique. ¶5. (C) Al-Mahmoud said we would have a better idea of Iranian intentions once the IAEA reviewed Iranian documents related to the Iranian nuclear program. Al-Mahmoud emphasized again that it was not in the interest of the region for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. Charge told Al-Mahmoud that the U.S. was not interested in secret deals DOHA 00001071 002.2 OF 002 with Iran. The U.S. very much wanted a public deal whose conditions the Iranian government would fulfill. Al-Mahmoud responded that the U.S. should be cautious in its dealing with Iranian officials; the Iranian government did not speak with one voice. Referencing again Admiral Fallon's conversation (ref D),Charge made clear that the U.S. recognized this, adding that assurances from individual Iranian officials was far from what the U.S. had in mind. Al-Mahmoud offered that Khameini, in his personal view, was the ultimate decision maker on foreign policy issues. GCC COMMON APPROACH ON TRADE WITH IRAN -------------- ¶6. (C) Al-Mahmoud noted that Iran separately approached Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar about signing bilateral free-trade agreements. This occurred after the GCC had opened discussions with Iran on a common GCC-Iran agreement. Al-Mahmoud said the GCC states had since decided to make clear the need to pursue a joint arrangement and not country-by-country agreements. He closed the meeting by stressing again that Qatar's interests are aligned with those of the United States in finding a diplomatic solution to the Iranian pursuit of WMD. Al-Mahmoud noted that the U.S. was a major source of investment in Qatar and that all of us seek to avoid war. That said, what Iran would do in the region after acquiring WMD remained a concern for Qatar and the GCC states. Charge thanked Al-Mahmoud for Qatar's views and agreed that no one would gain from military conflict with Iran. INCREASED SCRUTINY OF BANKING TRANSACTIONS -------------- ¶7. (C) Separately, Deputy Central Bank Governor Sheikh Fahad Bin Faisal Al Thani told Charge and Econoff November 14 that Qatar was closely monitoring banking transactions with Iran. (Note: See ref E for more information on the GOQ's implementation of UNSCRs 1737 and 1747). Sheikh Fahad confirmed that Bank Saderat maintained a "small assets" branch in Qatar that is used primarily for retail banking services, such as transfers by Iranian workers and businessmen. Sheikh Fahad expressed more concern about potential Iranian use of Qatari banks as a conduit of money to entities of concern than about the Bank Saderat branch itself. He reported that the Qatari Financial Intelligence Unit was watching for potential transfers from Bank Saderat to other institutions as an attempt to avoid sanctions. The Sheikh added that the Central Bank and Ministry of Finance were also looking at business and real-estate licenses being issued to Qataris who might have partnerships with Iranian individuals or entities with the goal of preventing Iranians from using Qatari entities as fronts to obtain licenses. These actions, he said, were consistent with GOQ efforts to gain better visibility on money transfers to and from Qatar. RATNEY