PRIME MINISTER OFFERS "SINCERE ADVICE" ON IRAQ

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 001042 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS IZ QA SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER OFFERS "SINCERE ADVICE" ON IRAQ Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael A. Ratney, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: Ambassador Crocker briefed Qatar's Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani (HBJ) October 31 on the progress in Iraq and asked his assessment of building on this progress with the help of Arab states. HBJ said Qatar was a friend of the U.S. and wanted us to succeed in Iraq and elsewhere. He agreed with Ambassador Crocker that the Arabs need to collaborate with the U.S. on finding a solution that gives Iraq and the region security. He proposed collaboration on a "road map" for Iraq with this aim as well as eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces. HBJ voiced Qatar's frustration at finding itself on the outside of U.S.-led initiatives in the region and emphasized that Qatar wants to help. He stressed the importance of wresting Syria away from the Iranian camp and argued that the Syrians were pragmatic merchants who could be swayed with the right deal, such as discussion of peace negotiations that would include Syria on the issue of the Golan Heights. HBJ believed Syria's attachment to Iran resulted from a sense of isolation and belief that it was a target of regime change. Ambassador Crocker said U.S. policy was not regime change, but policy change, in Syria and Iran. He encouraged HBJ, as he had other Arab leaders on his regional tour, to visit Baghdad. He suggested that the December 3 GCC Summit in Doha would be a good opportunity for the Gulf states to have a strategic discussion regarding the organization's future, and in particular, its future relations with Iraq. End Summary. ¶2. (S) U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker, accompanied by David Pearce and Ali Khedery of Embassy Baghdad, and Charge and P/E Chief, briefed Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Hamid bin Jasim Al Thani (HBJ) October 31 on the evolving situation in Iraq and sought HBJ's assessment of how best to build on the momentum of an improving situation in Iraq for the benefit of the entire region. Noting that seven months had passed since the U.S. introduced additional troops into Iraq, Crocker reported that the "surge" saw its first success in Anbar and that success moved east quickly. Ambassador Crocker described the shift in attitude, especially among the Sunni, as striking. The surge, as well as Iranian overreach and a Shi'a backlash against Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) extremist 
violence, had also prompted Moqtada Al-Sadr to suspend his JAM militia's activities. Crocker underscored that these successes did not mean that we had turned the corner in Iraq and everything was fine. It did mean there had been some positive developments and that there were now possibilities that we did not have six months ago, possibilities that the countries in the region should take seriously. PROGRESS BEING MADE IN IRAQ -------------- ¶3. (S) Crocker observed that Sunni and Shi'a leadership contacts had increased; the sheikhs of Qarbala and Anbar were holding meetings, and the central government was beginning to take advantage of this momentum. The level of violence in Baghdad was sharply down. Sunni youth in the capital were joining the security forces; both young Sunni and Shi'a were doing so in mixed neighborhoods of Baghdad. Even though violence was down, many challenges remained. Sectarianism was still an issue, as was corruption. The Iranians were present and active in Iraq and had an ambassador posted in Baghdad, in stark contrast to the Arab states, which had none. Crocker expressed his hope that Qatar and other Arab states would take another look at establishing a diplomatic presence, which would reassure the Sunni and also the Shi'a. The Shi'a fear that neighboring states want to overthrow the existing order and re-establish a Sunni ascendancy, he added. Crocker encouraged Qatar to be active in addressing this issue, as it has been in other areas. Noting that the GCC was originally established as a counterweight to both Iraq and Iran, Crocker observed that the GCC Summit scheduled to take place in Doha in December was a good place to start addressing these issues, which were important to the entire region. It could also be an opportunity for the GCC leaders to have a strategic discussion on the future of the organization as it relates to regional security, and in particular their future relationship with Iraq. HBJ CALLS FOR COLLABORATION ON ROAD MAP FOR IRAQ -------------- --- ¶4. (S) HBJ thanked Ambassador Crocker for his assessment and pledged a candid response. HBJ began by stressing that Qatar cared about its relationship with the U.S. and wanted the U.S. to be successful in Iraq and elsewhere. He said the Arab states used the security situation in Iraq as an excuse for not establishing a diplomatic presence. But the real reason, he said, was unhappiness among Sunni Arab governments of the region with the treatment of Sunnis in Iraq's DOHA 00001042 002.4 OF 003 Shi'a-centered political institutions. On Iran, HBJ said it "tries to make problems with you and us -- but in a clever way." All of the GCC states, HBJ said, had problems with Iran. He observed that Iran, besides in Iraq, was making problems in Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain, and Kuwait. And Afghanistan, Crocker put in. It was essential, said HBJ, that the Arab states increase their involvement in Iraq. But Arab politicians were all reluctant to be the first to establish a diplomatic presence, because each wanted "the other to burn his hand." At the same time, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and others wanted to lead. On the danger posed by insurgents in Iraq, HBJ observed that Qatar had jailed 15 Qataris transiting Syria in order to engage in jihad in Iraq. ¶5. (S) HBJ said an understanding between the Americans and Arabs was sorely needed on Iraq. He suggested convening a conference with an agenda (not a ceremony) that would work with the Iraqis to create a "road map" toward eventual U.S. troop withdrawal but tied to a concrete pathway toward achieving a sustainable security environment in Iraq. Such a road map would take into account regional interests. It could also constrain Syria's behavior in Iraq, because it would be difficult for Syria to oppose the interests of all its Arab neighbors if there were such a joint effort to move forward. That said, HBJ noted there would be a lot of opposition, so discussion should start at lower levels and move up to higher levels as consensus was forged. The stated goal had to be to help the Iraqis, and HBJ urged the U.S. to make the solicitation of Arab views an integral part of achieving that goal. HBJ: NEED TO PUSH SYRIA AWAY FROM IRAN -------------- ¶6. (S) HBJ encouraged the U.S. to talk to Syria with the goal of reorienting Syrian interests away from Iran. The Syrians, he observed, are traders who know how to strike a bargain. Regional issues, such as acknowledging the importance to Syria of the return of the Golan Heights, had to be pursued as part of stabilizing Iraq. Syria was turning to Iran for support because it felt isolated in the region. That equation, he said, had to change. It was important to take Iraq and Syria out of Iranian hands. As for the Russians, HBJ said Putin, whom he had met a few weeks ago, "had his problems with the U.S. and teases the Americans" with Iran. This was a Russian tactic, not a strategy, he observed. HBJ concluded that if "America and her friends know what each other wants, we can succeed." No matter our differences, emphasized HBJ, "America's problems are Qatar's problems. If you are defeated, we are defeated." QATAR WANTS TO HELP ITS AMERICAN STRATEGIC PARTNER -------------- -------------- ¶7. (S) Working with other countries in the region, observed HBJ, had led the U.S. to "zero results." HBJ said he had told Secretary Rice in December 2006 that the Arab Quartet strategy would not last past summer 2007. Rather than grow angry at Qatar's exclusion from secret regional meetings, HBJ said Qatar "decided not to run after the U.S., but to relax, feeling we had given you sincere advice." HBJ continued, "I like and care about the U.S. You need to ask yourselves what practical results your other Arab friends have given you." As an example of Qatar's ideas being rejected, HBJ noted that he had discussed with former CENTCOM Commander General Anthony Zinni before the invasion of Iraq the idea of Qatar supplying troops (which HBJ acknowledged would have been small in number given that Qatar is a small state) with the goal of Arab forces securing the cities in Iraq. Had that happened, posited HBJ, the use of the word "invasion" among Arabs to describe U.S. actions in Iraq would have died. Yet, this idea "was killed because some friends of the U.S. did not want Qatar involved." HBJ stressed again that Qatar could help change the thinking of some Arab countries on Iraq and that Arab states had to be involved in finding a solution. ¶8. (S) Ambassador Crocker responded that success or failure in Iraq was not about the United States. "Iraq must succeed so that we all succeed," he stated. "It is in our common interest." Ambassador Crocker recalled the bold decision HBJ and the GOQ took to allow U.S. military forces to use Al-Udeid Air Base. Crocker said the use of that facility was "invaluable" to us, and the U.S. was deeply grateful. Crocker added that the Qatari contribution in this regard was solidly concrete and by no means pretty words. HBJ responded that the bilateral military relationship was good, but not the political. He said again that Qatar did not want to push more until the U.S. realizes that Qatar is a friend. HBJ added, "I started this relationship in 1991-92," and it is very much strategic. DOHA 00001042 003.2 OF 003 COMMON PROBLEMS REQUIRE COMMON SOLUTIONS -------------- ¶9. (S) Returning to the discussion on Syria, where he had served as ambassador from 1998-2001 when mobs twice attacked the U.S. Embassy, Crocker picked up on HBJ's point about the need to separate Syria from Iran and persuade Damascus that its interests lie in the Arab world. Referencing Hama, a city that where former President Hafez Al-Assad had conducted a bloody crackdown on Islamist extremists, Crocker noted that Syria should understand the threat that foreign fighters pose to its own interests. HBJ agreed, commenting that Syria was standing with Iran because it was worried by threats posed by Israel, the U.S., and some elements of the Arab world. HBJ said he had been helping the French establish a channel with the Syrians, and there was some progress. He had also helped arrange meetings for the British. "If Syria understands we are not after their regime, it can help -- especially in Lebanon," observed HBJ. With regard to Lebanon, HBJ noted that Syria was worried that the (Hariri) tribunal is targeting its leaders. He said the Syrians must be persuaded that the only way to succeed in calming Lebanon was through elections, not violence. Crocker told HBJ that U.S. policy is not regime change, but policy change, whether in Syria or Iran. HBJ responded that many Syrians worry that if the current Syrian regime falls, the Islamists would take power. ¶10. (S) Crocker thanked HBJ for his candor and noted the need to continue the consultations. He said Iraq, Syria, and Iran were three of the common problems their discussions had defined and that Qatar and the U.S. had substantial other common issues of interest to address as well. While Qatar and the U.S. may differ from time to time on tactics, "our strategic views are close," said Crocker. HBJ said he would continue to give U.S. officials his sincere advice. In closing, Crocker observed that one concrete contribution that Qatar could make would be a visit to Baghdad by HBJ. Not only the Sunni and Shi'a communities, but also the Kurds, all Iraqis, would be delighted by the gesture. HBJ responded, "We shall see." ¶11. (U) Ambassador Crocker has cleared this message. RATNEY