EAST TIMOR: OBSTACLES TO ACCOUNTABILITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000008 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MTS USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW PACOM FOR JOC AND POLAD SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/12/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KJUS ID UN TT SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: OBSTACLES TO ACCOUNTABILITY DILI 00000008 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: W. Gary Gray, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Dili, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary. While there are indications that East Timor's Prosecutor-General genuinely desires to pursue justice for crimes related to the April-May 2006 events, he is said to be under strong pressure from the political elite not to do so, and to fear for his personal safety. He is therefore anxious to pass responsibility on to international personnel for the investigations and prosecutions recommended by the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) report. A respected Norwegian former Deputy Prosecutor-General here is having second thoughts about returning to the position, given concerns that she will be undermined by the Government. Serious obstacles to accountability originate as far back as killings related to the 1975 civil war, and some see a link between the continuing impunity in regard to the 1999 events and the country's inability to deal with more recent violations of law. The legacy of lawlessness from the Indonesian occupation, the general lack of appreciation of the role of rule of law and accountability among the ruling elite, a perception of F-FDTL impunity, and the weakness and vulnerability to intimidation of the country's nascent legal system all suggest that there will be little impetus from the Timorese side to implement the recommendations of the COI. Many ordinary Timorese and political activists nevertheless continue to press for justice in regard to 1999 and 2006 crimes and virtually everyone wants to see an end to the relative impunity enjoyed by gangs whose violence perpetuates a climate of fear in Dili. Underlying all this, however, is a vicious circle of impunity and fear plaguing all levels of society and concerns that political actors threatened with prosecution are capable of provoking organized violence in retaliation. While the international judges and prosecutors who currently dominate the judicial system here could push through investigations and prosecutions over the objections of the ruling political and security force elite, the UN and international community will have to be prepared to deal with the kind of situation seen on January 12, when about 100 F-FDTL, some armed, appeared at the Dili district courthouse during a preliminary hearing for F-FDTL suspects in the May 25, 2006 shooting of PNTL officers. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Charge met on January 11 with Siri Frigaard, a Norwegian prosecutor who was Deputy Prosecutor General and Chief of the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) here during the UNTAET period. She is considering an offer to return in that position, whose current job description involves investigation and prosecution of crimes related to the April-May events, but does not pertain to the revived SCU or the 1999 crimes. Frigaard's main concern was that the GOET would not be supportive of her efforts, viewing her only as a "scapegoat" to deflect attention and responsibility away from the Timorese actors in the process. Frigaard has maintained a close and amicable relationship with Timorese Prosecutor-General Longuinhos Monteiro, and unlike some other observers here, she believes that Monteiro has a sincere desire to pursue justice for the April-May 2006 cases. She said Monteiro was under extreme pressure from the ruling Fretilin elite, however, and was "very afraid" for his own safety. Monteiro was therefore anxious to have responsibility for the COI-recommended investigations and prosecutions diverted to international personnel. ¶3. (C) While her prospective position would not address the 1999 crimes, Frigaard sees the lack of real accountability for these crimes as reinforcing the continuing overall atmosphere of impunity here. She was skeptical regarding the revived SCU, maintaining that it would only be capable of carrying out investigations and submitting the results to Monteiro's office, which would merely add to the backlog of cases there. She said the renewed SCU seemed to lack any apparatus for carrying out its logistical needs, such as the procurement of warrants. She maintained that her discussions with the current UNMIT leadership regarding the SCU had not dispelled her impression that the unit had been re-established in response to international pressure, but that the UN itself lacked the will to wholeheartedly support the enterprise. She was under no illusions regarding the GOET attitude toward the SCU, recalling that in mid-2005 former Prime Minister Alkatiri had bluntly responded "no" when she asked if he supported its continuation DILI 00000008 002.2 OF 003 and that current PM Ramos-Horta had told her he held her in high regard but did not support her objectives. She added that President Gusmao, despite his public statements on the need for reconciliation with Indonesia to take precedence over justice, had indicated to her privately that he genuinely wanted to see accountability for the 1999 crimes but for political reasons could not say this publicly. ¶4. (C) Frigaard expressed serious concern about the terms of reference for the Indonesia-East Timor Truth and Friendship Commission (TFC) which give the TFC access to SCU case files. She characterized this as a betrayal of the absolute assurances of confidentiality SCU had given victims and witnesses during previous investigations. (Note: Our recent conversations with the Timorese TFC commissioners suggest that the TFC, though recently renewed for another year, is largely moribund and unlikely to make any real inroads into files here, or in Indonesia.) ¶5. (C) Frigaard said her many discussions with Timorese on these issues had convinced her that the 1999 events could not be addressed in isolation from what had occurred in previous years, stretching as far back as the brief but bloody 1975 civil war. While she agreed that in most cases achieving actual convictions of perpetrators, especially those currently residing across the border in Indonesia, was an unrealistic expectation, she argued that it was nevertheless important to continue with investigations and indictments so that the truth would be known, which in itself would satisfy many of the Timorese victims. ¶6. (C) There are serious obstacles here to the kind of accountability Frigaard advocates. Few in the political elite wish to revisit to killings related to the 1975 civil war. This was evident during the CAVR hearings, when the relevant political actors were careful not to delve into these issues in any substantive manner. In addition to the political motivations behind the reluctance to confront the crimes of the 1975-1999 era, longstanding cultural and systemic factors severely complicate efforts to address impunity. Among the political class in general there is little understanding or appreciation of the value of rule of law and the need for accountability. The legacy of lawlessness originates not only from the Indonesian occupation but also from the experience of the returning exiles in places like Mozambique and the mindsets of the former resistance fighters, who, as F-FDTL commander Taur Matan Ruak has graphically described to us, tended to resolve their internal differences via armed confrontations. There is also a strong tendency, promoted especially by the President, to see "reconciliation" rather than discipline and accountability as the way to address incidents such as armed clashes between F-FDTL and police. ¶7. (C) Despite the COI findings and recommendations, the GOET has rushed to "normalize" the F-FDTL and declare it cleared of any wrongdoing in the April-May events. The flip side of the increasing glorification of the role of the armed resistance in the struggle for independence seems to be a perception, shared by both the F-FDTL itself and the ruling political elite, that the defense forces are above the law. Political leaders also are likely see any attempt to confront F-FDTL on accountability issues as too dangerous. The virtually complete failure to punish any F-FDTL personnel for many incidents of abusive and criminal behavior over the past several years has strongly reinforced this image of impunity. This also applies to some extent to the National Police (PNTL). Unlike the F-FDTL the PNTL has internal disciplinary systems. However, the weakness of these systems combined with political manipulation and the juciciary's reluctance to hold police accountable has contributed to sense of impunity within that institution as well. ¶8. (C) All of the above, along with the country's weak legal system and the vulnerability of its Timorese judges and prosecutors to political pressure and personal threats, strongly suggest that there will be little impetus from the Timorese side to implement the recommendations of the COI. Many ordinary Timorese and political activists nevertheless continue to press DILI 00000008 003.2 OF 003 for justice in regard to the 1999 and 2006 crimes and virtually everyone wants to see an end to the relative impunity enjoyed by violent gangs whose activities perpetuate a climate of fear in Dili. A judge in the ongoing trial of former Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato opened the second day's proceedings by giving strong assurances to the witnesses that they and their families would be provided protection by UNPOL. This highlighted one of the most serious obstacles to rule of law here -- the vicious circle of impunity and fear plaguing all levels of society. Even in regard to more ordinary criminal cases, it is extremely difficult to convince people to testify and put themselves at risk of violent retributions from which they feel they have no protection. On a more macro level, there is concern that higher level political actors threatened with prosecution can mobilize more organized violence and further undermine the overall stability of the country as a whole. ¶9. (C) If Frigaard does accept the Deputy Prosecutor position, as many of us here are urging her to do, she will need strong, consistent backing from the international community, including interventions with the GOET and possibly UNMIT as well to head off any attempts to undermine her efforts. It is likely that similar diplomatic efforts will be required to ensure that the revived SCU operation does not sink into irrelevance. The international judges and prosecutors who currently dominate the judicial system here could push through investigations and prosecutions relating to last year's April-May events over the objections of the ruling political and security force elite. In this case, however, the UN and other international entities here may have to be prepared to deal with the kind of situation seen on January 12, when about 100 F-FDTL, some armed, were circulating inside and in the vicinity of the Dili district courthouse during a pre-indictment hearing for F-FDTL suspects in the May 25, 2006 shooting of PNTL officers. GRAY