REINADO'S LAST STAND: REBEL LEADER SURROUNDED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000070 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/MTS USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/27/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL MAAR KPKO UN AU TT SUBJECT: REINADO'S LAST STAND: REBEL LEADER SURROUNDED REF: 2006 DILI 597 DILI 00000070 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Stanley Harsha, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Dili, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: As of 9 p.m. local time February 27, a large contingent of the mainly Australian International Security Forces (ISF) in a western East Timor town had cordoned off escape routes for dissident F-FDTL Major Alfredo Reinado and his group, who on February 25 seized 15-25 assault rifles from three Border Patrol Unit (BPU) posts. Barracaded in with Reindado were petitioner spokesman Lt. Gustao Salsinha and opposition politician Leandro Isaak. Reinado's February 25 actions have produced an immediate and unified consensus by both national and international authorities, including President Xanana Gusmao, that he has crossed a line and that the International Security Forces (ISF) should affect his surrender or capture as soon as possible. An unknown number of "petitioners," the group of soldiers fired from the military in March 2006 after they complained of discrimination, are also in the area. ISF forces reportedly are tightening the cordon in hope that Reinado will surrender, but failing that are determined to arrest him, according to the Australian ambassador to East Timor. However, the Australian Embassy is also apparently seeking written authorization from the President and Prime Minister before taking decisive action with the objective of persuading Reinado to surrender in light of public proof that the ISF has official authority to act forcefully. Regardless of the outcome of the current standoff, there will be several questions and risk factors to consider. His popular support in the West could produce a backlash in response to action against him, especially in the context of perceptions of double standards in holding key actors in the recent crisis accountable. In addition, he has become increasingly close to the military "petitioners" group and it is not clear how they will respond to current developments. End summary. ¶2. (C) On Sunday February 25, dissident F-FDTL (East Timor's defense force) Major Alfredo Reinado and eight or nine of his men descended upon the BPU outposts of Tonobibi, Mota Masin, and Salele Suai in three vehicles, and acquired between 15 to 25 HK-33 assault rifles and some ammunition. Based on various sources, it appears that between 13 to 16 rifles were acquired in Tonobibi, three in Mota Masin, and five more from Salele Suai. All reporting from those areas indicates that these acquisitions were not the result of attacks, but rather that there was at least some collaboration between Reinado's group and the BPU, and that mutual coordination may have actually preceded Reinado's arrival at two of the locations. According to one report, the commander at Tonobibi did challenge Reinado initially, but capitulated after succumbing to rhetoric about how "we are all Westerners and must work together." Additionally, sources told us that BPU officers Marciano Andrade and Acacio de Araujo from Mota Masin, and Joao Martinho from Tonobibi joined Reinado following the handover of weapons. However there are conflicting reports as to whether or not this actually occurred as other sources report that the three simply accompanied him to facilitate the movement of the weapons and then returned to post. ¶3. (C) Reinado's actions have produced an immediate and unified consensus by both national and international authorities that he has crossed a line, that all dialogue options are now off the table, and that (ISF) should achieve his surrender or capture as soon as possible. Perhaps most damning for Reinado, President Xanana Gusmao who has been sympathetic to his stance, went on television the night of February 26 to proclaim that what Reinado had done was "stupid", and that he had given the ISF authorization to launch an operation against him. Prime Minister Jose Ramos-Horta contacted President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono on the day of the weapons seizure and requested that the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) be used to secure Jakarta's side of the border. Ramos-Horta's presidential campaign manager today relayed to Emboff that they had been intending to reach out to Reinado to ask for his support of the Ramos-Horta candidacy but that this was now out of the question. Special DILI 00000070 002.2 OF 003 Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Atul Khare, in a meeting with Charge d'Affaires, stated unequivocally that negotiations were now off the table. Khare added that he was previously intent on pursuing a course of action that would give Reinado every possible chance to surrender himself peacefully and that, in fact, Reinado had recently indicated that was ready to surrender. ¶4. (C) Former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri in a meeting today with CDA remarked that Reinado should have been captured immediately following his prison break last year, instead of being given time to organize and build support. (Alkatiri and his ruling Fretilin party have repeatedly alleged that Reinado was part of a larger conspiracy involving opposition parties to unseat him and undermine Fretilin's governance.) However, he expressed satisfaction with the current leadership consensus to take military action to capture Reinado, identifying the ISF as the appropriate force to do so. ¶5. (C) Following a great deal of collective speculation as to Reinado's whereabouts, we received accurate reporting that he would be holding a press conference in Same at 10 a.m. February ¶27. About two hours after the press conference was scheduled to begin, we began receiving eyewitness reports of an ISF cordon of Same, where no one - journalists included - were being allowed to leave or enter the town, that Reinado was trapped inside, and that his whereabouts had been confirmed. One member of his group was reportedly captured with weapons this afternoon. At the close of the day as night fell, it appeared that no further action would be taken overnight except to ensure that Reinado is unable to escape. It is not known whether he is armed at this time, how many of his men are with him, or what his intentions are. An unknown number of the "petitioners" group is also in Same. In a conversation this afternoon with Embassy staff, the petitioners' spokesperson Lt. Gastao Salsinha confirmed that he is currently with Reinado. Deputy SRSG Finn Reske-Nielson confirmed at 8 p.m. February 27 that ISF was tightening the noose around Reinado and had spotted 10-15 unarmed petitioners walking around town intoxicated, but that decisive action would likely not happen until the next day. ¶6. (C) Late this afternoon the Australian Ambassador relayed to us that the ISF is seeking to obtain a letter signed by both Gusmao and Ramos-Horta to give them unambiguous authorization to "take specific action" against Reinado, and that the two men were to meet late today for this purpose. With this authorization, it is expected that the ISF will initiate operations that should culminate in either Reinado's capture, or perhaps his death, should he choose not to surrender. Earlier today, in speaking with media sources Reinado stated that he would not surrender and that he would in fact fight to the death. In a possible indication of increasing desperation, Reinado attempted to reach the CDA by conveying his current number and a request for a call via opposition Member of Parliament Quiteria da Costa. No call was made to Reinado and the information was passed to SRSG Khare and the Australian Ambassador. The Ambassador said this information was useful in determining how desperate Reinado was in grasping for straws. ¶7. (C) With the current leadership consensus on the need for action, it is possible that the risk of a pro-Reinado backlash may be somewhat mitigated but it is by no means eliminated. Although there are reports that some Catholic Church leaders in the western districts have dropped their support, he has built up widespread sympathy and varying degrees of support throughout the western districts (see Reftel). Underscoring this support is the fact that there has been no evident movement by Timorese authorities to begin formal legal proceedings against a number of prominent individuals, with the exception of former Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato, who were recommended for prosecution by the United Nation's Commission of Inquiry (COI) for their roles in the events of April and May 2006. Besides Reinado, other individuals named in the COI's report include ex-Defense Minister Roque Rodrigues, Defense Force Chief Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak, and several others. Nearly all of them are still holding the same position they occupied during the period last year when several possible human rights violations occurred. The recent archiving of the criminal case against DILI 00000070 003.2 OF 003 ex-Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, along with these other factors, probably contributed to Reinado and his supporters an even greater sense of injustice in light of the possible fate which may soon await him. ¶8. (C) Additionally, there appears to have been almost nothing achieved by the Commission of Notables appointed by the GOET to look into the circumstances surrounding the military "petitioner" episode, the trigger for the period of crisis which began last April. The petitioners also have much sympathy throughout the West and, unlike Reinado, are regarded as having conducted themselves maturely and non-violently throughout the crisis (although some individuals or small sub groups have been accused of involvement in violent incidents). The fact that the petitioners appear to have now thrown in their lot with Reinado may also have a significant influence on the response to action against Reinado. Reinado's closeness to the military petitioners is also a key to his overall tactical capability, and perhaps more significantly, his ability to project himself as a threat. While there are still many unanswered questions with regards to the actual number of arms the petitioners possess, this ambiguity plays to one of Reinado's strengths of being able to project a threat while not actually having requisite capability. HARSHA