REBEL REINADO HANGS TOUGH IN TIMOR-LESTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000370 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MTS PACOM FOR POLADS -- AMB CHRISTY E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2017 TAGS: PGOV ASEC TT SUBJECT: REBEL REINADO HANGS TOUGH IN TIMOR-LESTE DILI 00000370 001.2 OF 004 CLASSIFIED BY: Henry M. Rector, Charge d'affaires a.i., U.S. Embassy Dili, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C/NF) Summary. During November, Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao suffered setbacks in his efforts to rein in fugitive rebel Major Alfredo Reinado and his supporters - a group consisting primarily of several hundred "petitioners" dismissed from the Armed Forces of Timor-Leste (F-FDTL) in 2006. Gusmao had attempted to split Reinado from the petitioners by treating their grievances as two separate matters, saying that while he was prepared to negotiate a solution to the petitioners' demands, Major Alfredo must be brought to justice for acts committed during last year's April-May crisis. This two-track approach has failed so far. The petitioners boycotted a meeting with Xanana Gusmao's envoys on November 15-16, and instead stood loyally behind Reinado, holding military-style parades on November 9, 16, and 22. Bolstered by this display of unity, Reinado is now demanding that the GOTL resolve the conflict on his terms by the end of this year, or he will "march on Dili." He is apparently styling himself and his supporters as a western-based military command which he hopes could be integrated into the F-FDTL. To compound the disarray, President Jose Ramos-Horta and a Portuguese judge of the Dili District court are at public loggerheads over the status of an arrest warrant for Reinado. Additionally, the opposition FRETILIN party, which regards Reinado and the petitioners as partly responsible for former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri's fall in June 2006, appears covertly eager to use these developments to make political headway against Xanana Gusmao. But given the presence of the International Stabilization Force (ISF) and UN Police Mission (UNPOL) in Timor-Leste, Reinado poses no serious threat to national security. Further, both senior GOTL officials and the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General report that the dialogue with Reinado and the petitioners continues and express confidence that a peaceful resolution will occur. End summary. Unfinished Business For Xanana Gusmao -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In early November, Major Alfredo Reinado, a fugitive from justice since walking out of prison in August 2006, and his chief lieutenant Gastao Salsinha were moving freely in Timor-Leste's western districts, airing their demands to the government of Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao in both the domestic and foreign media. Reinado was refusing to be tried by the Portuguese judges who currently dominate Timor-Leste's judiciary, and was demanding that his followers - several hundred ex-military "petitioners" whose dismissal in April 2006 precipitated civil unrest and a major political crisis - be reintegrated into the Armed Forces of Timor-Leste (F-FDTL). Reinado and his men enjoy considerable popular support both in Dili and in the western districts, and present a continuing potential threat to the stability of the country. Xanana Gusmao has repeatedly said that resolving the issues around the petitioners and Reinado are two of his three highest priorities (the internally displaced persons - IDPs - being the third). ¶3. (SBU) President Jose Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao have pursued an approach that addresses the conflict as two separate issues. They are seeking a negotiated solution with the petitioners, although they reject demands to re-integrate them into the F-FDTL. With regard to Reinado himself, however, Ramos-Horta and Xanana Gusmao insist that he face justice for his actions during the 2006 crisis, as well as for seizing weapons from an F-FDTL border patrol unit in February. (This is also somewhat negotiable; Ramos-Horta has requested that the U.N. Police Mission and International Stabilization Force not act on a November 9 warrant issued by a Dili District Court judge for Reinado's arrest.) To assist in these efforts, the GOTL has hired a Swiss NGO, the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, to act as an intermediary. Dialogue Fizzles, Renegades Parade -------------- ¶4. (C/NF) On November 9, Reinado rallied his men for a show of support in Gleno, staging a parade at the main sports field. DILI 00000370 002.2 OF 004 Sources with both the petitioners and F-FDTL stated that Reinado had more than 700 participants at the event. It was unclear to what extent this group was a mix of petitioners from last year and new recruits. Observers from both UN Police Mission (UNPOL) and the International Stabilization Force (ISF) watched from the periphery of the field, making no attempt to apprehend either Reinado or members of his core group. F-FDTL sources counted only 12 weapons in the possession of Reinado's group. ¶5. (SBU) On November 13, Xanana Gusmao announced the opening of his dialogue with the petitioners with some fanfare in an address to the nation. Calling it "an important step to solve the problems with the petitioners," the Prime Minister said the dialogues would be held on November 15 - 16 in the town of Aileu. He said he was taking this step to fulfill a recommendation of the Report of the Commission of Notables on the 2006 crisis calling for the petitioners and the F-FDTL leadership to engage in "open and frank dialogue." He appealed to all petitioners to participate, and asked the people of Aileu to welcome the petitioners and assist to move this process forward. ¶6. (C/NF) The exercise seemed ill-fated from the outset. On the eve of the dialogue, the Prime Minister's advisor for petitioner issues, Joaquim Fonseca, said Major Reinado had called him to protest the role of former F-FDTL officers, Major Tara and Captain Piloto, as the government-selected representatives of the petitioners (Note: Tara was active in the political opposition movements against the Alkatiri government in 2006, and Piloto resigned from F-FDTL in 2005. The pair appears to have been chosen because of links they had to the petitioners early in the 2006 crisis.) Reinado told Fonseca that he and his deputy Lieutenant Salsinha would boycott the proceedings. ¶7. (SBU) They made good on their threat. Only 14 petitioners appeared for the meeting in Aileu on November 15, all of them reportedly extended family members of Tara and Piloto. On November 16 - the second day slated for the dialogues - the petitioners ignored Xanana Gusmao's plea to come to the table, instead holding a second parade in Gleno, led by Reinado and Salsinha. Emboldened by the petitioners' display of loyalty, Reinado referred to his men in his speech as "a parallel force to the F-FDTL," a reference consistent both with his stated intent to set up Western military command and with his position that the petitioners are still members of the F-FDTL. In comments to Pol assistant, Reinado indicated that any talks with the GOTL would be on his own terms, and that if the government "played with him too much it might fall." ¶8. (SBU) Reinado and the petitioners held a third parade on November 22, again in Gleno, with about 500 participants. For this event, Reinado went even further in projecting the appearance of a legitimate military force, issuing invitations to President Ramos-Horta and the diplomatic corps in the name of the "FDTL." About 14 of the men carried automatic weapons; others had light arms. Only Reinado and his deputies were wearing full military uniforms. The parade was attended by a handful of semi-prominent supporters, including a priest from Liquica, a Director from the Ministry of Public Works, and a member of Parliament. There were also crowds of youths from certain Dili neighborhoods known to be hotbeds of support for the petitioners. ¶9. (U) In his speech, Reinado accused GOTL of acting in bad faith. He said that his cause could not be separated from that of the petitioners, and that he would submit himself to justice only after they had been re-integrated into the F-FDTL. He said that he and his men would march on Dili if the conflict were not resolved by the end of 2007. Reinado said that if the petitioners were not reintegrated into the F-FDTL, "blood could run again." ¶10. (C/NF) Despite this strong rhetoric, Reinado insists that he is not threatening the Gusmao government. On November 26, he called Pol assistant to stress that the international community should know that the GOTL's own mistakes had "brought the DILI 00000370 003.2 OF 004 country close to civil war," and that if a conflict were to erupt it would not be his fault. He insisted that the re-integration of the petitioners into the F-FDTL was the key to the country's security, and said that a screening process could be implemented to facilitate this. He said that he had given the GOTL every chance to show goodwill, and was still doing so. Xanana, JRH Flailing; FRETILIN Muted -------------- ¶11. (C/NF) While Reinado has consolidated his following and apparently won some new support, the GOTL's strategy for dealing with the conflict is in apparent disarray. On November 23, Joaquim Fonseca told Pol assistant that the GOTL is at a loss on how to proceed from this point. He said that re-integrating the petitioners into the F-FDTL is out of the question; this would create conflict with soldiers who remained loyal, and F-FDTL's commander, Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak, had rejected this option. Fonseca said that the GOTL's key players are all ineffective or incompetent, and that the Secretaries of State for Defense and Security cannot control the F-FDTL and National Police (PNTL) respectively. Fonseca said the GOTL was receiving no reliable intelligence on the activities of the Reinado/petitioners camp, whereas Reinado always seemed to be acting on the basis of good information. The upshot of all this, Fonseca said, was that any attempt to confront Reinado could easily get out of control. He added that not only was Reinado enjoying robust public support, but that he was apparently receiving material aid from supporters operating throughout the western districts of Timor-Leste, and Indonesia. ¶12. (SBU) President Ramos-Horta has not emerged unscathed from these developments. Since assuming the Presidency, he has sought to negotiate Reinado's surrender to the authorities, rather than have him arrested by the ISF or U.N. Police Mission. This has brought him into conflict with the judiciary. In early November, District Judge Ivo Rosa (a Portuguese national) issued a warrant for Alfredo's arrest. President Ramos-Horta requested the ISF to disregard the warrant, as confirmed by a UN spokesman on November 8. Subsequently, Judge Rosa accused Ramos-Horta of acting illegally by violating the separation of powers clauses of Timor-Leste's constitution. Ramos-Horta responded during a November 16 state visit to Lisbon, saying that Portuguese judges seconded to Timor-Leste should "show more respect" for the Presidency. ¶13. (SBU) The opposition FRETILIN party has refrained from openly rejoicing at the Gusmao government's predicament. Indeed, party leader Mari Alkatiri - whose government was brought down by a chain of events set in motion by his dismissal of the petitioners from the F-FDTL - has endorsed Xanana Gusmao's approach to negotiation. Member of Parliament Jose Teixera, a former FRETILIN minister, has seconded Gusmao government's position that Reinado must be brought to justice, but has attacked both the UN and President Ramos-Horta for overriding Judge Rosa's arrest warrant and violating the constitution's separation of powers. ¶14. (C/NF) Behind the scenes, however, FRETILIN has reportedly quietly reached out to Reinado on several occasions. According to both Fonseca and former FALINTIL 3rd Region Commander, Ernesto "Dudu" Fernandes, FRETILIN operatives have contacted Reinado for the purpose of joining together at some level to weaken Gusmao. But there is no indication that Reinado is interested. He continues to publicly charge that FRETILIN aims to set up a dictatorial regime in Timor-Leste. Australia, Portugal: Hands Off Reinado, But Trouble Ahead -------------- -------------- ¶15. (C/NF) The ISF's Australian commander, Brigadier John Hutcheson, has stated publicly that the ISF will not be a party to Reinado's arrest, in part in order to avoid anti-Australian sentiment. Similarly, in a private conversation with Poloff, a Portuguese Embassy political officer stated emphatically that the Portuguese National Guard (GNR) "will never" take any part in arrest operations against Reinado in order to avoid provoking a serious anti-Portuguese backlash. The Portuguese POLOFF said he believed that a crisis caused by Reinado's "grandstanding" is DILI 00000370 004.2 OF 004 "inevitable," and that only its timing and magnitude remain in question. Comment: Reinado Riding High, But Showdown Unlikely -------------- -------------- ¶16. (C/NF) Comment. November's developments have created a certain amount of tension. Reinado's aggressive rhetoric and brazen rallies of his supporters in military-style parades have sparked concern about his intentions. This concern is fueled further by Reinado's continued support among western district youth and rumors about arms funneled to him from Indonesia. Finally, the warrant for his arrest expires on December 3, and some speculate that the GOTL or ISF might precipitously confront Reinado before that date. ¶17. (C/NF) However, Post believes while Reinado's confrontational posture and rhetoric have hardly been conducive to public security, he is not spoiling for, or able to execute, a major showdown at this juncture. An arrest of Reinado is highly unlikely given the ISF and UNPOL's public hands-off position and the weakness of the PNTL. More importantly, Reinado has too much to lose by fomenting a major escalation in violence. He has defied the GOTL's attempt to peel away his following, and is now in a strong position to press his own terms in negotiation with the GOTL. If he were to confront the GOTL by force, he would risk setting off a chain of events he probably could not control. Reinado's men would have the ISF to contend with, and could probably not impose discipline on his supporters among Dili youth. ¶18. (C/NF) Given the continuing presence of the ISF and UNPOL in Timor-Leste, Reinado does not have the capability of raising a serious security threat to the country. In conversation with the Ambassador, SRSG Atul Khare was confident that Reinado and the petitioners would peacefully managed. Similarly, Deputy Prime Minister Guterres told the Ambassador on November 24 that negotiations continue between the government's task force and Reinado, and that a peaceful resolution would be found. SRSG Khare placed a good deal of the blame for the failure of this month's process on the shoulders of Fonseca, the PM's point person, and predicted his imminent replacement. A path to success may not be readily apparent, but the government remains committed to a peaceful resolution of the challenges posed by Reinado and the petitioners. End Comment. KLEMM