REBEL REINADO HANGS TOUGH IN TIMOR-LESTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000370

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MTS
PACOM FOR POLADS -- AMB CHRISTY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV ASEC TT
SUBJECT: REBEL REINADO HANGS TOUGH IN TIMOR-LESTE


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CLASSIFIED BY: Henry M. Rector, Charge d'affaires a.i., U.S.
Embassy Dili, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C/NF) Summary. During November, Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao
suffered setbacks in his efforts to rein in fugitive rebel Major
Alfredo Reinado and his supporters - a group consisting
primarily of several hundred "petitioners" dismissed from the
Armed Forces of Timor-Leste (F-FDTL) in 2006. Gusmao had
attempted to split Reinado from the petitioners by treating
their grievances as two separate matters, saying that while he
was prepared to negotiate a solution to the petitioners'
demands, Major Alfredo must be brought to justice for acts
committed during last year's April-May crisis. This two-track
approach has failed so far. The petitioners boycotted a meeting
with Xanana Gusmao's envoys on November 15-16, and instead stood
loyally behind Reinado, holding military-style parades on
November 9, 16, and 22. Bolstered by this display of unity,
Reinado is now demanding that the GOTL resolve the conflict on
his terms by the end of this year, or he will "march on Dili."
He is apparently styling himself and his supporters as a
western-based military command which he hopes could be
integrated into the F-FDTL. To compound the disarray, President
Jose Ramos-Horta and a Portuguese judge of the Dili District
court are at public loggerheads over the status of an arrest
warrant for Reinado. Additionally, the opposition FRETILIN
party, which regards Reinado and the petitioners as partly
responsible for former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri's fall in
June 2006, appears covertly eager to use these developments to
make political headway against Xanana Gusmao. But given the
presence of the International Stabilization Force (ISF) and UN
Police Mission (UNPOL) in Timor-Leste, Reinado poses no serious
threat to national security. Further, both senior GOTL
officials and the UN Special Representative of the Secretary
General report that the dialogue with Reinado and the
petitioners continues and express confidence that a peaceful
resolution will occur. End summary.


Unfinished Business For Xanana Gusmao
--------------

2. (SBU) In early November, Major Alfredo Reinado, a fugitive
from justice since walking out of prison in August 2006, and his
chief lieutenant Gastao Salsinha were moving freely in
Timor-Leste's western districts, airing their demands to the
government of Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao in both the domestic
and foreign media. Reinado was refusing to be tried by the
Portuguese judges who currently dominate Timor-Leste's
judiciary, and was demanding that his followers - several
hundred ex-military "petitioners" whose dismissal in April 2006
precipitated civil unrest and a major political crisis - be
reintegrated into the Armed Forces of Timor-Leste (F-FDTL).
Reinado and his men enjoy considerable popular support both in
Dili and in the western districts, and present a continuing
potential threat to the stability of the country. Xanana Gusmao
has repeatedly said that resolving the issues around the
petitioners and Reinado are two of his three highest priorities
(the internally displaced persons - IDPs - being the third).



3. (SBU) President Jose Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Xanana
Gusmao have pursued an approach that addresses the conflict as
two separate issues. They are seeking a negotiated solution
with the petitioners, although they reject demands to
re-integrate them into the F-FDTL. With regard to Reinado
himself, however, Ramos-Horta and Xanana Gusmao insist that he
face justice for his actions during the 2006 crisis, as well as
for seizing weapons from an F-FDTL border patrol unit in
February. (This is also somewhat negotiable; Ramos-Horta has
requested that the U.N. Police Mission and International
Stabilization Force not act on a November 9 warrant issued by a
Dili District Court judge for Reinado's arrest.) To assist in
these efforts, the GOTL has hired a Swiss NGO, the Center for
Humanitarian Dialogue, to act as an intermediary.


Dialogue Fizzles, Renegades Parade
--------------

4. (C/NF) On November 9, Reinado rallied his men for a show of
support in Gleno, staging a parade at the main sports field.

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Sources with both the petitioners and F-FDTL stated that Reinado
had more than 700 participants at the event. It was unclear to
what extent this group was a mix of petitioners from last year
and new recruits. Observers from both UN Police Mission (UNPOL)
and the International Stabilization Force (ISF) watched from the
periphery of the field, making no attempt to apprehend either
Reinado or members of his core group. F-FDTL sources counted
only 12 weapons in the possession of Reinado's group.



5. (SBU) On November 13, Xanana Gusmao announced the opening of
his dialogue with the petitioners with some fanfare in an
address to the nation. Calling it "an important step to solve
the problems with the petitioners," the Prime Minister said the
dialogues would be held on November 15 - 16 in the town of
Aileu. He said he was taking this step to fulfill a
recommendation of the Report of the Commission of Notables on
the 2006 crisis calling for the petitioners and the F-FDTL
leadership to engage in "open and frank dialogue." He appealed
to all petitioners to participate, and asked the people of Aileu
to welcome the petitioners and assist to move this process
forward.



6. (C/NF) The exercise seemed ill-fated from the outset. On the
eve of the dialogue, the Prime Minister's advisor for petitioner
issues, Joaquim Fonseca, said Major Reinado had called him to
protest the role of former F-FDTL officers, Major Tara and
Captain Piloto, as the government-selected representatives of
the petitioners (Note: Tara was active in the political
opposition movements against the Alkatiri government in 2006,
and Piloto resigned from F-FDTL in 2005. The pair appears to
have been chosen because of links they had to the petitioners
early in the 2006 crisis.) Reinado told Fonseca that he and his
deputy Lieutenant Salsinha would boycott the proceedings.



7. (SBU) They made good on their threat. Only 14 petitioners
appeared for the meeting in Aileu on November 15, all of them
reportedly extended family members of Tara and Piloto. On
November 16 - the second day slated for the dialogues - the
petitioners ignored Xanana Gusmao's plea to come to the table,
instead holding a second parade in Gleno, led by Reinado and
Salsinha. Emboldened by the petitioners' display of loyalty,
Reinado referred to his men in his speech as "a parallel force
to the F-FDTL," a reference consistent both with his stated
intent to set up Western military command and with his position
that the petitioners are still members of the F-FDTL. In
comments to Pol assistant, Reinado indicated that any talks with
the GOTL would be on his own terms, and that if the government
"played with him too much it might fall."



8. (SBU) Reinado and the petitioners held a third parade on
November 22, again in Gleno, with about 500 participants. For
this event, Reinado went even further in projecting the
appearance of a legitimate military force, issuing invitations
to President Ramos-Horta and the diplomatic corps in the name of
the "FDTL." About 14 of the men carried automatic weapons;
others had light arms. Only Reinado and his deputies were
wearing full military uniforms. The parade was attended by a
handful of semi-prominent supporters, including a priest from
Liquica, a Director from the Ministry of Public Works, and a
member of Parliament. There were also crowds of youths from
certain Dili neighborhoods known to be hotbeds of support for
the petitioners.



9. (U) In his speech, Reinado accused GOTL of acting in bad
faith. He said that his cause could not be separated from that
of the petitioners, and that he would submit himself to justice
only after they had been re-integrated into the F-FDTL. He said
that he and his men would march on Dili if the conflict were not
resolved by the end of 2007. Reinado said that if the
petitioners were not reintegrated into the F-FDTL, "blood could
run again."



10. (C/NF) Despite this strong rhetoric, Reinado insists that he
is not threatening the Gusmao government. On November 26, he
called Pol assistant to stress that the international community
should know that the GOTL's own mistakes had "brought the

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country close to civil war," and that if a conflict were to
erupt it would not be his fault. He insisted that the
re-integration of the petitioners into the F-FDTL was the key to
the country's security, and said that a screening process could
be implemented to facilitate this. He said that he had given
the GOTL every chance to show goodwill, and was still doing so.


Xanana, JRH Flailing; FRETILIN Muted
--------------

11. (C/NF) While Reinado has consolidated his following and
apparently won some new support, the GOTL's strategy for dealing
with the conflict is in apparent disarray. On November 23,
Joaquim Fonseca told Pol assistant that the GOTL is at a loss on
how to proceed from this point. He said that re-integrating the
petitioners into the F-FDTL is out of the question; this would
create conflict with soldiers who remained loyal, and F-FDTL's
commander, Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak, had rejected this
option. Fonseca said that the GOTL's key players are all
ineffective or incompetent, and that the Secretaries of State
for Defense and Security cannot control the F-FDTL and National
Police (PNTL) respectively. Fonseca said the GOTL was receiving
no reliable intelligence on the activities of the
Reinado/petitioners camp, whereas Reinado always seemed to be
acting on the basis of good information. The upshot of all
this, Fonseca said, was that any attempt to confront Reinado
could easily get out of control. He added that not only was
Reinado enjoying robust public support, but that he was
apparently receiving material aid from supporters operating
throughout the western districts of Timor-Leste, and Indonesia.



12. (SBU) President Ramos-Horta has not emerged unscathed from
these developments. Since assuming the Presidency, he has
sought to negotiate Reinado's surrender to the authorities,
rather than have him arrested by the ISF or U.N. Police Mission.
This has brought him into conflict with the judiciary. In
early November, District Judge Ivo Rosa (a Portuguese national)
issued a warrant for Alfredo's arrest. President Ramos-Horta
requested the ISF to disregard the warrant, as confirmed by a UN
spokesman on November 8. Subsequently, Judge Rosa accused
Ramos-Horta of acting illegally by violating the separation of
powers clauses of Timor-Leste's constitution. Ramos-Horta
responded during a November 16 state visit to Lisbon, saying
that Portuguese judges seconded to Timor-Leste should "show more
respect" for the Presidency.



13. (SBU) The opposition FRETILIN party has refrained from
openly rejoicing at the Gusmao government's predicament.
Indeed, party leader Mari Alkatiri - whose government was
brought down by a chain of events set in motion by his dismissal
of the petitioners from the F-FDTL - has endorsed Xanana
Gusmao's approach to negotiation. Member of Parliament Jose
Teixera, a former FRETILIN minister, has seconded Gusmao
government's position that Reinado must be brought to justice,
but has attacked both the UN and President Ramos-Horta for
overriding Judge Rosa's arrest warrant and violating the
constitution's separation of powers.



14. (C/NF) Behind the scenes, however, FRETILIN has reportedly
quietly reached out to Reinado on several occasions. According
to both Fonseca and former FALINTIL 3rd Region Commander,
Ernesto "Dudu" Fernandes, FRETILIN operatives have contacted
Reinado for the purpose of joining together at some level to
weaken Gusmao. But there is no indication that Reinado is
interested. He continues to publicly charge that FRETILIN aims
to set up a dictatorial regime in Timor-Leste.


Australia, Portugal: Hands Off Reinado, But Trouble Ahead
-------------- --------------

15. (C/NF) The ISF's Australian commander, Brigadier John
Hutcheson, has stated publicly that the ISF will not be a party
to Reinado's arrest, in part in order to avoid anti-Australian
sentiment. Similarly, in a private conversation with Poloff, a
Portuguese Embassy political officer stated emphatically that
the Portuguese National Guard (GNR) "will never" take any part
in arrest operations against Reinado in order to avoid provoking
a serious anti-Portuguese backlash. The Portuguese POLOFF said
he believed that a crisis caused by Reinado's "grandstanding" is

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"inevitable," and that only its timing and magnitude remain in
question.


Comment: Reinado Riding High, But Showdown Unlikely
-------------- --------------

16. (C/NF) Comment. November's developments have created a
certain amount of tension. Reinado's aggressive rhetoric and
brazen rallies of his supporters in military-style parades have
sparked concern about his intentions. This concern is fueled
further by Reinado's continued support among western district
youth and rumors about arms funneled to him from Indonesia.
Finally, the warrant for his arrest expires on December 3, and
some speculate that the GOTL or ISF might precipitously confront
Reinado before that date.



17. (C/NF) However, Post believes while Reinado's
confrontational posture and rhetoric have hardly been conducive
to public security, he is not spoiling for, or able to execute,
a major showdown at this juncture. An arrest of Reinado is
highly unlikely given the ISF and UNPOL's public hands-off
position and the weakness of the PNTL. More importantly,
Reinado has too much to lose by fomenting a major escalation in
violence. He has defied the GOTL's attempt to peel away his
following, and is now in a strong position to press his own
terms in negotiation with the GOTL. If he were to confront the
GOTL by force, he would risk setting off a chain of events he
probably could not control. Reinado's men would have the ISF to
contend with, and could probably not impose discipline on his
supporters among Dili youth.



18. (C/NF) Given the continuing presence of the ISF and UNPOL
in Timor-Leste, Reinado does not have the capability of raising
a serious security threat to the country. In conversation with
the Ambassador, SRSG Atul Khare was confident that Reinado and
the petitioners would peacefully managed. Similarly, Deputy
Prime Minister Guterres told the Ambassador on November 24 that
negotiations continue between the government's task force and
Reinado, and that a peaceful resolution would be found. SRSG
Khare placed a good deal of the blame for the failure of this
month's process on the shoulders of Fonseca, the PM's point
person, and predicted his imminent replacement. A path to
success may not be readily apparent, but the government remains
committed to a peaceful resolution of the challenges posed by
Reinado and the petitioners. End Comment.
KLEMM