EAST TIMOR'S GOVERNMENT FORMATION DEBATE CONTINUES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000258 SIPDIS SECSTATE FOR EAP/MTS USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/13/2017 TAGS: PGOV KDEM TT SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR'S GOVERNMENT FORMATION DEBATE CONTINUES REF: DILI 255 DILI 00000258 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth S. Wharton, Political/Economic Officer, U.S. Embassy, Dili, East Timor, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The mutually exclusive positions of FRETILIN and the Alliance of the National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction (CNRT),the Social Democratic Association of Timor and the Social Democratic Party (ASDT/PSD) coalition, and the Democratic Party (PD) described in reftel appear to remain entrenched, although Discussions have been ongoing over the last week. FRETILIN has held fast to the proposition that its position as the most voted party gives it the right to designate the prime minister and play a key role as part of an "inclusive" government. Simultaneously the party is continuing to mobilize its supporters to come to its aid if it does not get its way, and this implied threat has become an important element in all political calculations. The Alliance meanwhile formalized its association through a memorandum of understanding on July 10. In a July 12 conversation with Ambassador, President Jose Ramos-Horta seemed most inclined to pursue a national unity government but relayed that he had yet to make up his mind on how to proceed. Several motivations seem to be driving Ramos-Horta's approach to the process: his desire to position himself as the peacemaker; his concern regarding the potential destabilizing role of FRETILIN; and his own ambitions to expand the powers of the Presidency. On July 13 Ramos-Horta called FRETILIN and the Alliance to meet at his office in an effort to bring the two together to work out a compromise solution. We learned at the end of the day that the consultations ended inconclusively and that further talks may be delayed to allow for a "cooling off" period. End summary. ¶2. (C) On July 11, the Court of Appeals formally certified the results of the elections, thereby marking the moment from which more formal discussions on government formation could proceed. On July 13, JRH called FRETILIN and Alliance leaders for an all day consultation at his office on the government formation question. Other political leaders also joined, including Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak, commander of East Timor's armed forces (F-FDTL),who reportedly played the role of moderator in the meeting. According to information we received at the end of the day, the meeting ended without any specific progress on forming a government. Meeting participants reportedly agreed that they should instead focus on convening the new parliament first, possibly by July 20. The new government could then be established within about one week after that. There was reportedly some sentiment after the meeting that a "cooling off" period might be beneficial. Fretilin's successfully defines the debate -------------- ¶3. (C) In a July 11 meeting with Ambassador, FRETILIN Secretary General and former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri reiterated the party's stance on government formation, stressing that they are proposing an "all inclusive" government. Stating that "we must be responsive to the will of the people" he said that the results demonstrate that the electorate does not want any single party to rule. Alkatiri referenced the letter reported in reftel in which FRETILIN appealed to all political parties who gained seats in parliament on July 7 proposing to meet with their leaderships to discuss the formation of "a more inclusive government with the participation of all the parties with parliamentary seats". He described the response to the letter in vague but positive terms. (Note: Post has gained a copy of the reply sent by all Alliance members which did not take Alkatiri up on the invitation to talk, and instead reviewed the Alliance's case for governing as a majority.) Not included in this letter was Alkatiri's statement to us that an "inclusive" government would still in his view mean that the party with the most votes would designate the prime minister, although hopefully based on discussions and consensus. He also cited FRETILIN's continued majority in the eastern districts, saying that to exclude them from government would further divide the country. Responding to the concern that an "all inclusive" government would lack a strong opposition, he said that, while this also concerned him, the priority at present needed to be on DILI 00000258 002.2 OF 003 stability. Moreover, he stated, the National Parliament can still monitor the government and provide strong debate. Alkatiri also emphasized that in his view both he and CNRT president Xanana Gusmao should be out of government altogether. ¶4. (C) Meanwhile we continue to hear reports of FRETILIN efforts to organize its base in preparation for action if they are ultimately excluded from government. Meetings such as those reported in reftel have continued, including a meeting of the FRETILIN youth wing held at the party headquarters on July 13. In our meeting with him, Alkatiri stated that FRETILIN has sent its people out to talk to its supporters and calm people, asking them to trust the leadership. However, multiple sources continue to report that FRETILIN' message is one asserting its right to be in government and asking its supporters to back it up if it fails in this goal. While life in Dili remains basically normal and reports of incidents in the districts have not significantly increased, many observers are concerned that the announcement of a government that excluded FRETILIN might trigger instability. (Note: Post is separately tracking the potential for renewed instability involving the supporters of dissident military leader Alfredo Reinado who is reasserting himself in the public eye. While not apparently related to the government formation issue, further developments on this front could complicate the security picture. End note.) The "Alliance with a Parliamentary Majority" holds its ground -------------- -------------- ¶5. (SBU) As noted above, the Alliance responded to FRETILIN's proposal to discuss the formation of an inclusive government with a brush off. Alliance contacts have further emphasized to us that they are willing to engage in talks with FRETILIN, but only if called to do so by the President. They have in the meanwhile moved to consolidate their association, and completed a "Memorandum of Understanding for the Formation of the Alliance with a Parliamentary Majority (AMP)", signed by the presidents of all the parties involved, on July 10. The MOU does not yet address the question of who they will propose as prime minister, or any other positions, but establishes the basic organization and governing bodies. Regarding the identification of the Prime Minister and President of Parliament, the MOU states that this will be determined by consensus decision by the Presidential Council, comprising the presidents of all participating parties. Other government positions will be determined by both the quality of the candidates and the proportion of votes received by each party. Additionally, the MOU commits the parties to work together to harmonize their respective programs. Finally, the MOU states that should new elections become necessary, the Alliance will form a coalition to run a single list. ¶6. (SBU) Despite continued meetings between a group of PD leaders who do not agree with their party's decision to join the Alliance, the Alliance appears to be holding strong both in its commitment to work together and its determination to either form a government or go into the opposition, but either way without FRETILIN. President maneuvers for stability and turf -------------- ¶7. (C) Over the course of a long conversation with Ambassador on July 12, Ramos-Horta explained his thinking on the current government formation process. He emphasized that he has not yet made up his mind on how to proceed, but described a number of potential scenarios. His "ideal" government, he said, would be the inclusive model with FRETILIN, the Alliance and everyone else on board. He echoed Alkatiri's argument that FRETILIN's strong support in the East meant its exclusion from government could sharpen regional divides. He also echoed Alkatiri's assurance that an "inclusive" government would not unduly compromise democratic development, stating his confidence that the new Parliament will become an institution with a strong commitment to oversee the government. However, he also went on to outline two other scenarios, including a possible sequence in which FRETILIN would form a government, then fail to pass its program and budget in parliament, upon which he would invite the Alliance to form a government without new elections. In addition, he described as perhaps "the best outcome" if FRETILIN would voluntarily go into opposition from the very beginning, DILI 00000258 003.2 OF 003 clearing the way for the Alliance to lead the government. In any scenario, Ramos-Horta identified Gusmao and current Prime Minister Estanislau da Silva as the only viable candidates for Prime Minister; he also described Gusmao as a potentially strong candidate to lead the Parliament as speaker. In order to work out the final arrangements, Ramos-Horta described his role as a grand mediator of a "Camp David" like process, with the meeting cited in paragraph 2 as the first step. If this goes well, he said, then he will organize a follow up retreat, perhaps in Dare in the southern outskirts of Dili, to hammer out the details. ¶8. (C) In answer to questions regarding how he viewed the mandate of the Constitution in relation to government formation, Ramos-Horta described it as basically ambiguous, forcing him to set precedents. He said that he saw the Constitution as clearly providing two options regarding who has the right the form government: either the party with the most votes or the alliance with the majority. In his view, he thought the priority should go to the party with the most votes to form a workable majority, and also left open the door of inviting it to form government even without a majority. ¶9. (C) It became clear especially toward the end of the conversation that Ramos-Horta is concerned that FRETILIN will deliberately create instability if its determination to remain in power is thwarted. Further, these concerns are key to his preference for an "inclusion" government. He emphasized his fear that there would be widespread unrest in the eastern districts should FRETILIN be excluded. He noted that Alkatiri's speeches have served only to raise the expectations of the party faithful and inflated emotions. ¶10. (C) It is also evident that Ramos-Horta's own ambitions to reshape the presidency into a more powerful office are influencing his decision making. In our discussion he emphasized his determination to be an activist president, relaying a number of initiatives he has in mind. Of particular interest is his determination to have ultimate say over the foreign affairs, defense, and security portfolios (the "French model," said Horta). In this regard, there are strong indications that he is using the government formation process to also negotiate his own goals. In a meeting on July 9 with Zacarias da Costa of PSD, a potential Alliance candidate for Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ramos-Horta reportedly stated that he would support da Costa for the position on condition that half of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs building be used to house offices of the President. (The building, a gift of the Chinese Government currently under construction, was a project undertaken when Ramos-Horta was still Foreign Minister.) In addition, Ramos-Horta conditioned support for da Costa on having ultimate control over foreign affairs, defense and security matters. Da Costa reported to us that he did not react directly to the proposals but simply noted that he is only a candidate for Foreign Minister in an Alliance government and will not be available for any government involving FRETILIN. ¶11. (U) Comment: As this process unfolds, we should continue to push for an effective government established transparently and in accordance with the constitution. Additionally, we will continue to urge all parties to abide by the outcome of the process peacefully. End comment. KLEMM