EAST TIMOR PRESIDENT RAMOS HORTA LOOKS AHEAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000234

SIPDIS

SECSTATE FOR EAP/MTS
TOKYO FOR HANS KLEMM
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/21/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL AS PO ID TT
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR PRESIDENT RAMOS HORTA LOOKS AHEAD

REF: A) DILI 232, B) DILI 218, C) DILI 33, D) JAKARTA 1618

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CLASSIFIED BY: Henry M. Rector, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy,
Dili, East Timor, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)





1. (C) Summary. In a June 20 meeting with Charge and Poloff,
East Timor President Jose Ramos-Horta expressed satisfaction
with the ongoing parliamentary election campaign and confidence
in connection with various post-election political scenarios.
He confirmed that he had requested that the International
Stabilization Force (ISF) suspend its search for renegade F-FDTL
Major Alfredo Reinado. Ramos-Horta claimed that Reinado's
supporters were deserting him and reiterated his plan for
resolving the petitioner issue. On national security,
Ramos-Horta said that as President, he intended to dominate
foreign and defense policy, and that he would not necessarily be
bound by the "Force 2020" white paper on the modernization of
the Timorese Armed Forces (F-FDTL). He said he wanted to
intensify cooperation with Australia, which was East Timor's
natural partner in national security matters. Ramos-Horta said
he would welcome any USG assistance to the National Police
(PNTL) and in counter-terrorism. He was dismissive of UNMIT's
efforts to complete the investigations of 1999 cases left
unfinished by the UN Serious Crimes Unit when it closed in 2004,
saying that these resources should instead be focused on
strengthening the justice sector overall and that he would not
permit East Timor's bilateral relationship with Indonesia to be
disrupted by this issue. Ramos-Horta's comments on the new
amnesty law have been reported ref A. End summary.


2. (SBU) Charge and poloff met June 20 with President Jose
Ramos-Horta. This was Mission's first meeting with Ramos-Horta
since he assumed the Presidency on May 20. The President
thanked us for our invitation to our Fourth of July reception,
and readily agreed to make a short speech at the event.

Campaign On Track
--------------


3. (SBU) Ramos-Horta said he was generally satisfied with the
conduct of the parliamentary election campaign so far. He said
that the June 3 incident in Viqueque (ref A) had shocked people,
and the parties were now exercising caution in order to avoid
further problems. Such disturbances as had occurred since June
3 were mostly rooted in long-standing local disputes and were
not really related to the national campaign. Recent incidents
in Ermera district which resulted in the arrival of news IDPs in
Dili, for instance, arose from long-standing local conflicts
involving land disputes and local power struggles. Friction in
the Uatolare area of Viqueque district, he said, went back more
than 50 years, describing the population there as "really nuts".
Hard-line FRETILIN elements there, he said, were out of sync
with the national party.


4. (SBU) We asked Ramos-Horta how he envisioned the government
formation process following the elections. He replied that
there was some ambiguity in the constitution, and that he would
seek legal advice on the question of whether a majority
coalition appointed to form a government had to be in place
before the elections, or could result from post-election
negotiations. (Note: Legal experts with IFES insist that the
constitution clearly allows for post election alliances, as
distinct from the pre-election coalitions allowed under the
election law.) He said that he intended at any rate to call the
party that received the most votes. There were two most likely
scenarios, he said. In the first, FRETILIN would win with a
slim plurality and would attempt to build a coalition with other
parties. This would be difficult because of the antipathy
FRETILIN has created. In the second scenario, the National
Congress for Timorese Reconstruction (CNRT) would form a
coalition with other opposition parties. He said that FRETILIN
had been humbled by what "can only be called a debacle" in the
April-May Presidential elections, and noted that former PM
Alkatiri had said he would accept an opposition role if FRETILIN
failed to secure a majority, even if it was the largest party.


DILI 00000234 002.2 OF 004



4. (C) Ramos-Horta said that he had urged former President
Xanana Gusmao, President of the CNRT, to retain some figures
from the FRETILIN government with technical knowledge in order
to manage the bureaucracy. Ramos-Horta cited Health Minister
Rui Araujo in this regard, adding that he should continue as
Deputy Prime Minister. Charge recalled that a recent report by
the International Crisis Group had said that the FRETILIN
government had capably managed some crucial technical matters
such the petroleum negotiations. Ramos-Horta riposted that the
ICG had given FRETILIN too much credit on this score, and that
many of the FRETILIN ministers were "totally incompetent." East
Timor, he said, had relied heavily on foreign advisors on such
matters and would continue to do so in the foreseeable future.

A Timorese De Gaulle
--------------


5. (C) Looking forward to the remainder of his Presidency,
Ramos-Horta commented that his predecessor, Xanana Gusmao, had
let constitutional constraints limit his powers too stringently.
Ramos-Horta said he envisioned his office, like the French
presidency, as a full partner to government. Ramos-Horta said
he intended to conduct a full review of foreign and defense
policy shortly after the new government is in place and had just
advised F-FDTL Commander Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak to
that effect. He would not, he said, feel bound by the Force
2020 white paper (ref B),which was developed with Portuguese
input. Australia, Ramos-Horta said, was East Timor's natural
partner in security issues. Portugal was too small, too
distant, and its commitments to East Timor's security were not
sustainable, whereas Australia had one of the best military
forces in the world and a clear long-term interest in a secure
East Timor, particularly in regard to maritime affairs. Current
Portuguese involvement in East Timor's national security affairs
was the doing of "that lunatic," former Defense Minister Roque
Rodriguez, Ramos-Horta said. Portuguese assistance was more
welcome in the areas of education, health, and strengthening the
judiciary.

U.S. Help Wanted For PNTL, CT
--------------


6. (C) Charge said that the USG was also looking to assist East
Timor's national security institutions wherever possible.
Ramos-Horta said that although there were good individual police
officers, the PNTL was "really rotten" and needed all the help
it could get. He said that East Timor's intelligence service
was useless, capable only of passing on gossip and rumors.
Ramos-Horta stressed at some length his concern that East Timor
presented a soft target for terrorists operating in the region.
He recalled a meeting with then-Deputy Secretary of Defense
Wolfowitz on this issue that had led to a senior U.S. expert
being dispatched to Dili. He said that he would welcome further
U.S. engagement on this area.

Search For Reinado On Hiatus
--------------


7. (C) Charge asked about media reports that Ramos-Horta had
called on the Australian and New Zealand International
Stabilization Force (ISF) to suspend its search for rebel F-FDTL
leader Alfredo Reinado. Ramos-Horta confirmed that he had done
so in a June 18 meeting with UNMIT SRSG Atul Khare and in a
subsequent discussion with ISF Commander Brigadier Rerden. He
had done so, he said, in order to call Reinado on his offer to
turn himself in if ISF operations were ended.


8. (C) Ramos-Horta asserted that Reinado's supporters were
deserting him, and said his strategy was to isolate Reinado from
his support base while simultaneously negotiating with him for
his surrender. Ramos-Horta discussed his meeting with a group
of Reinado's men, including Garcia and Susar as well as some
petitioners, in Same over the previous weekend, saying that they
were disillusioned with Reinado. He said that they conducted a
symbolic handover of one HK-33 rifle to the Prosecutor General
who accompanied Ramos-Horta to Same, and that this would be
followed up with a group of 15 or so of Reinado's men presenting
themselves and their weapons in Dili shortly. He added that
Reinado had called him for the first time in months over the

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weekend and that he had been shocked when Ramos-Horta provided
detailed information on his recent movements. Ramos-Horta said
he now received such information from western youths who were
formerly supporters, a further indication of Reinado's decline.
He also said that Reinado's claim to be the commander of the
petitioners had been shown to be false, and that petitioner
spokesperson Gustao Salsinha no longer had wide support among
the petitioner group, who he emphasized must be dealt with as
individuals only. Salsinha has requested to meet with him and
he has told his staff to make the arrangements. (Note: Our
sources indicate that Susar et al are still allied with Reinado,
and that those petitioners who still identify themselves as such
still regard Salsinha and Reinado as their leaders.)


9. (C) Ramos-Horta went on to say that he was looking into a
variety of incentives for petitioners who decided to return,
including offers of contract work in Korea, separation with
three years' salary, reintegration into the F-FDTL under certain
conditions, etc. The petitioners would also receive a formal
apology from the F-FDTL leaderships for its actions prior to and
doing the April-May 2006 crisis. Once he had negotiated a
package acceptable to the petitioners, Ramos-Horta said, he
would ask for the endorsement of the political parties, the
Church, and the international community. Ramos-Horta claims to
have F-FDTL buy in for this approach. (Note: This is the same
package that he has been promoting to resolve the petitioner
issue for a while. Our understanding is that F-FDTL opposition
to any reintegration remains the key obstacle.)

Time For IDPs To Clear Out
--------------


10. (SBU) We asked for Ramos-Horta's assessment of the
continuing problem of thousands of Internally Displaced Persons
(IDPs) in camps around Dili. He said that this was a pressing
matter for after the elections. Thousands, he said, are in
reality squatters who face no real security threat, take
advantage of food distributions in the camps, and return to
their old homes on the weekend. The camps are now a breeding
ground for gang-related activity, he said. Ramos-Horta said he
had recently met with UNMIT and the Ministry of Labor on this
issue. After the elections, he said, he will to develop a plan
to deal with the gang problem in the camps and get IDPs who are
no longer in danger back to their homes.

Jakarta Ties Trump SCU Investigations
--------------


11. (C) We asked for the President's views on UNMIT's efforts to
complete the investigations of the Serious Crimes Unit.
Ramos-Horta replied that the UN's resources would be better
devoted to strengthening East Timor's judicial system. East
Timor, he stressed, must maintain good relations with Indonesia,
which had been remarkably accepting East Timor's independence
since 2002. Any Timorese support for attempts to create a
special tribunal for these crimes would wreck this excellent
bilateral relationship that has been established so far and
would strengthen the hand of hard-line nationalist and Islamist
opponents of President Yudhoyono in Jakarta. East Timor,
Ramos-Horta said, should not take these good relations for
granted. Recalling his recent visit to Jakarta (ref D),he
contrasted the warm welcome he had received with the case of
France and Algeria. Algeria, he said, had been independent for
thirty years before it became possible for Presidents Chirac and
Bouteflika to exchange visits.


12. (C) Warming to his historical theme, Ramos-Horta said that
East Timor must put past resentments behind it and look toward
the future. There was ample blame on all sides for the
country's misfortunes in the pre-independence years. He said he
bore the U.S. no ill-will for allegedly having "given the green
light" for Indonesia to intervene in 1975. Following the fall
of Saigon, Ramos-Horta said, the Soviet Union, embracing the
Brezhnev doctrine, was supporting Communist movements in the
Third World, and the Vietnamese government had openly stated its
intention to liberate Southeast Asia. The Unites States,
Ramos-Horta said, had therefore had good reason to believe that
Communism was on the rise at that time, and the Timorese people
were in fact lucky to have been spared Communist rule.

DILI 00000234 004.2 OF 004


Ramos-Horta said that the various Timorese factions had
themselves invited disaster by escalating the political conflict
into outright civil war in 1974-75. "Our stupid students who
came back from Lisbon and spread Marxist revolutionary ideas,"
were also culpable, Ramos-Horta said.

Comment
--------------


13. (C) Ramos-Horta's ambiguity regarding how he will proceed
with the government formation process is somewhat worrying. It
is possible that he is simply being evasive regarding how he
intends to proceed. However, if he indeed is unclear on the
constitutional options and how he will address the potential for
conflicting claims to the right to form a government, this could
contribute to a difficult post-election process. Ramos-Horta's
insistence that he will take the lead on security and foreign
policy issues is of note and may put him at odds with Xanana
Gusmao should the latter become Prime Minister. Gusmao has
particularly emphasized the need to reform the F-FDTL and the
PNTL as key reasons for his establishment of the CNRT party and
post assesses that he is unlikely to leave security issues to
Ramos-Horta. Finally, it is also important to note that
Ramos-Horta's claims regarding progress on both the Reinado and
petitioner issues are very familiar and repeated themes that
have yet to bear fruit. Post believes he may be overstating the
extent of splintering among both Reinado's men and the
petitioners. Moreover, his insistence that he has convinced
F-FDTL leadership to accept his proposal for the petitioners
does not match with our most recent information that the F-FDTL
leadership remains adamantly opposed to any petitioners
returning to their ranks. End comment.
RECTOR