PRESIDENT GUSMAO DECLINES TO MEET ON JOINT DEMARCHE

C O N F I D E N T I A L DILI 000019 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, EUR/WE, AF/S USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/17/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL AS JA MZ PO TT SUBJECT: PRESIDENT GUSMAO DECLINES TO MEET ON JOINT DEMARCHE REF: (A) DILI 595, (B) STATE 197162 CLASSIFIED BY: W. Gary Gray, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Dili, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b) ¶1. (C) Summary. President Gusmao has declined to meet the Australian, Japanese, Portuguese, and U.S. chiefs of mission to receive the Ref B joint demarche previously delivered to former Prime Minister Alkatiri (Ref A). Through his Chief of Staff the President conveyed that he was well aware of the contents of the demarche, which urges him and Alkatiri to work out an accommodation, but saw it as overtaken by events since in his view he already had made sufficient overtures to the former Prime Minister. The demarche in the form of a nonpaper nevertheless was conveyed to the President's Chief of Staff before Gusmao's departure to the U.S. on January 17. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Following the delivery of Ref B joint demarche to former Prime Minister Alkatiri on December 14 (Ref A),the four missions involved made repeated attempts to obtain an appointment with President Gusmao. A meeting was scheduled for December 21, but the President's office cancelled it at the last minute. Following Gusmao's absence from the country during most of the ensuing holiday period, further attempts were made to secure an appointment. On January 12, however, Presidential Chief of Staff Agio Perreira informed the Australian Charge d'Affaires that the President had made a firm decision not to meet with the four chiefs of mission in regard to this demarche. Perreira said the President was well aware of the contents of the demarche (this joint demarche has become common knowledge among informed diplomatic and government circles in Dili),but strongly felt that it had been overtaken by events since he already had made sufficient overtures to the former Prime Minister. In subsequent discussions the four missions agreed to propose that the demarche at least be delivered to Perreira as a nonpaper to ensure that the President had an accurate version of what had been conveyed to Alkatiri. Perreira agreed to this and the nonpaper was delivered to him shortly before he and the President departed to the U.S. on January 17. ¶3. (C) While Gusmao's refusal to meet is disappointing, it is Embassy's assessment that this joint demarche has had a positive effect here. As noted above, it became widely known around Dili that four of the major donors were pressing for the two leaders to reach an accommodation, and this in itself delivered a strong message. The joint demarche also established a valuable precedent for further cooperation among the diplomatic missions here on such issues. Since the genesis of this joint demarche, the President and the former Prime Minister have indeed taken some significant steps, meeting together and appearing jointly in public at a December 10 "traditional peace ceremony." More recently, however, the momentum for this mutual accommodation process seems to have slowed, and there are indications that there is again strong potential for conflict between the two leaders on issues such as the timing of the elections. Embassy would therefore recommend that the points of the joint demarche be reinforced in any meetings with Gusmao in his upcoming visit to Washington. GRAY