SECURITY OUTLOOK IN ADVANCE OF PRESIDENTIAL RUNOFF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000164 SIPDIS NOFORN DEPT FOR EAP/MTS USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC TOKYO FOR HANS KLEMM SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/24/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR ASEC KPKO UN TT SUBJECT: SECURITY OUTLOOK IN ADVANCE OF PRESIDENTIAL RUNOFF REF: DILI 154 DILI 00000164 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Major Ron Sargent, US Defense Representative, US Embassy, Dili, East Timor, Department of Defense. REASON: 1.4 (a),(b) ¶1. (C/NF) Summary. With the start of the campaign period for the second round of the presidential election, East Timor for the most part remains calm. Within this context, Charge d'Affaires (CDA) met with International Stabilization Force (ISF) commander Brigadier Mal Rerden April 23 to discuss the current security environment. Rerden expressed disquiet concerning a recent incident involving a confrontation of ISF members with anti-Fretilin activists, noting that future incidents of a similar nature could pose a significant challenge. He assessed that political intimidation tactics would remain at a low-intensity through the presidential election's second round, but that the election's outcome could elicit a more severe response. Rerden discussed at length Prime Minister Jose Ramos-Horta's recent effort to end the ISF operation against dissident military leader Major Alfredo Reinado in order to broaden his political base in advance of the runoff, and the role President Xanana Gusmao has played in undermining this effort. Additionally, Rerden assessed that the East Timorese Defense Force (F-FDTL) appeared to be exhibiting behavior more consistent with that of a politically neutral player, but noted clear signs that F-FDTL is badly stretched and likely will not be able to sustain its static postings in Dili at current levels. Lastly, Rerden commented on the current state of the National Police of Timor Leste (PNTL) and corresponding challenges faced by the United Nations Police (UNPOL) in managing PNTL's resurrection in Dili, and reform nationwide. End summary. ¶2. (C) East Timor continues to be relatively calm and outwardly normal in the run-up to the second round of the presidential election between Prime Minister Jose Ramos-Horta and Speaker of Parliament (and Fretilin party President) Francisco "Lu'Olo" Guterres. Following Lu'Olo's first round victory over Ramos-Horta, there have been no significant episodes of conflict beyond the scope of what could be considered normal for East Timor. ¶3. (C/NF) However, during a meeting on April 23 between International Stabilization Force (ISF) commander Brigadier Mal Rerden and CDA, Rerden expressed genuine concern regarding an April 5 confrontation just prior to the first round vote in Manatuto between anti-Fretilin activists, and members of both the United Nations Police (UNPOL) and the ISF. During this incident, where several hundred Fretilin supporters were prevented from returning to their home districts in the east by the blockage of a key transit bridge, it took UNPOL and ISF elements several hours of intense effort - to include the firing of several warning shots - before tensions subsided enough for the Fretilin supporters to pass. Rerden stated that he felt that this incident was the result of careful planning, and demonstrated "how prepared some people were to create problems if they wanted to." Because of the apparent intractability of the activists in Manatuto, Rerden implied that in the future, if UNPOL and ISF had to face similar antagonists on a larger scale, "things could become very difficult." ¶4. (C/NF) Rerden stated his belief that there would be plenty of low intensity intimidation occurring "in the dark of night" in the lead up to the second round of the presidential election, but added that because the East Timorese people were sufficiently resilient and knew that their vote was secret, would not be deterred from voting. ISF was also looking at plans to address such intimidation tactics where they became known. However, Rerden added that the ruling Fretilin party would likely conduct its "dirtiest fight in a long time," and observed that a heating up of rhetoric between national leaders DILI 00000164 002.2 OF 003 could inadvertently cue Fretilin local supporters into violent behavior because of the relative autonomy of the latter. In general, Rerden stated that he was most concerned with the reactions of various groups once the election was concluded and outcomes were known. He also indicated that the ISF would be watching the region surrounding the southwestern city of Suai closely because of the relatively strong showing of Lu'Olo there during the first round of the election. As Suai is known as an opposition stronghold, this could create conditions for increased friction in the upcoming weeks. ¶5. (C/NF) Rerden also discussed at length Ramos-Horta's machinations with regards to military dissident leader Major Alfredo Reinado within the context of the Prime Minister's recent public statements suggesting the ISF operation to capture Reinado be stopped. During an April 14 meeting with the PM, Rerden stated that Ramos-Horta asked ISF to stop its mission and stated (when asked by Reardon for a formal letter to that effect) that a formal request signed by President Xanana Gusmao would soon be sent to the Government of Australia requesting a change to the ISF's mission. On April 19, Rerden said that he was called into Gusmao's office, and that Gusmao said "that there was no way that all state instruments could support this," and that Gusmao himself would not support such a request. During a coordinating meeting later that day, Rerden stated that Gusmao told him to "continue with your mission, Commander," in the presence of several senior United Nations Integrated Mission to Timor Leste (UNMIT) and GOET officials. Ironically, this meeting was conducted in the absence of Ramos-Horta, who was away in Same visiting with political maverick and Reinado advisor Leandro Isaac, members of the military petitioners group, and some of Reinado's men. (Note: Prior to departing Dili on April 19, Ramos-Horta made an unusual request to Rerden to have no ISF helicopters in the air near Same that day. While adding credence to media reports of an actual meeting between Ramos-Horta and Reinado, Rerden could not confirm this, and Horta staff have denied to post that any Horta meeting with Reinado occurred. End note.) ¶6. (C/NF) With regards to the East Timorese Defense Force (F-FDTL) Chief Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak, Rerden stated that Ruak and his institution are now better situated to remain neutral for the time being, particularly in light of recent public statements Ruak has made about F-FDTL being an apolitical actor. Rerden observed that while F-FDTL continues to exhibit undisciplined behavior characteristic of an ex-guerilla army, it was clear to him that Ruak was conveying the right intent and in his estimation was doing all he could to exhort restraint from his forces. Rerden also noted that "reality is beginning to catch up with F-FDTL" as it relates to the conduct of its static postings throughout Dili, and he anticipated that F-FDTL would become significantly stressed by the operational requirements of the mission. He predicted that F-FDTL would likely begin to curtail some of its postings by the end of the month. ¶7. (C/NF) Lastly, Rerden stated his concern that the National Police of Timor Leste (PNTL) "has too many entrenched bad habits" in reference to the UNPOL effort underway to screen its members and resurrect the national institution as a functioning professional police force. Rerden remarked that UNPOL likely has "some tough days ahead" as it moves from screening Dili-based police to a similar effort throughout the districts. (Note: UNPOL's intent - in collaboration with the Ministry of Interior - is to declare no more than 10 percent of those currently serving within any district PNTL force as unfit for duty because of ethics violations or criminal conduct. Many observers are concerned that this cut off is essentially arbitrary and may allow a number of ethically questionable police to continue in their jobs. End note.) ¶8. (C/NF) Comment: We share Reardon's concern about an increase in intimidation tactics during the second round and into the parliamentary elections, as well as the possibility for local DILI 00000164 003.2 OF 003 actors to react independently with violence or manipulation in response to an uptick in rhetoric at the national level. Regarding Rerden's concern about ISF challenges in handling future conflicts with crowds such as the one encountered in Manatuto (para 3),post notes that the vast majority of activists in country are armed with little else besides rocks, slingshots, and traditional weapons. Because of the less lethal nature of the East Timorese threat environment, this creates a dilemma for both UNPOL and ISF in managing large, violent crowds in light of constraints created by their own rules of engagement and limited riot control capabilities. Both UNPOL and ISF easily could be portrayed as overly heavy-handed in their response to stone-throwers. Regarding Ramos-Horta's attempt to draw nearer to Reinado, he appears to be calculating that he needs to reach out to Reinado and his supporters in order to bolster his support in the western districts. Doing so without Gusmao's full support may be placing him in a position where he will be making promises he cannot deliver. However, Rerden did add that the ISF has picked up that even Fretilin has quietly made overtures to Reinado, including promises of being able to "solve the problems, reinstate Reinado to F-FDTL, etc." Lastly, if the F-FDTL presence in Dili has indeed helped to curtail violence in Dili, a drawdown of their presence prior to the second round of the presidential election could have negative consequences. Post believes that Ruak is cognizant of this, and that he will likely attempt to maintain a strong presence in Dili through the June 30 parliamentary election period. End comment. NAGY