THREE FRONTRUNNERS FOR EAST TIMOR'S PRESIDENTIAL RACE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000141 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/MTS,DRL,IO USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY TOKYO FOR HANS KLEMM SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/5/2017 TAGS: PGOV KDEM UN TT SUBJECT: THREE FRONTRUNNERS FOR EAST TIMOR'S PRESIDENTIAL RACE REF: DILI 066 DILI 00000141 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth S. Wharton, Political / Economic Officer, U.S. Embassy, Dili, East Timor, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: As the East Timorese presidential campaign wraps up, opposition candidate Fernando "Lasama" de Araujo has emerged alongside establishment candidates Jose Ramos-Horta and Francisco "Lu'Olo" Gutterres as a serious contender in the 9 April presidential election. While current Prime Minister Ramos-Horta enjoys the highest international prominence, his name recognition overseas does not automatically equate to electoral success in East Timor. That said, despite a lackluster start to his campaign, he has improved his electioneering and appears likely to gain enough votes to make it to the expected run-off in May. The apparent failure of the Fretilin party machine to drum up support for Lu'Olo at campaign rallies has probably been the biggest surprise of the campaign. Nevertheless, Embassy Dili notes that Fretilin's organizational machinery and historical brand name cannot be underestimated. While the other five candidates do not appear to be competitive, they could still impact the race by siphoning off votes and ensuring that a second round is required. Ultimately, in light of the lack of reliable polling and a widespread reluctance by Timorese citizens to reveal their voting intent, this election outcome remains unpredictable. End summary. ¶2. (C) In contrast to early assessments that the presidential race would be essentially a competition between Prime Minister Jose Ramos-Horta, backed by President Xanana Gusmao, and the ruling Fretilin party's nominee, party president Francisco "Lu'Olo" Gutterres, the election now appears to be a three-way race. Opposition candidate, Fernando "Lasama" de Araujo has emerged as a serious threat to capture one of the top two spots in the 9 April presidential election. (Note: Embassy Dili and most observers do not expect any of the eight candidates to garner sufficient votes to win the election outright. A second round, probably on 9 May, will most likely be required.) Lasama, who briefly served as deputy Foreign Minister from 2002-2003 and like President Xanana Gusmao was a political prisoner under the Indonesian occupation, has neither Ramos-Horta's fame or Lu'Olo's party machinery, but his opposition Democratic Party (PD) has been working hard since 2002 and enjoys strong support, especially in the western districts. ¶3. (C) The ongoing frustration of many with the central government in Dili, and his reform message have probably boosted Lasama's popularity in the presidential election. We are unable to assess the impact of the vote of confidence he received from popular dissident military leader Alfredo Reinado. Reinado's endorsement was watered down by encompassing four candidates and even some of his die-hard supporters have indicated that his views will not be determinative in their vote. Lasama also enjoys the support of some members of the enormously influential Catholic Church, although Church leadership has been cautious in its election-related language, primarily focusing on thinly veiled exertions against supporting continued Fretilin rule. Lasama's Democratic Party (PD) also has stronger than expected support in some of the eastern districts. During Emboffs' 1-3 April visit to Baucau, Los Palos, and Viqeuque a relatively strong PD presence was in evidence and reliable observers reported that Lasama's recent campaign events were comparable in attendance to Lu'Olo's and larger and better organized than most of the other candidates. While we continue to hear reports of concern within PD that Lasama cannot defeat Lu'Olo in a run-off and therefore some PD officials and supporters have instead decided to back Ramos-Horta, Lasama has run a stronger than expected campaign and could sneak into the expected run-off. ¶4. (C) Despite initial missteps, such as not showing an interest in campaigning due to his expectation that he is "already known", current Prime Minister Ramos-Horta has also improved his electioneering and appears likely to make the expected run-off. As Emboffs observed on 3 April in Baucau, East Timor's second-largest city, Ramos-Horta's candidacy has benefited from DILI 00000141 002.2 OF 003 the fracturing of some of the Fretilin party's traditional support base, with the splinter Fretilin Mudansa (reform) faction backing him. The Ramos-Horta rally in Baucau on 3 April was significantly larger than the Lu'Olo event that same day and Lu'Olo appears to have ceded Baucau - he decided 24 hours in advance to not attend the rally in his honor, probably because his local coordinator defected to the Mudansa faction and threw his backing to Ramos-Horta instead. The new UNDERTIM party, which has strong links with Fretilin Mudansa and also draws from Fretilin's traditional support base of veterans of the struggle for independence, has also provided strong backing, especially in the eastern districts. ¶5. (C) In addition, supporters of President Xanana Gusmao's new CNRT party turned out in force for a boisterous rally in Dili's Municipal Stadium on 4 April. Gusmao, Foreign Minister Jose Luis Guterres - Fretilin Mudansa's most prominent member - and UNDERTIM leader Cornelio Gama "L-7" all played key roles during the event, though it appeared Gusmao was the driving force. Emboffs witnessed him directing speakers and prompting music to be played from his high-profile observation spot in the stadium stands. Despite this support from Gusmao and other influential figures, Ramos-Horta is perceived by many as having failed to do very much during his 10 months as prime minister, and Reinado has publicly lumped him in with Lu'Olo as unfit to lead the country. While the international press continues to label Ramos-Horta the front-runner, Embassy Dili is not yet convinced that his name recognition overseas will translate into an automatic win at home. ¶6. (C) The failure of the Fretilin party machine to drum up support for Lu'Olo has probably been the biggest surprise of the campaign. Despite outlandish claims on the candidate's website (www.luolobapresidente.blogspot.com) of tens of thousands of supporters at each rally, turnout has been significantly less than reported. Emboffs attending the Lu'Olo rally in Baucau on 3 April saw only 1,000 people in attendance, the bulk of whom were there to watch and did not actively participate. This eastern district event was even less enthusiastic than the event Emboffs attended in Gleno the previous week, where Lu'Olo claimed 7,000 people but Emboffs and UN observers estimated closer to 1,000, most of which appeared to be disinterested. Lu'Olo did, however, turn out an estimated 5,000 supporters in Dili on 4 April, more than simultaneous rallies for Ramos-Horta and Lasama which had a few thousand apiece, but this was far less than the "Fretilin tsunami" of tens of thousands promised the previous week by some SIPDIS organizers. ¶7. (C) According to Fretilin contacts in the eastern districts, one of the factors working against Lu'Olo is the popular perception, even within the party, that a vote for him would be a reaffirmation of support for former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri and his Maputo clique, a prospect that discomfits even many loyal Fretilin members. The district administrator in Viqueque told us on 2 April that with the economy broken, no jobs available, and an influx of internally displaced persons from Dili, he had no choice but to admit that the Maputo clique's system of heavy centralization needed to change. Nevertheless, Embassy Dili notes that Fretilin's organizational machinery cannot be underestimated; moreover, a lack of information on the candidates and issues especially in more remote areas could mean that many regard Fretilin as the only known quantity. ¶8. (C) While the other five candidates do not appear to be competitive, they could still impact the race. At least two, Lucia Lobato of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and Xavier do Amaral of the Timorese Social Democrat Association (ASDT), probably have enough support to siphon off votes and ensure that a second round is required, possibly influencing which two of the three leading candidates make the run-off. Lobato, the only female candidate has closely associated her campaign with Mario Carrascalao, her party's president, who remains popular for his work as the governor of East Timor under Indonesian occupation. Do Amaral, the only candidate to run against Gusmao in 2002, is likely to still do well in his home district of Aileu, which he DILI 00000141 003.2 OF 003 won five years ago. Manuel Tilman (Kota),Joao Carrascalao (UDT),and Avelinho Coelho appear unlikely to garner significant votes. ¶9. (C) Comment: The winner of this election is ultimately unpredictable. East Timor has not had reliable polling since ¶2004. Campaign attendance does not equate to voting intent - many are there to watch, some are there to be convinced, some are paid and/or fed; and some are indeed there because they support the candidate. Our anecdotal evidence indicates that undecided voters may still be numerous. There is also a widespread reluctance by Timorese citizens to reveal their voting intent, a phenomenon that has only been increased by the heightened tensions and related violence of the last year. Remote areas that Embassy (and voter information) have trouble reaching could be home to as much as 50 percent of the voters, a group that could play a huge role in determining the outcome, especially if Fretilin remains strong there. End comment. NAGY