SECURITY SECTOR POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000120 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/MTS,IO,INL USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/23/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL MAAR ASEC KPKO UN TT SUBJECT: SECURITY SECTOR POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS REF: DILI 119 DILI 00000120 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Major Ron Sargent, US Defense Representative, US Embassy, Dili, East Timor, Department of Defense. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: As detailed in reftel, Post has become increasingly concerned regarding the direction of developments in the security sector, including both the East Timorese armed forces (F-FDTL) and the East Timorese National Police (PNTL). In light of these concerns, we have reviewed our policy on the security sector and recommend the policy guidance outlined below. Issues relating to the security sector must be kept on the front burner in Post's ongoing dialogue with the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT),the GOET, and diplomatic counterparts. We will convey to both UNMIT and the GOET that we regard both the expansion of F-FDTL operations in Dili, the rearming of PNTL, and similar developments as important policy decisions that cannot be regarded as routine operational calls. Additionally, Post plans to request a formalized way in which the donor and diplomatic communities be both consulted and informed on security sector matters, and on the progress of the Security Sector Review (SSR) by emphasizing its importance and priority relative to true reform efforts. In addition to these messages, we believe that targeted assistance to the PNTL through INCLE (International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement) funding can help the institution get on the right track and ensure that we have a seat at the table in determining policy direction for the PNTL in the long term. End summary. ¶2. (C) Post plans to request that regular security sector updates be provided to relevant members of the diplomatic community from either Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Atul Khare or Deputy SRSG Eric Tan. SIPDIS These updates should also be viewed as opportunities for UNMIT to brief the diplomatic community on the status of the SSR. Separately, Post will request that the RSO be included in the weekly Security Operations Center updates which are currently limited to UNMIT agencies. This is vital in abilty to optimally understand the security environment which we inhabit, and we view exclusion as detrimental to our safety. In other UN missions, it is the norm for there to be information sharing at this level, and in this volatile environment it does not serve the interests of either the American or the UN mission to be exclusionary. ¶3. (C) Within this context, Post will endeavor to use this as an opportunity to identify a specific role where it can apply targeted resources to the development of the East Timorese National Police (PNTL) through use of approximately $1.5 million of still available Fiscal Year 2006 INCLE funds. Post is in the process of consulting with PNTL leadership, the UN Police (UNPOL),and other interested parties regarding the long-term training plan for the PNTL, which has necessarily changed significantly following last year's crisis and the concurrent disintegration of the PNTL in the capital. We intend to use this consultation process to identify the areas where US INCLE assistance could have the most leverage. We can have a significant impact on the direction of the PNTL through INCLE assistance; moreover, by being directly involved in PNTL development we will have a seat at the table in important policy decisions. Specific proposal on this will be conveyed septel once consultations are complete. ¶4. (C) While Post recognizes that there are extraordinary sensitivities at play in terms of the East Timorese national election cycle, we will persist in emphasizing that clear progress be made by the GOET regarding the UN Commission of Inquiry's (COI) recommendations. (Note: The COI recommended several security sector officials for prosecution relating to crimes committed during the 2006 crisis period.) Additionally, UNMIT must continue to leverage all of its influence upon the achievement of an outcome which best reflects the fullest possible accounting on behalf of all parties. True security sector reform in East Timor hinges upon this end. The fullest qualitative engagement of the East Timor Defense Force (F-FDTL) can only occur once the recommendations of the COI have been satisfactorily considered and acted upon by the GOET. While Post is sincerely interested in working to professionalize F-FDTL and to better integrate it within Pacific Command's DILI 00000120 002.2 OF 002 Theater Security Cooperation Plan, all efforts will remain obstructed until appropriate steps have been taken. ¶5. (C) As for other specific security-related issues, Post will maintain its support of collaborative GOET, International Stabilization Force (ISF),and UNMIT efforts to apprehend dissident leader Alfredo Reinado. We recognize that he and his close supporters are destabilizing factors, and that it is in East Timor's best interest to see them brought to justice swiftly. Post also sees the prompt resolution of the military "petitioner" (soldiers dismissed in 2006 following allegations of discrimination in the military) issue as being vital to renewing much of civil society's confidence in the rule of law, and to reinvigorate dialogue in matters of justice. While ex-Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato's conviction struck a significant chord in these regards, the petitioner episode - which has arguably been the trigger for much of the strife of the past year - must be met with a satisfactory outcome if true closure is to be achieved. HARSHA