S E C R E T DILI 000106

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY
PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/14/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MAAR ASEC KPKO AU TT
SUBJECT: CONTINUED SYMPATHY FOR REINADO IN WESTERN DISTRICTS

REF: A) DILI 089, B) DILI 096

CLASSIFIED BY: Stanley Harsha, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy
Dili, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)


1. (C/NF) Summary: In a March 11-13 visit to East Timor's
western districts Emboffs and US Defense Representative found
that dissident military leader Major Alfredo Reinado retains
strong backing across the region, though it remains unclear if
his supporters would be willing to go beyond their current
rhetoric to engage in demonstrations or violence. Police and
local leaders cautioned that further action against Reinado
could lead to renewed civil unrest and possibly violence.
However, such predictions are frequent and their realization
much less so, therefore the extent of this threat remains to be
seen. Nevertheless, Reinado clearly enjoys a friendly and
supportive environment in which he can operate, putting the
International Stabilization Force (ISF) at a distinct
disadvantage. Also of concern are unconfirmed but worrying
indications that Reinado may be regrouping his scattered forces
and that more members of the "petitioners" group may be joining
him. None of the scenarios for what happens next in the Reinado
saga can be regarded with equilibrium and it is likely that
Reinado, whether at large, captured or killed, will continue to
be a destabilizing factor. Moreover, the issues he represents
to the western population will remain in play and show little
sign of being resolved soon, as the growing iconic image of
Reinado as a "Robin Hood" figure loom larger than the man
himself. Charge and Emboffs briefed the Australian Ambassador
on these observations on March 14, while also reiterating the
USG's continued support for Australia's policy in East Timor.
During the trip, covering over 500 kilometers through six
districts, Emboffs saw few signs of hostility towards
westerners, though there was some anti-Australia graffiti. End

summary.


2. (SBU) Emboffs and USDR traveled to the western districts of
East Timor, March 11-13, traveling through six districts while
stopping in the towns of Maliana, Suai, Same, Maubisse, Aileu,
and Gleno. The goal of the trip was to assess the current state
of support for dissident military leader Alfredo Reinado, who is
currently on the run from the ISF following a clash in Same on
March 3-4 in which five of his men were killed (see reftel A).
Emboffs were able to travel throughout the western districts
without incident, finding the friendly reception encountered on
previous trips to be the same. Overall, there were few signs of
hostility toward foreigners, with the exception of a few
sightings of anti-Australian graffiti. In general, pro-Reinado
sources emphasized that they blamed the government, not the
Australians, for the raid on Reinado as the government had set
the policy and issued the order.

Widespread support for Reinado endures
--------------

3. (C) Throughout our travels, it was evident that popular
sympathy and support for Reinado remains strong, especially
among youth, but also among community, opposition, and church
leaders. International interlocutors resident in these
districts consistently reported that pro-Reinado sentiment was
in fact the norm. In Aileu, American citizen nuns who have
lived there for more than a decade noted that most people
question why the authorities are fixated on Reinado, who they
see as not having harmed anyone, while neglecting problems they
regard as far more urgent, such a the petitioner issue, security
in Dili, and rice shortages. The support that Reinado is
receiving from various Catholic Church leaders is also
significant. (See Ref B on the views of the Bishop of Dili.)
Father Natalino, the Catholic Church's sole representative in
Suai and an unabashed Reinado supporter told us that when
Australian troops called him to the local police station to
question him about Reinado's whereabouts, he retorted that "he
is hiding in my heart." Other signs of pro-Reinado sentiment
were also in evidence, such as the well-tended shrines in Suai

honoring two Reinado subordinates who have been killed as well
as several instances of pro-Reinado graffiti.


4. (C) Despite the consistent expressions of support for Reinado
and the consequent unhappiness with the decision taken by the
President and Prime Minister requesting ISF to take military
action to capture him, Emboffs observed life carrying on as
normal throughout the West. The clear exception to this was the
town of Same which exhibited both the physical and psychological
impact of the recent events there. Emboffs in Same on March 12
observed that it was visibly tense with evidence of substantial
unrest. There was extensive pro-Reinado graffiti around the
market area and numerous piles of ash where tires had recently
been burned. Local police officers initially told us that
things were calming, but the Director of Operations for the
national police (PNTL) in Manufahi district later confided to a
member of our locally-engaged staff that they feared reprisals
from the local community, who perceived them as collaborating
with the Australian troops. In addition, local and
international media reported this week that residents of Same
are angry because Australian troops searched their homes,
damaged over a dozen houses with their helicopter's rotor wash,
and briefly detained some citizens, although Australian
diplomatic sources said these reports sensationalized the
situation and we were unable to get direct confirmation that
these events occurred.


5. (C) At present, it appears that the pro-Reinado sentiment is
primarily passive. While we saw several days of unrest in Dili
last week apparently by Reinado supporters in response to the
March 3-4 ISF operations in Same, this was limited in scale and
quickly subsided. Despite calls to "call off the ISF" coming
from multiple quarters, ranging from opposition parties and
youth groups to the Church, these calls have not been
accompanied by any notable mobilization. Nonetheless, the
importance of this "passive" support should not be dismissed.
While the pro-Reinado populace is not actively agitating, they
comprise a remarkably friendly and advantageous environment in
which he can operate. Without him doing something to call
attention to his location, he may be able to continue to evade
capture efforts. Moreover, many interlocutors in the western
districts claimed that the currently passive support could
easily translate into action if Reinado was captured or killed.
In conversation with Emboffs on March 12, the Covalima district
youth coordinator for the opposition Democratic Party (PD)
stated that the youth of Suai would not under any circumstances
accept either the arrest or death of Reinado.

Petitioners joining up?
--------------

6. (C) Besides Reinado's broader popularity, another concern is
the prospect that he and his men may be regrouping, possibly
with new members from the petitioner group joining. Sources in
both Gleno and Aileu reported that the petitioners, whose main
bases have been in these towns for many months, have disappeared
and their current location remains unknown. The Australian
Defense Force (ADF) based in Gleno reported that the petitioners
"started disappearing" on March 3 as the operation in Same got
underway. Sources close to the petitioners have relayed to
Emboffs that they are scared that the operation against Reinado
will soon extend to them and that they are simply hiding in the
hills. However, several petitioners told a reliable journalist
source that they are intent on joining Reinado. Indications
that petitioners as well as other sympathizers are endeavoring
to join Reinado have come from other sources as well.
Meanwhile, in the last few days Reinado has been actively using
local media to draw links between himself and historical figures
which waged rebellions against the Portuguese. Observers note
that Reinado's best chance to avoid capture and increase his
ability to influence the situation would be to lay low for now
and wait for election results, but that his penchant for the
lime light may result in an earlier action, with potential to
bring things to a head again.

Staying the course~for now

--------------

7. (S/NF) Charge and Emboffs briefed Australian Ambassador
Margaret Twomey on these findings on March 14. Ambassador
Twomey was eager to hear our impressions of popular sentiment in
the western districts and agreed that a key outstanding question
was the extent to which this sympathy for Reinado would turn
into active support. She also concurred with our assessment
that Reinado's popularity is stems from the broad perception
that he is standing up to an unjust Fretilin government which
has accomplished little for the people in the western districts,
and despite the crisis of the last year has continued to
demonstrate a lack of will to address pressing problems, ranging
from failures of the judicial sector to immediate food
shortages. She agrees that Reinado the symbol is more of a
threat than the man. Ambassador Twomey told us that she
personally sympathizes with those who complain about ineffective
governance, but that taking up arms is not the solution. Charge
expressed to Ambassador Twomey that the USG fully supports the
Australian government in its efforts to restore stability to
East Timor, but that we remain concerned over potential
implications of the Reinado situation, whether he remains an
outlaw at large, or is caught or killed. When asked if the
Australian government was considering ways to resolve the
situation to avoid violence or a potential popular backlash, she
told us that her experience in the last nine months has proved
that negotiations with Reinado are fruitless.


8. (S/NF) While at present, the Australian-UN-GOET consensus
that dialogue with Reinado is out of the question remains
steadfast, pressures continue from a number of quarters for the
government in particular to soften this stance. A reliable
source today relayed to us that the Church leadership is working
behind the scenes to convince both the President and Prime
Minister to resume dialogue with Reinado. This pressure seems
to be emerging despite Church leaders' avowed reluctance to be
involved in facilitating such a dialogue themselves. (Ref B).
Australian Ambassador Twomey on March 14 relayed her frustration
with some of the previous government "waffling" on the Reinado
issue. Some observers believe that accepting the terms of
surrender that Reinado has relayed to the government and the ISF
may be an acceptable compromise way out of the current dilemma.


9. (C/NF) Comment: None of the scenarios for what happens from
here can be regarded with equilibrium. If Reinado remains at
large, the credibility of the GOET and ISF will continue to
erode and he his mythical stature will likely grow. While it is
possible that his group could remain too scattered and weakened
to do anything (a view held by some international observers), it
is not at all clear that this is the case. The possibility of
Reinado emerging at the head of a larger threat than his group
represented previously cannot be discounted at this point.
Moreover, the longer he remains free, the more likely that we
will see the government start to bend in its resolve, an
occurrence which will have implications for the ISF and GOA's
role in the country. His surrender would be the ideal solution,
with capture and imprisonment as the next best outcome, helping
to remove the threat of this armed group and hopefully
diminishing his hero status and shifting his case to a judicial
process. Nonetheless, such a development is highly likely to
cause another round of unrest in Dili such as that seen for
several nights last week, and possibly a much more widespread
reaction. The risk of widespread unrest would be significantly
increased if Reinado were to be killed in the effort to capture
him, and such a development would likely make him a martyr. In
many ways Reinado is far less important as an individual than
for what he represents to a large portion of a disaffected
populace. End comment.
HARSHA