CONTINUED SYMPATHY FOR REINADO IN WESTERN DISTRICTS

S E C R E T DILI 000106 SIPDIS NOFORN DEPT FOR EAP/MTS USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/14/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL MAAR ASEC KPKO AU TT SUBJECT: CONTINUED SYMPATHY FOR REINADO IN WESTERN DISTRICTS REF: A) DILI 089, B) DILI 096 CLASSIFIED BY: Stanley Harsha, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Dili, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C/NF) Summary: In a March 11-13 visit to East Timor's western districts Emboffs and US Defense Representative found that dissident military leader Major Alfredo Reinado retains strong backing across the region, though it remains unclear if his supporters would be willing to go beyond their current rhetoric to engage in demonstrations or violence. Police and local leaders cautioned that further action against Reinado could lead to renewed civil unrest and possibly violence. However, such predictions are frequent and their realization much less so, therefore the extent of this threat remains to be seen. Nevertheless, Reinado clearly enjoys a friendly and supportive environment in which he can operate, putting the International Stabilization Force (ISF) at a distinct disadvantage. Also of concern are unconfirmed but worrying indications that Reinado may be regrouping his scattered forces and that more members of the "petitioners" group may be joining him. None of the scenarios for what happens next in the Reinado saga can be regarded with equilibrium and it is likely that Reinado, whether at large, captured or killed, will continue to be a destabilizing factor. Moreover, the issues he represents to the western population will remain in play and show little sign of being resolved soon, as the growing iconic image of Reinado as a "Robin Hood" figure loom larger than the man himself. Charge and Emboffs briefed the Australian Ambassador on these observations on March 14, while also reiterating the USG's continued support for Australia's policy in East Timor. During the trip, covering over 500 kilometers through six districts, Emboffs saw few signs of hostility towards westerners, though there was some anti-Australia graffiti. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) Emboffs and USDR traveled to the western districts of East Timor, March 11-13, traveling through six districts while stopping in the towns of Maliana, Suai, Same, Maubisse, Aileu, and Gleno. The goal of the trip was to assess the current state of support for dissident military leader Alfredo Reinado, who is currently on the run from the ISF following a clash in Same on March 3-4 in which five of his men were killed (see reftel A). Emboffs were able to travel throughout the western districts without incident, finding the friendly reception encountered on previous trips to be the same. Overall, there were few signs of hostility toward foreigners, with the exception of a few sightings of anti-Australian graffiti. In general, pro-Reinado sources emphasized that they blamed the government, not the Australians, for the raid on Reinado as the government had set the policy and issued the order. Widespread support for Reinado endures -------------- ¶3. (C) Throughout our travels, it was evident that popular sympathy and support for Reinado remains strong, especially among youth, but also among community, opposition, and church leaders. International interlocutors resident in these districts consistently reported that pro-Reinado sentiment was in fact the norm. In Aileu, American citizen nuns who have lived there for more than a decade noted that most people question why the authorities are fixated on Reinado, who they see as not having harmed anyone, while neglecting problems they regard as far more urgent, such a the petitioner issue, security in Dili, and rice shortages. The support that Reinado is receiving from various Catholic Church leaders is also significant. (See Ref B on the views of the Bishop of Dili.) Father Natalino, the Catholic Church's sole representative in Suai and an unabashed Reinado supporter told us that when Australian troops called him to the local police station to question him about Reinado's whereabouts, he retorted that "he is hiding in my heart." Other signs of pro-Reinado sentiment were also in evidence, such as the well-tended shrines in Suai honoring two Reinado subordinates who have been killed as well as several instances of pro-Reinado graffiti. ¶4. (C) Despite the consistent expressions of support for Reinado and the consequent unhappiness with the decision taken by the President and Prime Minister requesting ISF to take military action to capture him, Emboffs observed life carrying on as normal throughout the West. The clear exception to this was the town of Same which exhibited both the physical and psychological impact of the recent events there. Emboffs in Same on March 12 observed that it was visibly tense with evidence of substantial unrest. There was extensive pro-Reinado graffiti around the market area and numerous piles of ash where tires had recently been burned. Local police officers initially told us that things were calming, but the Director of Operations for the national police (PNTL) in Manufahi district later confided to a member of our locally-engaged staff that they feared reprisals from the local community, who perceived them as collaborating with the Australian troops. In addition, local and international media reported this week that residents of Same are angry because Australian troops searched their homes, damaged over a dozen houses with their helicopter's rotor wash, and briefly detained some citizens, although Australian diplomatic sources said these reports sensationalized the situation and we were unable to get direct confirmation that these events occurred. ¶5. (C) At present, it appears that the pro-Reinado sentiment is primarily passive. While we saw several days of unrest in Dili last week apparently by Reinado supporters in response to the March 3-4 ISF operations in Same, this was limited in scale and quickly subsided. Despite calls to "call off the ISF" coming from multiple quarters, ranging from opposition parties and youth groups to the Church, these calls have not been accompanied by any notable mobilization. Nonetheless, the importance of this "passive" support should not be dismissed. While the pro-Reinado populace is not actively agitating, they comprise a remarkably friendly and advantageous environment in which he can operate. Without him doing something to call attention to his location, he may be able to continue to evade capture efforts. Moreover, many interlocutors in the western districts claimed that the currently passive support could easily translate into action if Reinado was captured or killed. In conversation with Emboffs on March 12, the Covalima district youth coordinator for the opposition Democratic Party (PD) stated that the youth of Suai would not under any circumstances accept either the arrest or death of Reinado. Petitioners joining up? -------------- ¶6. (C) Besides Reinado's broader popularity, another concern is the prospect that he and his men may be regrouping, possibly with new members from the petitioner group joining. Sources in both Gleno and Aileu reported that the petitioners, whose main bases have been in these towns for many months, have disappeared and their current location remains unknown. The Australian Defense Force (ADF) based in Gleno reported that the petitioners "started disappearing" on March 3 as the operation in Same got underway. Sources close to the petitioners have relayed to Emboffs that they are scared that the operation against Reinado will soon extend to them and that they are simply hiding in the hills. However, several petitioners told a reliable journalist source that they are intent on joining Reinado. Indications that petitioners as well as other sympathizers are endeavoring to join Reinado have come from other sources as well. Meanwhile, in the last few days Reinado has been actively using local media to draw links between himself and historical figures which waged rebellions against the Portuguese. Observers note that Reinado's best chance to avoid capture and increase his ability to influence the situation would be to lay low for now and wait for election results, but that his penchant for the lime light may result in an earlier action, with potential to bring things to a head again. Staying the course~for now -------------- ¶7. (S/NF) Charge and Emboffs briefed Australian Ambassador Margaret Twomey on these findings on March 14. Ambassador Twomey was eager to hear our impressions of popular sentiment in the western districts and agreed that a key outstanding question was the extent to which this sympathy for Reinado would turn into active support. She also concurred with our assessment that Reinado's popularity is stems from the broad perception that he is standing up to an unjust Fretilin government which has accomplished little for the people in the western districts, and despite the crisis of the last year has continued to demonstrate a lack of will to address pressing problems, ranging from failures of the judicial sector to immediate food shortages. She agrees that Reinado the symbol is more of a threat than the man. Ambassador Twomey told us that she personally sympathizes with those who complain about ineffective governance, but that taking up arms is not the solution. Charge expressed to Ambassador Twomey that the USG fully supports the Australian government in its efforts to restore stability to East Timor, but that we remain concerned over potential implications of the Reinado situation, whether he remains an outlaw at large, or is caught or killed. When asked if the Australian government was considering ways to resolve the situation to avoid violence or a potential popular backlash, she told us that her experience in the last nine months has proved that negotiations with Reinado are fruitless. ¶8. (S/NF) While at present, the Australian-UN-GOET consensus that dialogue with Reinado is out of the question remains steadfast, pressures continue from a number of quarters for the government in particular to soften this stance. A reliable source today relayed to us that the Church leadership is working behind the scenes to convince both the President and Prime Minister to resume dialogue with Reinado. This pressure seems to be emerging despite Church leaders' avowed reluctance to be involved in facilitating such a dialogue themselves. (Ref B). Australian Ambassador Twomey on March 14 relayed her frustration with some of the previous government "waffling" on the Reinado issue. Some observers believe that accepting the terms of surrender that Reinado has relayed to the government and the ISF may be an acceptable compromise way out of the current dilemma. ¶9. (C/NF) Comment: None of the scenarios for what happens from here can be regarded with equilibrium. If Reinado remains at large, the credibility of the GOET and ISF will continue to erode and he his mythical stature will likely grow. While it is possible that his group could remain too scattered and weakened to do anything (a view held by some international observers),it is not at all clear that this is the case. The possibility of Reinado emerging at the head of a larger threat than his group represented previously cannot be discounted at this point. Moreover, the longer he remains free, the more likely that we will see the government start to bend in its resolve, an occurrence which will have implications for the ISF and GOA's role in the country. His surrender would be the ideal solution, with capture and imprisonment as the next best outcome, helping to remove the threat of this armed group and hopefully diminishing his hero status and shifting his case to a judicial process. Nonetheless, such a development is highly likely to cause another round of unrest in Dili such as that seen for several nights last week, and possibly a much more widespread reaction. The risk of widespread unrest would be significantly increased if Reinado were to be killed in the effort to capture him, and such a development would likely make him a martyr. In many ways Reinado is far less important as an individual than for what he represents to a large portion of a disaffected populace. End comment. HARSHA