"KING'S" PARTY COULD UNDERMINE FREE AND TIMELY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DHAKA 000907 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2017 TAGS: PGOV MARR PHUM BG SUBJECT: "KING'S" PARTY COULD UNDERMINE FREE AND TIMELY ELECTIONS Classified By: A/DCM D.C. McCullough, reason para 1.4 d. ¶1. (C) Summary. The military continues to court primarily BNP politicians for a new "king's" party, but its failure to displace the "two ladies," the absence of credible leadership for the party, and mixed signals about General Moeen's political ambitions have confused and frustrated potential recruits. If the military's exit strategy is the creation of a "king's" party to supplant the two mainstream parties and protect its equities with the next government, the presumption -- based on Bangladeshi history and political realities -- is that the new party would need time and major military support to win. End Summary. The Drive Begins -------------- ¶2. (C) Within weeks of the onset of the current government, contacts in the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, the Awami League, Ershad's Jatiya Party, and the Liberal Democratic Party -- virtually every major party except Jamaat Islami -- told us they were being urged by Brigadier General Chowdhury Fazlur Bari, Counterintelligence Director of the Directorate-General Forces Intelligence, and in some cases by Brigadier General ATM Amin, DGFI Counterterrorism Director, to support a new military-backed political party. The target audience includes senior and mid-level party officials as well as several prominent members of civil society. One Awami League MP claimed he was threatened with corruption charges if he balked, but other contacts report the threat was assumed but not explicit. A former BNP minister told us 100 BNP MPs interested in a king's party face or fear they could face corruption charges. ¶3. (C) The recruitment continued even after Awami League president Sheikh Hasina's triumphant return to Dhaka on May 7, although the focus tightened on the BNP as Hasina solidified her position within the party. In the last 10 days of May, Bari reportedly met with a large group of BNP backbenchers twice at local restaurants, one of which Hasina indirectly referred to in public as an example of how some people are above the ban on indoor political activity. Bumps in the Road -------------- ¶4. (C) By late May, BNP dissident leaders who had originally hailed the January 11 state of emergency as a golden opportunity for the no-nonsense military to evict the two ladies and clean up the country were complaining to us that the military failure's on key fronts and mixed signals from DGFI and COAS General Moeen has left them frustrated and confused. They cited: A) A failure of nerve that allowed Hasina to return to Dhaka and failed to dislodge Khaleda Zia from Dhaka or the BNP, which aborted any hope of meaningful internal reform (i.e., change leaders) and undercut the potential of a new party to compete effectively against two very well-established parties. B) The lack of clarity on General Moeen's intentions. On the one hand, Bari promised the new party would enjoy full military support, but Amin and other officers now maintain that no final decision had been made about a new party. Most intermediaries reported that Moeen assured them he has no political ambitions, though one said Moeen added the caveat "unless the country calls on me to serve." C) The absence of credible leadership for the new party, especially with Moeen's role undefined. Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus was seriously damaged by his premature, flopped entry into politics, and constitutional lawyer Kamal Hossain, although well regarded by liberal elites, has no popular appeal and a dismal track record as a politician. D) The lack of a defined party identity. BNP is a hodgepodge of anti-Awami League elements, but, especially if the BNP survives, what would be the rallying point of a new party? Impact on Possible Political Scenarios -------------- ¶5. (C) The question of a king's party profoundly affects the three political scenarios now challenging Bangladesh: DHAKA 00000907 002 OF 003 A) The AL and BNP reform themselves into credible, rejuvenated parties and participate constructively in the new electoral process: This looks like the least likely outcome, at least with the two ladies still at the helm of their respective parties and the continuing timidity of potential successors, especially in the BNP, to make their move. BNP Secretary General Manan Bhuiyan lamented to us as a SIPDIS cautionary tale: "(BNP leader) Hanan Shah spoke out and he got arrested," a lesson that got sharper with the May 28 arrest of his Awami League counterpart. Reputed advisers of Moeen, like Kamal Hossain and political science professor Ataur Rahman, have publicly proclaimed the parties' failure to reform as a justification for a new "clean" party. B) The AL and BNP remain largely unchanged and, over a bumpy road, end up taking Bangladesh back to more or less pre-January 11 levels of stalemate and poor governance, a concern held by insightful liberal observers like Daily Star editor Mahfuz Anam. C) A king's party emerges and almost by definition is guided to electoral victory, presumably with a big enough majority to implement major constitutional changes, like boosting presidential powers and ratifying the creation of a military-dominated national security council. The Purpose of a King's Party -------------- ¶6. (C) Moeen and Bari deny to us and others that they are forging a king's party or have any political ambitions. If that is true, and dozens of contacts across the political spectrum are wrong, the military does not appear to have a Plan B for achieving the goals of a king's party, namely safeguarding the institutional and personal equities of the military from civilian, and especially BNP, reprisals in the next government. Many Bangladeshis assume, based on their history with the parties launched by Generals Zia and Ershad, and also because of the enduring strength of the two big parties, that a king's party with no grassroots organization could gain traction only with major government support, either by hamstringing the opposition or actually rigging the electoral process. ¶7. (C) There is a consensus across the loyalist-dissident divide in both parties that the government will maintain the political activity ban until a king's party gets its footing or the king's party idea is discarded. Loyalists say the ban should be lifted now, while those who lean toward a king's party, like Kamal Hossain, say politics remains too susceptible to corrupt influences to allow an immediate resumption of activity. What's Next? -------------- ¶8. (C) Having failed to exile the two ladies, the next option for the government is to take Hasina and then, for the sake of bipartisanship, Zia to trial on corruption and perhaps other charges. The government is clearly laying the groundwork for charging Hasina and is close to the point of political no return, where inaction would be interpreted as loss of nerve or conviction. Arresting Hasina, however, would be risky because of the Awami League's potentially violent reaction and her ability to project herself as a martyr to the tens of millions of Bangladeshis who still fervently back her. Alternatively, Hasina plans to travel to the U.S. in late June, potentially a second chance for the government to keep her out. ¶9. (C) Whither the two major parties? BNP is in disarray with a leader, Zia, who is preoccupied with saving her sons, and no one in her party has the stature or the guts to challenge her leadership. The Awami League is relatively intact, despite the recent arrests. Having first covered its flanks by disabling the BNP, the obvious immediate threat to the military's engineering of the state of emergency proclamation, the military -- the driving force behind the government's anti-corruption program -- appears to be moving on to the Awami League and especially to Hasina's most loyal supporters. Senior military officers remain strongly anti-Awami League, and it is highly unlikely that they would destroy the BNP to leave the field open for the Awami League. DHAKA 00000907 003 OF 003 ¶10. (C) Another factor is the erosion of the government's popularity, the bedrock of its political legitimacy. Recent polling by The Asia Foundation and overwhelming anecdotal evidence indicate the honeymoon is over because of rising discontent over rising prices and the government's perceived inability to improve basic infrastructure services (septel). ¶11. (C) We continue to take encouragement from Moeen's assurances that a coup will not occur on his watch and that martial law would happen only if the army's "back was against the wall." However, the specter of martial law looms large for many Bangladeshis for and against a king's party. Martial law is the fallback if a king's party fails, some worry, while others say it would take martial law to make a king's party a serious political contender. ¶12. (C) The acid test of military intentions may be the municipal elections the government says will come first at some unspecified point. Although ostensibly non-party, if a king's party is not in place for the rehearsal, it likely has little future for the main event. Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) Bangladeshi media have become more direct in reporting efforts to create a "new" party, normally without any reference to military involvement. However, if the creation of a king's party is the military's exit strategy, the presumption must be that the military knows the party will need much help to win. Even if widescale cheating is ruled out, the party would need time to develop and erode the advantages of its rivals. It is also worth emphasizing that, the muttering of urban elites aside, Hasina and Zia retain large rural followings, and many of them might shun an election if the two ladies are not in some way onboard with the process. Thus, if a king's party does materialize, almost certainly at the expense of the two mainstream parties, its impact on a free and timely election will likely be significant. PAIGE