USARPAC COMMANDER BROWN'S MEETING WITH BANGLADESH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 000848

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SECDEF FOR OSD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2017
TAGS: MARR PREL PHUM PGOV BG
SUBJECT: USARPAC COMMANDER BROWN'S MEETING WITH BANGLADESH
COAS MOEEN

Classified By: Ambassador Patricia Butenis, reason para 1.4 d.


1. (C) Summary. In his meetings with COAS General Moeen and
other senior Bangladeshi military officers, USARPAC Commander
LTG Brown stressed the importance of returning Bangladesh to
democratic, elected governance as soon as possible and noted
the difficulties the Thai generals have encountered by
intervening in politics. Other topics reported USDAO Dhaka
septel. End Summary.


2. (C) On May 16, General Brown, the Ambassador, and DATT
(notetaker) met with Chief of Army Staff LTG Moeen Uddin
Ahmed. He noted the difficulties that General Sonthi and the
Thai military are experiencing as a result of their coup
d'etat and attempts to combat corruption and re-engineer
Thailand's political culture. In that context, he hoped that
Bangladesh could return to elected, democratic government as
soon as possible. General Brown also discussed with Moeen
and other senior Bangladeshi military officers U.S. security
commitments and cooperation, transformation and
modernization, the importance of NCO leadership development,
and force modernization strategies for enhancing
interoperability (see USDAO Dhaka septel.)


3. (C) Moeen said he wished to raise two points. First, he
expressed concern over the USG's policy of not training
Bangladeshi military members assigned currently or in the
past to the paramilitary Rapid Action Battalion (RAB).
(Note: The policy stems from RAB's association with
extra-judicial killings.) In this situation, Moeen said,
Bangladesh might be obliged to stop sending its military
personnel for U.S. training. Second, the Bangladesh military
is subservient to the caretaker government and operates only
in aid to civil authorities, nothing more. The military does
not run ministries or a parallel administration, he said, but
does provide advice on issues ranging from security to
possible reforms in health care and power generation.


4. (C) The Ambassador told Moeen that IMET is a State, not a
DOD, program, and that as a matter of policy and law we are
obligated to vet course nominees on human rights grounds. We
are open to proposals for improving the process, she said,
but the best solution of course would be for RAB to deal
effectively with its human rights problems.


5. (C) Moeen described the army as a jack of all trades but
master of just one -- peacekeeping. The army is the only
entity capable of supporting the Election Commission; the
government wants elections in late 2008, he said, but the
army has pushed for early elections at the local level to
develop the capacity for successful voter registration and
elections at the national level. The army can mobilize
personnel to support elections, but involving it in electoral
machinery procurements would expose it to corrupt influences.


6. (C) In a separate meeting with Principal Staff Officer MG
Mohammed Jahangir Alam Chowdhury, General Brown reiterated
the dangers of following the Thai "model" and the importance
of returning Bangladesh to elected, democratic governance.
Jahangir took the points.


7. (C) Turning to the Rapid Action Battalion, Jahangir
credited it with the arrest and subsequent execution of six
senior leaders of Jamaatul Mujahdidin Bangladesh, the banned
terrorist group responsible for a series of bombings and
suicide attacks in late 2005. RAB, he said, is interrogating
some 16 suspects picked up after three small bomb blasts on
May 1 at railroad stations in Dhaka, Chittagong, and Sylhet,
that were claimed by the previously unknown Jadid al-Qaida
Bangladesh. Approximately 3500-4000 of the 7000-person RAB
comes from the military, with 45 percent from the army, he
added. Jahangir blamed negative RAB press reports on
sensationalist media and human rights organizations.

8. (C) Comment: Moeen's assertion aside of possibly looking
for military training elsewhere, the Bangladesh military
greatly values IMET because of its value for individual
officers and because it enhances the military's overall
credibility for lucrative international peacekeeping
missions. Preserving a healthy IMET program is also
important for the USG because of its significant policy
implications, both regional (peacekeeping) and bilateral

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(access to a key institution). Our ban on any nominees with
RAB service will take a greater toll on IMET as more and more
officers rotate through RAB. To avert a breakdown, we need
to consider discreet but effective options for weeding out
RAB-affiliated nominees, but in the longer run we may wish to
consider an approach that provides for effective vetting
based on individual scrutiny rather than an outright
institutional ban.


9. (C) With the military sending mixed signals on its
political intentions, it is essential that we continue to
press senior leaders on the importance of restoring
Bangladesh's democracy as soon as possible. General Brown's
support in this area was therefore very welcomed. His
reference to Thailand addressed the widespread perception
here that Bangladeshi generals were inspired by their Thai
counterparts to take what they characterized as corrective
action against a debased political system.


10. (SBU) General Brown departed Bangladesh before this
message was drafted.
BUTENIS