BANGLADESHIS STILL UPBEAT ABOUT GOVERNMENT BUT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DHAKA 000283 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEN BG SUBJECT: BANGLADESHIS STILL UPBEAT ABOUT GOVERNMENT BUT CLOUDS LOOM REF: DHAKA 0144 Classified By: Ambassador Patricia Butenis, reason para 1.4 d. ¶1. (S) Summary. Bangladeshis remain highly supportive of their government's reformist agenda, but the success of its anti-corruption drive is critical -- if the drive falters, so does the rationale for delaying elections and hobbling political parties. Government hints of an election in late 2007 are unlikely to materialize, especially if a "national unity government" is installed as early as May. Mixed popular reaction to the political trial balloon of Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus, the favorite to head a unity government, and the refusal of the "two ladies" to heed army encouragement to leave Bangladesh suggest all will not be smooth sailing for the government. We continue to press for elections as soon as Bangladeshis can arrange them, to urge the government to announce an election road map and engage with the political parties, and to protest violations of human rights and due process. We have also offered the government concrete help in investigating and prosecuting corruption cases. End Summary. The Honeymoon Continues -------------- ¶2. (C) Not since the collapse of the Ershad dictatorship in 1990 has the country's mood been so strikingly upbeat. Having averted the disaster of a one-sided election and its violent aftermath, Bangladesh now has a government that commands high popular support for its actions and vision. Democracy stalwarts like Kamal Hossain, a drafter of the Bangladesh constitution, support the government because, despite its undemocratic origins, it seems to represent the country's best hope for genuine reform. The government has stumbled in a few areas, such as the mass evacuation of slum dwellers, transparency in its decision-making is blurry at best, and there are growing signs it is not above cutting legal corners to get results. However, none of this seems to have undermined its popularity. The Bliss Will Fade -------------- ¶3. (S) Even matches made in heaven, though, develop strains, and Bangladesh is a demanding partner under the best of circumstances. Within the next six months, the government faces several potential tests: A) Agitation. There is no chance elections will occur before the summer, but the Awami League has threatened to hit the streets if elections are not held by May 12, the date some constitutional analysts say marks the end of a 120-day state of emergency. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party could join the fray to short-circuit the government's anti-corruption crusade, which has fractured the party's leadership and gutted its chances in an early election. Seasonal power, fuel, fertilizer, and water shortages this summer -- along with rising prices of commodities due to domestic and regional factors -- could boost the agitation. B) Restive Political Parties. Sheikh Hasina has begun attending low-key events and speaking to the media, but Khaleda Zia is in virtual seclusion, anxious to protect Tarique and her other son from arrest on corruption charges. Senior party figures once viewed as her inner circle now tell us Zia and Tarique have to go, and party Secretary General Mannan Bhuiyan has emerged as her likeliest successor. If the parties feel threatened or deprived, they could begin defying bans on political activities, and demand to be consulted at the beginning, and not just the end, of the political reform process. C) Reaction to a major government misstep, such as a botched attempt to force Sheikh Hasina or Khaleda Zia into exile. D) Disappointment over the failure of government initiatives to fix long-standing problems like power shortages. E) The military changes course. There is no sign of a Zia counter-reformation, and there is consensus that the military has gone too far to return to the barracks without ensuring DHAKA 00000283 002 OF 004 it is protected against reprisals from the next government, especially if it is led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. However, some senior army officers, recollecting the Ershad disaster or fearing for the institution's long-term integrity, are already wary of the military's renewed involvement in politics. If the government agenda starts to unravel, military divisions cannot be ruled out. ¶4. (S) A failure of military nerve or unity seems remote, but the other potential tests all seem likely to one degree or another. Warning Signs -------------- ¶5. (S) As an un-elected, military-backed regime, the government's legitimacy hinges on its meeting Bangladeshi expectations for reform and timely elections. Its coyness about setting an election date is partially offset by hints from government officials of an election in late 2007, the outer marker of what many political leaders seem willing to accept. However, if the government's commitment to nonpartisan reform or timely elections appears to wobble, attitudes could change quickly. Possible warning signs include: A) The formation of a "national unity" government since almost by definition it implies a longer and broader tenure than just a "caretaker" regime. Its military backers envision a body of technocrats and a few defectors from the main political parties to serve as the executive body of a military-driven reform agenda. B) Government failure to announce an election road map by the end of the summer, since elections would presumably require at least a standard caretaker government span of 90 days to arrange. C) The anti-corruption drive falters. Cleansing politics of "black" money is central to the government's pledge to rehabilitate politics and governance. If prosecutions fail to materialize, suspects are tried only for relatively minor crimes, detainees are released without charge, and obvious "big fish" -- like Khaleda Zia's son Tarique or her brother, a former military officer who brokered military contracts and appointments -- continue to evade arrest, the drive would lose its luster and the government would lose much of its credibility. D) Both the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, perhaps with new leadership, transform themselves into constructive reform partners, but the government still refuses to engage with the parties or to allow them to operate freely. E) Tarique Rahman somehow survives as a force in his party. Given his resources and ruthlessness, anything short of imprisonment, death, or exile would leave him as a constant threat to the new political landscape. F) The government starts to lose the support of liberal civil society and thus a key part of its legitimacy. The Power Behind the Shrinking Screen -------------- ¶6. (S) Ironically, 17 years after the Ershad debacle a dysfunctional political process gave the army an opportunity, even an obligation, according to many Bangladeshis, to return to political power and become the savior of democracy by pulling the plug on an election. Bangladeshis seem ready to accept the sleight of hand that leaves the military discreetly positioned behind the screen so long as military influence becomes neither too overt or overbearing. ¶7. (S) Whether the military has the patience and commitment to remain behind the screen is another matter. Chief of Army Staff General Moeen insists he has no political aspirations, but he is acting more and more like a politician, meeting cross-sections of society, handing out relief materials to poor people, and summoning President Ahmed for a meeting with service chiefs at Army Headquarters. Retired generals DHAKA 00000283 003 OF 004 already hold two of the 10 government advisor positions, a retired general has been sworn in as an Election Commissioner, and military representation is expected on the Anti-Corruption Commission and the powerful Public Service Commission when they are reconstituted. Also, there appear to be limits to the army's commitment to reform; of the hundreds of notable persons fingered thus far in the anti-corruption drive, not one is known to be active or retired military. The Yunus Factor -------------- ¶8. (S) Military officers have identified Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus as the ideal consensus leader for a national unity government, but some are reportedly having second thoughts after the mixed reaction to his plan to float a political party. The negative reaction of political leaders was unsurprising since he projects himself as an alternative to their failed leadership, but popular reaction did not mirror the national rapture that greeted his Nobel Peace Prize. Invited to address Dhaka University's commencement ceremony, academics have demanded he withdraw because of his new political profile. He is, therefore, losing his stature as a national treasure, and his political party risks being labeled a "king's" party, particularly if it gets privileges denied to other parties. To succeed against the two major parties, his party would need massive financial and logistical support. The Fork in the Road -------------- ¶9. (S) At the end of the year, Bangladesh faces two scenarios: The government has held free, fair, and credible elections; or it has delayed elections until a national unity government has completed a long list of reforms. A 2007 election looks increasingly remote since no concrete action appears to be underway to meet such a timeframe, including the Election Commission, which says it is methodically studying reform options before reaching out to political parties. And on February 15, General Moeen told DATT (septel) that it would take at least a year just to produce a good voter list, a project the army itself is now proposing to undertake. Popular reaction to delayed elections would likely be negative but would be affected by perceptions of government performance, such as the impact of the anti-corruption drive and whether a credible electoral road-map were in place and whether the government was acting in an authoritarian or partisan manner. The USG Message -------------- ¶10. (S) Our message needs to strike a balance between key areas where we have some potential for influence, like human rights, and areas where our room for maneuver is less but it is still important to be on record. A) Elections: Bangladeshis are prepared to put up with a constitutionally ambiguous government in the hope they get long-needed reforms no political party was even willing to contemplate. Even senior leaders in both major parties are happy to wait in order to create conditions for replacing the "two ladies" or to improve their electoral prospects. Thus, while we need to call for elections as soon as possible to keep the focus on the importance of elections and to encourage the government to move forward, we also need to continue to leave it to Bangladeshis to determine the timing, and modalities, of their election. B) Road Map: Failure to release an election road map by May 12 will fuel apprehensions about the government's intentions and play into any political party effort to foment agitation in support of elections. Thus, it is important to keep pressing the government for a road map C) Political Party Engagement: It is counterproductive to ignore the parties because they retain formidable organizations and popular support. Both parties have an incentive to engage constructively with the government, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party to temper the anti-corruption DHAKA 00000283 004.3 OF 004 drive and the Awami League to lock in its current political advantages over its long-time rival. And no matter how discredited they now are, both parties will eventually have to be engaged to support, or to reveal their aversion, for the new political process. D) Human Rights: In the way it has arrested and kept corruption suspects, the government has shown it is willing to cut legal corners to get the job done. Where existing laws are inadequate, ordinances are being issued to increase government leverage on, for example, property seizure. Pressure from the USG and others seems to have ended the custodial deaths that plagued the early rounds of arrests, and the government is also sensitive to allegations of torture. We need to continue to urge the government to respect human rights and ensure due process for all persons. E) The Military: We should reiterate our support for democratic, civilian rule, our opposition to military governments, and our commitment to monitor government actions to see if they are consistent with international standards of due process and democratic practice. F) Corruption: Anti-corruption is a long-standing USG priority around the world, and in Bangladesh we welcome the government's pledge to combat corruption in all walks of life. We have offered to discuss with the government ways to support the investigation and prosecution of corruption cases to promote justice and support due process. BUTENIS