KIKWETE'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST CORRUPTION: PROMISING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAR ES SALAAM 000085 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT AF/E FOR B YODER AND D MALAC ALSO DEPT FOR INL PLEASE PASS TO MCC FOR G BREVNOV, MKAVANAUGH E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2012 TAGS: PREL PHUM EAID ECON PGOV TZ SUBJECT: KIKWETE'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST CORRUPTION: PROMISING SIGNS, BUT FOR NOW, MORE RHETORIC THAN REALITY REF: A. A. DAR ES SALAAM 01776 ¶B. B. DAR ES SALAAM 01740 DAR ES SAL 00000085 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission, Purnell Delly, for reason 1.4 ( d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. After one year in office, President Kikwete has yet to match his strong anti-corruption rhetoric with concrete results. There are promising signs on the legislative front: Parliament approved a new Anti-Money Laundering bill last fall and the Anti-Corruption Bill is slated to move to the cabinet and then Parliament in early ¶2007. But the Government of Tanzania (GOT) has still not prosecuted a high-level corruption case in either the public or private sector and Tanzania's Transparency International rating of 2.9 has remained stagnant since 2004. More troubling, Tanzania's new PCB director, Edward Hosea, told us it remains an unspoken rule that bringing charges against the President or, significantly, the Prime Minister (whose name frequently arises in connection with alleged corruption) remains off the table in Tanzania. Hosea also told us that he remains unconvinced of Kikwete,s commitment to bringing senior government figures to justice, and that the litmus test of the President's sincerity would be PCB's first referral of a senior official to court for indictment. Hosea said he was aware that his new appointment meant he had many enemies, and that he felt at personal risk. End Summary. Kikwete Appoints New Anti-Corruption Chief -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Edward Hosea told the DCM on December 8 that he was delighted by his recent appointment as Director General (DG) of the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB),a bureau established under the authority of the President's Office. Hosea had worked with the PCB for over ten years as Head of the Investigation Unit and served as acting DG when former PCB Chief, Anatoly Kamazima, retired in November 2006. When President Kikwete appointment him, Hosea said that President Kikwete had expressed dissatisfaction with the PCB's lack of "teeth." "I told Kikwete that if I had the legal framework, I would ensure the PCB had teeth! The President then promised me that he would ensure that the Anti-Corruption legislation moved to Parliament in early 2007." Needed: Anti-Corruption Bill to Empower PCB -------------- ¶3. (C) The Anti-Corruption legislation, Hosea explained, will introduce four main provisions to strengthen PCB's mandate. The Bill will (i) establish the PCB as an independent entity; (ii) enable the PCB to report directly to Parliament; (iii) include a whistle blowers clause; and (iv) no longer require the PCB to go to the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) for approval to take a corruption case to court. However, Hosea expressed his concern that not all four provisions would obtain Cabinet approval, especially the provision about the PCB bypassing the DPP. "While I'm confident the legislation will improve the environment to prosecute corruption, I'm also realistic. The provision for the PCB to go around the DPP will send the Attorney General's Office up in arms." ¶4. (C) Hosea stressed that the DPP had been a major stumbling block to prosecuting corruption cases, especially "big fish." After spending a great deal of time researching and building a case, the PCB is currently required to send the case for approval to the DPP before moving the case to court. "Cases sit in the DPP's office for years and then are often dismissed without any reasons being given!" Hosea complained. He estimated that the DPP approved only about 2 out of every 10 cases and asked the DCM to imagine how demoralized PCB staff had become. "If the DPP were fair, the system would work," Hosea said, adding, "The DPP is too reluctant to prosecute corruption cases." (Note: On December 11, just two days after the DCM met with Hosea, President Kikwete appointed 22 new judges, transferring out the DPP, Mr. Geoffrey Shaidi, whom Hosea DAR ES SAL 00000085 002.2 OF 003 referred to.) PCB: Ready to Catch a Big Fish... -------------- ¶5. (C) Regarding his goal as Director General, Hosea emphasized that he was committed to ramping up the risk of fighting corruption in Tanzania. He rejected the notion that the GOT should focus efforts on prevention: "I always tell people you don't try preventative medicine when you are already sick. The purpose of the PCB should be to let people know they can be embarrassed and criminally charged for corruption." Asked how he would measure his success, Hosea replied that he wanted the PCB to prosecute a "big fish." "This would signal real progress!" he exclaimed. ...But Not Too Big -------------- ¶6. (C) Although perhaps ready for a corruption case involving a "big fish" such as a Minister, Hosea clarified that he did not think the Tanzanian people were ready for corruption charges against the President or Prime Minister. He suggested that the PCB was also not ready or able to go after the Prime Minister or President, illustrating with the following Swahili "joke": "One day a President asks one of his assistants to identify corrupt people in his government. When the assistant began investigating the President's office, one night a gang of thugs beat up the assistant, sending him straight to the hospital. As a courtesy the President went to visit his assistant in the hospital and said, "I'm sorry but when I said look for corruption, I didn't mean my office!" ¶7. (C) The DCM asked Hosea about several high profile corruption cases currently in the press: the Ministry of Energy's contract with Richmond Development Corporation (see Refs A and B); tax exemptions for Alex Stewarts (a mining audit company); the U.K.-Tanzania radar deal; and the alleged sale of HIV/AIDS drugs meant to be distributed free of charge. Hosea said that the PCB was investigating the Richmond case and also looking into reports of abuse in the health sector. While not referring to the Richmond case directly, Hosea said that sometimes the problem was that ministers sought the Cabinet's imprimatur for a contract they might unfairly benefit from so that they are later protected by this stamp of approval. For example, Hosea explained, "sometimes a minister may bring a decision for approval to the Cabinet. If the Cabinet approves the agenda item and the Chair (the President or the Prime Minister in the President's absence) signs off on the meeting minutes, then a minister feels protected because if anything is wrong with the deal the President or Prime Minister are implicated themselves." Kikwete's Sincerity on Corruption: Jury Still Out -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) On the topic of political will, the DCM asked Hosea whether he believed President Kikwete was sincerely committed to combating corruption. Hosea paused and then said slowly, "I thought the President was honest...the test will be getting the big fish." (Comment: It is important to note that while rumors have circulated for years linking the Prime Minister to alleged corruption, there have been few such rumors related to the President himself. End comment.) PCB Chief: Wary of Personal Security and Staff -------------- - ¶9. (C) Just as the lunch was ending, Hosea let us know that he had concerns about his personal security as Director General of the PCB. "I try to believe I'm safe even though I know I'm not," he said and added, "If you start becoming fearful, it will become all-consuming." In addition, he noted that he had to be careful of his own staff as there was no way of knowing whom you could trust and who might be an informant. Comment: DAR ES SAL 00000085 003.2 OF 003 -------------- ¶10. (C) Mr. Hosea was surprisingly candid with us. He singled out the Director of Public Prosecution, who is a political appointee of the President, as an obstacle in the fight against corruption and pointedly said the jury was still out on Kikwete,s own commitment to fighting corruption. The jury would remain out, he suggested, until Kikwete allowed a major corruption case to move forward. ¶11. (C) In many respects, Tanzanian is at a crossroads in its campaign against corruption. Whether the Anti-Corruption bill emerges from the cabinet with its major anti-corruption provisions still intact will be a key indicator. As we note above, Kikwete, unlike his Prime Minister and various other ministers in his government, has not yet been tarred with corruption allegations by the Dar rumor mill. But the true measure of his commitment against corruption will remain unclear until the first "big fish," as his new Anti-Corruption chief put it, is brought to account. END COMMENT. RETZER