TANZANIA: A/S FRAZER AND PRESIDENT KIKWETE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DAR ES SALAAM 000260 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT AF/E FOR BYODER, AF/RSA FOR MBITTIRCK, CBECK ALSO FOR IO/PKO ADDIS FOR AU MISSION EUROPEAN POSTS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM MOPS SU SO TZ SUBJECT: TANZANIA: A/S FRAZER AND PRESIDENT KIKWETE DISCUSS SOMALIA, DARFUR, AND ERITREA-ETHIOPIA BOUNDARY DISPUTE Classified By: Ambassador Michael Retzer for reasons 1.4(b,d). USG A/S Jendayi Frazer Ambassador Michael Retzer Amb. John Yates (Head of Somalia Unit, Embassy Nairobi) ¶D. Purnell Delly (DCM, Embassy Dar es Salaam) Nole Garey (Somalia Desk Officer) Fatuma Sanneh (Special Assistant to A/S Frazer) Mary Johnson (notetaker) GOT President Jakaya Kikwete Amb. Augustine Mahiga (GOT UN Permanent Representative) Amb. Andrew Daraja (GOT Ambassador to the United States) Amb. Pastor Ngaiza (MFA, Head of Americas and Europe Division) Vitus Njiku (MFA Coordinator, International Contact Group on Somalia) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In a February 9 meeting with A/S Frazer, President Jakaya Kikwete outlined the Government of Tanzania's plans to train up to 1,000 Somali armed forces officers in Tanzania over the next 12 to 18 months. He confirmed that the Government of Tanzania (GOT) has no plans to deploy ground troops to Somalia, even if the AMISOM were to become a UN peacekeeping operation (PKO). Also, he would not send Tanzanian peacekeepers to Darfur until a UN command was in place. Kikwete understood the need for and welcomed news of the newly-announced African command (AFRICOM). He listened intently to A/S Frazer's outline of "Plan B"--a more severe approach toward President Bashir of Sudan--in an attempt to bring him into compliance with the Abuja Agreement to rehat the AMIS to a UN force. In discussing the Eritrea-Ethiopia boundary dispute, Kikwete shared USG concerns that President Isaias Afewerki of Eritrea "listens to no one" and may be supporting Somali insurgents within Eritrea. He updated A/S Frazer on the ongoing dialogue between ruling and opposition parties in Zanzibar. Kikwete remains optimistic that his efforts have reduced tensions and are supported by Zanzibaris from both camps. End summary. Tanzania will train Somali officers -------------- ¶2. (C) On February 9, just prior to the one-day meeting of the International Contact Group on Somalia, A/S Frazer met with President Jakaya Kikwete at the State House in Dar es Salaam. President Kikwete welcomed the opportunity offered by the ICG on Somalia to make progress in laying out a strategy and framework to stabilize Somalia. Kikwete explained that Tanzania will train up to 1,000 Somalia armed forces entry-level and mid-level officers over the next one to one and a half years. "We will do the training in Tanzania, where it is calm, utilizing several of the camps that were used to train freedom fighters like the ANC and FRELIMO." Kikwete said the Tanzanian Peoples Defense Force (TPDF) is waiting to receive a planning delegation from the Somalia armed forces, mostly likely on February 12 or 13 "to discuss the details." He noted that Ethiopia had agreed to train "rank and file" Somali forces, while Tanzania will train officers. ¶3. (C) President Kikwete confirmed the GOT has also agreed to train Somali intelligence officers. He said Tanzania has the military expertise to conduct this officer training, but may need assistance on logistics and supplies. He estimated that the officers would be trained in batches of 250 to 300, with a concerted effort to condense the training to 6 or 8 months rather than the usual 12-month program. In reply to A/S Frazer's question about whether Tanzania would consider deploying troops to Somalia if the peacekeeping effort were DAR ES SAL 00000260 002 OF 004 to become a UN supported operation, Kikwete answered clearly, "To Darfur, yes, but not to Somalia; our major contribution will be this training program." ¶4. (C) Kikwete noted that TGF President Abdullahi Yusuf of Somalia was strong and "upbeat" which bodes well for ongoing efforts to stabilize Somalia. Despite rumors he had heard that Somalia's Prime Minister might pose problems because he wanted all the Islamists out of the country, President Kikwete had a different impression after meeting him in Nairobi, commenting that he seemed reasonable: "Perhaps we can work with him as well." AFRICOM -------------- ¶5. (C) A/S Frazer briefed President Kikwete that the purpose of the new African Command (AFRICOM) is to better coordinate ongoing U.S. military activities in Africa including ACOTA peacekeeping training and CJTF-HOA humanitarian assistance programs ongoing in Tanzania. She assured Kikwete that AFRICOM had been under discussion for many years and was neither a response to the global war on terror nor to China's growing focus on Africa. President Kikwete understood the need for enhanced coordination and welcomed AFRICOM, dismissing with a laugh the notion that it was a U.S. effort to "compete with China." AU Chairmanship -------------- ¶6. (C) A/S Frazer thanked President Kikwete for his efforts at the AU Summit in Addis, January 29 and 30, to assure that the AU Chairmanship did not go to President Bashir of Sudan. Kikwete explained the behind-the-scenes efforts to reach consensus that, unlike the January 2006 AU Summit, no promise be offered to Bashir that if he waited, the chair would be his in 2008. "South Africa's President Mbeki agreed only to announce that Ghana would assume the Chairmanship this year, due to its 50 year independence celebration; next year it will go to East Africa, but the East African heads of state will decide in 2008 who it will be." Kikwete noted that when the news of this decision was delivered to Bashir "he remained silent." Sudan -------------- ¶7. (C) A/S Frazer outlined for President Kikwete the "carrots" that the United States had already offered to President Bashir over the past 12 months in an effort to encourage him to accept either a UN-hatted force or a hybrid UN-AMIS force for Darfur. However, these offers, including to further ease sanctions, meet with President Bush at the 2006 UNGA or upgrade the status of our Embassy in Khartoum, had all been rebuffed. A/S Frazer assured Kikwete that "Plan B" had the same overall objective--to push Bashir to honor the Addis Ababa Agreement and move toward an AU/UN hybrid force. She said the U.S. would urge the UN Security Council (UNSC) to impose stricter sanctions and, if asked, could even provide evidence to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to take action against Sudan. A/S Frazer emphasized that assisting the ICC would be a significant turnaround for the United States since "we have never signed the Rome Statute." ¶8. (C) President Kikwete bemoaned that President Bashir "signs agreements, but never keeps them." He also noted few African leaders can discuss any issues in depth with Bashir, with the exception of Prime Minister Zenawi Meles of Ethiopia. Kikwete added that the United Nations also needs to be prepared to take more risk. He said: "Somalia is the same situation; the UN always says that it needs a 'peace to keep' before it can send in forces." A/S Frazer agreed the UN DPKO has a responsibility as well to accelerate its efforts to deploy the heavy support package and hybrid force to Darfur. DAR ES SAL 00000260 003 OF 004 Eritrea-Ethiopia -------------- ¶9. (C) In response to President Kikwete's inquiry about U.S. efforts to ease the tension between Eritrea and Ethiopia, A/S Frazer confided the situation is serious since the United States has virtually no relationship with the Government of Eritrea. She pointed to our efforts to work through Norway and others to move forward resolution of the boundary dispute, emphasizing we will uphold the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) November 2006 decision. However, A/S Frazer noted since the EEBC demarcated the boundary without making even one trip to the border nor consulting the local populations, Ethiopia remains suspicious of the final EEBC decision: "Dialogue between Eritrea and Ethiopia is more critical now than ever," she said. ¶10. (C) Kikwete quipped: "President Isaias does not talk to anyone, not even his own people." He noted that former Eritrean foreign ministers have disappeared, that President Isaias has detained his own cabinet members, as he had previously done to the Darfur rebel leaders. "Isaias Afewerki appears to be becoming a despot," Kikwete stated. A/S Frazer noted that women and children have been held hostage and Isaias refused to take a phone call from Secretary Rice. The US is also concerned about Eritrea's SIPDIS relationship with Somalia; A/S Frazer told Kikwete that while the we have not mentioned it publicly, the USG is concerned that Isaias may be harboring terrorists in which case Eritrea would have crossed the line into state-sponsored terrorism. ¶11. (C) President Kikwete echoed this view, noting that in a recent BBC interview, President Isaias passionately insisted that the "Islamists have not been defeated in Somalia!" giving the appearance that he was personally involved in the outcome. Kikwete is also concerned that Isaias could be involved in supporting insurgents' activities within Eritrea. ¶12. (C) A/S Frazer reiterated the hope that the Somalia ICG meeting would address ways to "dry up" insurgent groups that any neighboring country might be supporting. "We need cooperation from Somalia's neighbors as well as UN funding and support to go after insurgency groups," she said. Kikwete suggested that President Isaias might listen to the Italians, noting that Italy's Deputy Foreign Minister, Mario Rafaeli, had come to Dar es Salaam to attend the ICG meeting. Kikwete noted Isaias appeared "obsessed" with making difficulties for Prime Minister Meles of Ethiopia, so, "Let's try to use the Italians if possible." Zanzibar Reconciliation -------------- ¶13. (SBU) President Kikwete briefed A/S Frazer on progress in political reconciliation in Zanzibar between the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party and the opposition Civic United Front (CUF). Kikwete's strategy following the contentious Zanzibar elections in late 2005 had been let some time elapse, a "cooling off period" to lower the tensions and misunderstandings between the two sides, while he continued to work quietly behind the scenes. He explained that at the end of December 2006, the CCM National Executive Committee finally agreed to opening a dialogue with CUF leaders; these inter-party discussions began January 13. "To date, three rounds are completed, primarily to set the agenda." Four more meetings remain and he anticipates both parties' leaders are ready to explore practical steps to keep tensions low and move forward. ¶14. (SBU) Kikwete emphasized his goal is to instill a gradual change of attitude within both CCM and CUF and among the citizens of Zanzibar until elections become a routine event that occurs every five years, where the electorate votes calmly and accepts whomever wins as the leader. "We made DAR ES SAL 00000260 004 OF 004 strides within our party during the 12-month period before this dialogue began; fears and anxieties have been healed on both sides." Kikwete was optimistic that the majority of Zanzibaris are supporting this dialogue: "Let's give it some time and see where the process leads." This cable has been cleared by A/S Frazer. RETZER