ZANZIBAR RECONCILIATION TALKS: END GAME OR DEJA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAR ES SALAAM 001581 SIPDIS SIPDIS AF/E FOR JLIDDLE, SHAMILTON AF/RSA FOR MBITTRICK, DRL/AE FOR BCONNUCK ADDIS FOR AU MISSION LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2017 TAGS: KDEM PREL PGOV PHUM TZ SUBJECT: ZANZIBAR RECONCILIATION TALKS: END GAME OR DEJA VU? REF: A. DAR ES SALAAM 01159 ¶B. DAR ES SALAAM 01075 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission, D. Purnell Delly for reasons 1.4 (b,d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Nearly one year after the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and opposition Civic United Front (CUF) parties shook hands January 17, 2007 and began talks to break the political impasse on Zanzibar, CUF leaders claim an agreement is close. Malim Seif Hamad, the CUF Secretary General and three-time candidate for the Zanzibar presidency, told the DCM recently that CUF wants a comprehensive agreement with CCM by the end of the year which would include formation of a national unity government before 2010 elections, vetting of the Zanzibar Permanent Voters Register (PVR),and commitment not to establish youth camps or allow military interventions during Zanzibar elections. Hon. Hamad Rashid Mohamed, CUF's chief negotiator and leader of the opposition in the Union Parliament, said he had spoken with President Kikwete in November urging him to ensure an equitable and rapid conclusion to the talks. "The CCM internal party elections are behind the President," Mohamed noted. "I told him the time to act is now." Seif Hamad, Hon. Mohamed and Juma Duni Haji, CUF's Deputy Secretary General, agreed that if Kikwete is serious, he can direct the CCM party to accept a government of national unity before the 2010 elections, the "redline" for CUF negotiators. End summary. CUF Negotiating for Complete Package -------------- ¶2. (C) Malim Seif Hamad told the DCM in a December 3 meeting with CUF Zanzibar leadership that the CCM did not keep its end of a confidence building deal in August 2007. Although CUF agreed to continue with the talks following President Kikwete's August 14 last-hour appeal (Ref A),President Karume has still not appointed two opposition party members to the Zanzibar House of Representatives as constitutionally mandated. Hamad clarified the agreement CUF is seeking must be a complete package with clear timelines that includes: 1) a transparent system to update and verify the PVR; 2) no excessive force, military or militia involved in campaigns or elections; 
 3) no youth camps, as well as 4) government of national unity before 2010. ¶3. (C) Hamad said the steepest hurdle to successfully concluding the talks is CCM's unwillingness to put a government of national unity in place before 2010. Thus CUF strategy has been to deal with other issues first, including whether the next elections should produce a "winner takes all" or proportional Government of Zanzibar (GOZ); how cabinet positions should be allocated; procedures to update and verify the Permanent Voters Register, etc. CUF is holding back on the issue of when a national unity government would take effect until the last round of discussions which they anticipate will occur by the end of December. Just a Paper Exercise? -------------- ¶4. (C) Juma Duni Haji explained that CUF's key concern is CCM Zanzibar's commitment to carry out an agreement once signed. "Our problem remains the political will on the part of CCM. Our reconciliation meetings often appear to be only a paper exercise for CCM; they can argue for one or two hours on one small issue," Haji said. He reiterated that CUF has seen CCM Zanzibar in action in 1995, 2000, 2005; never have they kept their word. "Unless there is a clear path with measurable confidence building measures, there can be no genuine elections in 2010," he stated. ¶5. (C) Seif Hamad added CUF is concerned because Karume continues to build more youth camps which the CCM will use to recruit young people to "assist" with future elections. In DAR ES SAL 00001581 002 OF 003 2005, these CCM youth harassed Zanzibar citizens during the voter registration period and allegedly participated in schemes to vote in more than one district on election day. Voter Register Already Being Modified by ZEC -------------- ¶6. (C) Even more disturbing for CUF according to Hamad is that until now, the CUF secretariat has never received a full copy of the Permanent Voters Register "except for the jumbled one which did not list constituencies nor was in alphabetical order" that was handed to the opposition parties only a few hours before the polls opened in October 2005. (Note: In 2005, donors and other observers agreed that the Zanzibar Permanent Voters Register was seriously flawed.) According to Hamad, despite the fact the composition of the Zanzibar Electoral Commission and the vetting of the PVR are both key elements of the ongoing negotiations, the ZEC Director of Elections has already begun to modify the PVR, with no opposition party involvement or supervision. ¶7. (C) In response to the DCM's concern that 2010 is fast approaching and verifying a voters registrar may require months to complete, Duni Haji explained that the previous ZEC Director of Elections resigned twelve months ago. The ZEC Chairman then appointed a new elections director who was the IT manager for ZEC during the 2005 Zanzibar voter registration period, campaign and election. (Note: In the run-up to the Zanzibar 2005 elections, several donors expressed concern in confidential meetings that this IT manager might have tampered with the PVR electronic data base on CCM's behalf. End note.) Haji said CUF has asked for the present modifications to halt since the issue of equitably vetting the PVR is central to the talks. "While we negotiate this issue, the Director of Elections continues to work on the PVR; we have no idea what he is doing and have warned that he is already sowing the seeds of a new impasse," Haji said. "Economy of Zanzibar is dead.." -------------- ¶8. (C) All three leaders reiterated that CUF's consistent message to Kikwete is: "It is easier to solve a problem before it gets out of hand and becomes a crisis." Hamad said during his recent three-week trip to Pemba, CUF party members were clear: 2010 is the last chance. Hamad lamented: "It is painful; the islands of Zanzibar are economically dead. It is not just a political impasse in Zanzibar; poverty and drug abuse are critically on the rise." He suggested that if the stalemate is not publicly solved by January 2008 "there could be hunger and chaos on both isles." On the other hand, if a fair agreement were announced and signed, Hamad believed that this in itself could create hope, even if implementation takes time. Trusting in Kikwete...Still -------------- ¶9. (C) Hon. Hamad Rashid Mohamed said that CUF continues to believe President Kikwete's motives are genuine. However, since Karume and the GOZ still seriously believe they are the revolutionary government who "won with blood," President Kikwete has to be more serious and to take action. "He has the power to do so," Mohamed insisted. In his view, as Commander in Chief, Kikwete cannot just "cajole," but must order a halt to any tampering with the PVR and construction of youth camps, and that by the end of December, the reconciliation talks have to conclude. Mohamed reiterated: "It is imperative that Kikwete take charge. As the Chair of CCM, he has the CCM internal party elections behind him; he can control the party line." ¶10. (C) Hon. Mohamed told the DCM he spoke personally to President Kikwete just prior to the early November 2007 CCM party elections and said: "How many times can we give you our trust ?" Kikwete's reply: "Let me finish with Party elections." Hamad said one result of the CCM Central Committee elections was that many of Karume's close DAR ES SAL 00001581 003 OF 003 supporters were weakened; others were not elected to the CCM Central Committee "thus creating a window of opportunity." Hamad added that recently the CUF negotiators sensed that Kikwete himself may be giving instructions to the CCM team. CUF understands that in mid-December, an extraordinary meeting of the CCM Central Committee might be called to review and discuss progress in the reconciliation talks. Still, Duni Haji was frank, saying unless Kikwete and the Mainland CCM party leaders push CCM Zanzibar, there will be no movement in the talks. "If President Kikwete delays too long, it will be much more difficult." And if No Agreement? -------------- ¶11. (C) In response to the DCM's query on CUF leaders' recourse if an agreement is not reached by the end of December, Hamad stressed CUF could not tolerate further delaying tactics such as another Joint Presidential Supervisory Commission (JPSC) as was set up in 2005. Its recommendations would simply be ignored by Karume. Thus CUF's "red line" is that a national unity government has to be in place before 2010. "Unless we are part of the Zanzibar government, it would be impossible to verify anything" and thus ensure that elections are free, fair and transparent. Duni Haji stressed that CUF could ensure free elections only from within the government, not outside it. If changes to the Zanzibar constitution are required for a unity government, such changes could be quickly approved by the House of Representatives. ¶12. (C) Hamad said if an agreement or its implementation is not forthcoming, the CUF leaders will of course ask for calm among the rank-and-file, yet at some point "we will wash our hands; we need to survive as politicians." Hon. Mohamed added: "We are negotiators only. CCM has the army, the police, the jails and the power to lock us up; but all of us have been there before, so we are not afraid of jail." Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) Several things concern us. First, over the past two years expectations of progress on reconciliation have repeatedly been raised, and then led nowhere. Perhaps this shouldn't surprise us, because there is a fundamental contradiction between CUF,s "redline" (the demand for a national unity government before 2010 elections) and what President Kikwete has told us privately ) that such a government will not work until after 2010 elections. ¶14. (C) Moreover, CUF leadership tells us they will not survive politically if there is nothing to show rank-and-file members of the party by the end of December or early January. These members view the reconciliation process against the backdrop of flawed Zanzibar elections in 1995, 2000, and ¶2005. CUF youth has lost its patience. Hamad is openly ridiculed at CUF events. There is clear frustration and growing dissension in CUF ranks. The threat of violence, therefore, is real. We can,t say when, or in what form, violence may erupt but we can say this: there are members within CUF who will not tolerate yet another set of reconciliation talks leading nowhere. They are resolved to take action into their own hands. GREEN