PRESIDENT KIKWETE PAVES WAY FOR CCM-CUF TALKS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAR ES SALAAM 000125 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/E B YODER AND D MALAC DEPT FOR INR F EHRENREICH E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2012 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR TZ SUBJECT: PRESIDENT KIKWETE PAVES WAY FOR CCM-CUF TALKS ON ZANZIBAR REF: A. A. DAR ES SALAAM 00084 ¶B. B. DAR ES SALAAM 01835 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission, D. Purnell Delly, for reason 1. 4 b and d. SUMMARY. Keeping the promise in his December 2005 inauguration speech to address political tensions in Zanzibar, President Kikwete paved the way in December 2006 for official dialogue to begin between the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and Civic United Front (CUF) parties. After the CCM National Executive Committee approved CCM consultations with CUF, an initial round of talks began on January 17, the first official discussions between the two parties since the October 2005 elections. Although the start of the CCM-CUF dialogue may mark a breakthrough for reconciliation efforts under the Kikwete administration, there are numerous reasons for maintaining only cautious optimism. On January 4, Poloff met with a range of CCM leaders and the CUF Deputy Secretary General who painted a picture of a tough road ahead, riddled with mistrust, historical hang-ups and hard-line spoilers. END SUMMARY. Official CCM-CUF Talks Begin -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Top leaders of the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and Civic United Front (CUF) met on January 17 at the Zanzibar Beach Resort, opening the first round of formal talks between the two political parties since the 2005 Zanzibar elections. At the close of the January 17 meeting, CCM Secretary General, Yusuf Makamba, and CUF's three-time presidential candidate, Maalim Seif Hamad, issued a joint communiqu. The communiqu stated that the session marked the first of many meetings to come, which "aimed to bring political harmony in Zanzibar." ¶3. (SBU) The beginning of CCM-CUF talks stems from the CCM National Executive Committee (NEC) passing a resolution to begin discussions for "mutual political understanding in Zanzibar." According to numerous press articles, President Kikwete sought approval from the NEC the week of December 18 to begin consultations with all political parties including CUF. Dr. Mohammed Bilal, former CCM Chief Minister in Zanzibar from 1990-2000, confirmed to Poloff on January 4 that the NEC unanimously supported President Kikwete's request for consultations with CUF. Dr. Bilal said he expected CCM Party Secretary Makamba to initiate dialogue with CUF in the near future. ¶4. (C) Just days after the NEC's endorsement to advance CCM-CUF dialogue, Ibrahim Lipumba, CUF Party Chairman, issued a press statement to pledge CUF's support for President Kikwete's "peace efforts." On December 25, three daily English newspapers published articles highlighting CUF's support for NEC's resolution. Juma Duni Haji, CUF's Deputy Secretary General, told Poloff on January 4 that CUF backed SIPDIS Kikwete and quickly indicated this to the press. Haji noted that CUF further extended an olive branch on January 1 when Maalim Seif Hamad accepted an invitation by President Karume to attend an Idd Baraza celebration. "Hamad accepted the invitation as a gesture to show Kikwete that CUF stands ready to embrace efforts to end Zanzibar's political conflict," Haji emphasized. (Note: On January 2, the Guardian newspaper published a front page picture of President Karume and Maalim Seif Hamad shaking hands at the Idd Baraza celebration.) Reconciliation Talks: Another Muafaka? -------------- ¶5. (C) CUF's goal for negotiations, Juma Duni Haji explained, would be to enhance and implement Muafaka II, an agreement reached by CCM and CUF after the 2000 elections. "We don't want another accord. We want to see Muafaka II fully implemented," Haji said. Apart from the accord, Haji said that CUF wanted to achieve implementation of an agreement signed prior to the 2005 presidential election on Zanzibar - a letter requiring the winning political party to appoint a Chief Minister from the losing party. "Although this document was signed by former CCM Secretary General DAR ES SAL 00000125 002 OF 003 Mangula and CUF Secretary General Maalim Seif Hamad, it was forgotten after the 2005 election. We see it as the basis for building a national unity government," Haji said. ¶6. (C) Dr. Mohamed Bilal, former Chief Minister and leading nominee in 2000 for the CCM presidential ticket on Zanzibar, shared his view on January 4 that a government of national unity was not the solution to Zanzibar's political problems. "It is not clear that a coalition government will reduce tensions or eliminate mistrust between the political parties. There are many ways of power sharing that we need to consider," Bilal noted. He emphasized that CUF and the press had misinterpreted President Kikwete's promise to mean a national unity government when in fact, Kikwete's promise was to reduce polarization between the two islands, Pemba and Unguja. ¶7. (C) Offering an alternative solution, Dr. Bilal stressed, "What we really need for any long-lasting reconciliation is soul-searching." He elaborated that political tension and suspicions had been festering for too long and that both CUF and CCM badly needed to reflect on (i) what their party really wanted to achieve; and (ii) what their suspicions were about the other party. Only by answering these questions, Bilal explained, "will we be able to move beyond the divisions which leaders continue to perpetuate." ¶8. (C) A notoriously hardline member of CCM, Hon. Ali Juma Shamhuna, Deputy Chief Minister and Minister of Information, Culture and Sports in Zanzibar, dismissed the notion of a government of national unity: "We support President Kikwete's efforts to open talks with CUF to reduce bitterness, but CCM won the 2005 elections - elections deemed free and fair by all international organizations and other countries. A coalition government is unfair and unconstitutional." When Poloff asked for an alternative solution to promote reconciliation, Shamhuna was emphatic: "It's obvious - CUF needs to recognize President Karume's government!" Prospects for Political Harmony: CCM Zanzibar Skeptical -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Regarding prospects for reaching a long-lasting solution to Zanzibar's political problems, CCM members on Zanzibar expressed skepticism. Dr. Bilal said he was wary of formal talks to hasten reconciliation. "Once talks are in the public eye, negotiations become more difficult. If discussions were kept informal, more progress might be possible," he noted. Dr. Bilal also reiterated his view that unfortunately Zanzibar's political leaders had "missed the boat, perpetuating divisions from the revolution rather than educating the next generation to move forward." ¶10. (C) Minister Shamhuna also expressed skepticism on chances for reconciliation but placed full blame on the opposition party. "I don't believe the opposition party is ready to move forward. Pemba, CUF's stronghold, wants a Pemban President and if they don't get this they won't be satisfied. You see, it all goes back to the revolution," he said. Shamhuna also told Poloff that he was dismayed by the reaction of CUF to Hamad's participation in the Idd Baraza celebration on January 1. "According to reports I have received, CUF held a meeting on January 2 and CUF party members took Hamad to task for attending Idd Baraza. If this is the case...if this is the way the opposition thinks, I have no hope!" Shamhuna exclaimed. (Note: Both Juma Duni Haji and CUF Director of Publicity, Salim Bimani, denied rumors that CUF hardliners "took Hamad to task" over attending Idd Baraza. Haji explained that the reaction was mixed among CUF members but that Hamad took time to explain his reasoning to party members for accepting the invitation.) ¶11. (C) Poloff met with two other members of CCM on Zanzibar: Mr. Enzi Talib, a CCM senior government officer, and Baraka Shamte, a CCM hardliner and son of former Prime Minister Mohamed Shamte in the Republic of Zanzibar in the 1960s. While these two officials expressed different views on the source of Zanzibar's political impasse, both shared their doubts whether the upcoming CUF-CCM talks would bring reconciliation. "We have heard nice talk from political leaders before, with Muafaka I and Muafaka II. Where has DAR ES SAL 00000125 003 OF 003 that gotten us?" Talib asked. Shamte stressed, "For us, this is not a political crisis, this is a way of living. Only by removing CUF hardliners from every government post could anything change!" ¶12. (C) While expressing greater optimism on reconciliation prospects than Zanzibar's CCM members, Juma Duni Haji of CUF also revealed doubts. He noted that there were spoilers on both sides and that President Kikwete would have to maneuver carefully around CCM hardliners. Having recently returned from the U.S. in search of financial resources, Haji told Poloff, "I know that Kikwete is the darling of the U.S. But right now the U.S. needs to encourage and press Kikwete to deal with the crisis so that he doesn't lose his resolve." Furthermore, Haji expressed limitations within CUF: "Our members are scared about being cheated again by CCM. They have told Hamad to be careful and not to be hoodwinked." Comment: Kikwete's Promise: CUF's Bargaining Chip -------------- -------------- ¶13. (C) Despite widespread skepticism, the beginning of CCM-CUF talks on January 17 is undoubtedly a forward step on the road to reconciliation. There are few hints, however, as to where these discussions will lead. CUF has outlined its goals for the negotiations (i.e. a government of national unity) while CCM's goals remain general: to reduce political polarization. This vague objective seems to stem from the division between those CCM members who recognize a political problem in Zanzibar and those who either deny or downplay any problem (Refs A and B). ¶14. (C) While CUF's objectives may be clear, CUF's negotiating position appears weak. Late last year, CUF made public demands for a re-run of the 2005 election but, unlike after the 2000 elections, there has been little to no international or donor support for doing so. CUF's financial situation is bleak, as suggested by Haji's trip to the U.S. to drum up resources. Furthermore, without the ability to work in constituencies, particularly on Unguja, CUF's aim to expand its electoral base appears more remote than ever. Consequently, CUF's future seems to depend largely on Kikwete's commitment to achieving a lasting solution. And, with new elections and a national unity government apparently off the table, no one knows precisely where Kikwete wants reconciliation to lead. His plan, indeed, may be to buy time until the 2010 elections and ensure a "conciliator" is the CCM candidate to replace Karume. END COMMENT. RETZER