SYRIAN VISA REQUIREMENT ON IRAQIS: POSTPONED FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000933 SIPDIS SIPDIS PARIS FOR JORDAN; LONDON FOR TSOU; NSC FOR GAVITO; DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/I, PRM/ANE E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2017 TAGS: PREF PHUM PREL SY IZ SUBJECT: SYRIAN VISA REQUIREMENT ON IRAQIS: POSTPONED FOR NOW, AND MURKY AS EVER REF: A. DASMASCUS 905 ¶B. DAMASCUS 683 Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Michael H. Corbin for reason 1.4 b/d 1.(U) SUMMARY. UNHCR in Damascus confirmed Syrian press reports today that the SARG will postpone implementation of its new visa requirement for Iraqis at least until October 1, and UNHCR learned mid-day September 13 that this period will now extend until October 15. UNHCR describes the delay as intended to allow time for Iraqis already at the border to resolve their cases (although we are unaware of a big back-up at the border.) Prior to today's announcement, Syria-Iraq border crossings had been quiet since September 10, the original start date for a new Syrian visa requirement for Iraqis. UNHCR reported seeing only five Iraqis cross the border at al-Tanf on 9/11, and an Iraqi contact in Damascus noted Syrian authorities were refusing entry to Iraqis at Damascus airport. As has been the case since this issue arose ten days ago, the details of the Syrian policy remain unclear. The SARG decision is attributed to growing unease over the expanding refugee population, though some contacts posit that the SARG's true intention may have been to jolt the international community into action, either in the form of direct assistance to Syria or invigorated efforts to handle the problem from within Iraq's borders. The decision to delay implementation reflects SARG uncertainty over how to balance an increasingly difficult domestic problem against the regime's long-standing commitment to Arab causes and the desire for international approbation. END SUMMARY. ¶3. (C) REFUGEE FLOW SLOWS TO A TRICKLE. Syria-Iraq border crossings have been virtually devoid of traffic since September 10, the announced start date for a new Syrian visa requirement for Iraqis seeking to enter the country. Officials from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) office in Damascus report that, during a visit to al-Tanf on 9/11, they observed only five Iraqis enter Syria, each with a visa in hand. (Note: UNHCR is able to observe border movement at al-Tanf during daily visits to roughly 350 Palestinian refugees stranded on the border. End note.) UNHCR was unable to determine how the visas were obtained, but surmised that they were issued in Baghdad. The quiet along the border is in marked contrast to the level of activity earlier this week, when UNHCR noted lines of 100-300 vehicles seeking entry into Syria before the deadline. Separately, the Syria-based representive of the Iraqi Assyrian Democratic Movement, Amanoail Khoshaba, who is active within the refugee population, claimed that Iraqis were also being turned away at the Damascus airport. He cited one contact who, after stating his intention to travel to Iraq, was issued a transit permit valid for two-to-three days. ¶4. (U) The details of the Syrian visa policy remain unclear. UNHCR notes that the SARG issued a decree -- yet to be made public -- requiring Iraqis to obtain visas from the Syrian embassy in Baghdad. The SARG's stated intention is to limit issuance of visas to individuals meeting certain commercial, scientific, and educational criteria. UNHCR had also reported an exception for Iraqis involved in "transport." It is not certain, however, if the Syrian embassy is sufficiently equipped to perform consular functions, or when/whether the SARG will boost its visa processing capabilities. UNHCR officials note that the Syrian embassy in Baghdad is in a location of ongoing violence, citing Iraqis who say the area is too unsafe to risk appearing at the embassy. UNHCR senior protection officer, Dietrun Gunther, noted earlier this week that the Iraqi government asked UNHCR to approach the SARG with a request to issue visas along the border, placing UNHCR in the unusual position of mediating between the country of origin and the neighboring host state. As of 9/12, UNHCR had not raised the request with the SARG. ¶5. (U) UNHCR has focused its efforts on ensuring the SARG does not forcibly remove Iraqis already in-country -- on DAMASCUS 00000933 002 OF 003 which it reportedly has received assurances -- and that it affords protection to the most vulnerable categories of refugees. UNHCR is referring families and at-risk groups to the immigration directorate within the Syrian Ministry of Interior (MOI) to supply residence permits. Currently, the MOI is issuing one-month extensions enabling families with children to register in Syrian schools. The Ministry of Education reportedly assured UNHCR that Iraqi children will be accepted in Syrian schools if they have the required documentation and their families may receive one-year extensions. The SARG has not thus far responded to UNHCR requests to establish a humanitarian visa category for those fleeing violence and persecution. ¶6. (C) There is no indication, as yet, of whether or how the SARG intends to use the visa requirement to better track the Iraqi population inside Syria. Khoshaba noted no increase in activity among police or other security forces to check refugee documents in the Iraqi-dominated neighborhoods of Damascus. Dr. Samir al-Taqi, think-tank director and confidante of the Syrian foreign minister, predicted that the SARG would use the visa rules to exert greater control over the refugees over time. During their 9/11 visit to the border, UNHCR saw roughly 150 Iraqis depart Syria with expired residence permits; all planned to seek a visa to return. We understand other Iraqis have been able to return to Iraq after tourism travel to Syria in advance of the beginning of Ramadan on September 13. By September 13, the price of overland travel from Damascus to Baghdad reportedly had tripled, possibly due to the Ramadan season and the expectation of increased travel to Iraq to renew visas. UNHCR also reports that the SARG is issuing one-year visas to Iraqi taxi drivers, indicating possible Syrian expectation of continued refugee flows. At the same time, UNHCR in Damascus noted a significant increase in requests for registration interviews. As of Wednesday September 12, Gunther cited 1400 appointment requests for this week, in comparison to 600 total requests the week before. 7.(C) WHAT WAS THE SARG THINKING? Since the visa requirement was first publicized on September 3, most Embassy contacts have averred that the government was committed to implementing the policy, but many raised questions about how it would be implemented. The SARG decision is attributed to growing nervousness over the ever-expanding Iraqi presence, now estimated by UNHCR at 1.3-1.5 million, though some assert that the number is considerably higher. Khoshaba claims to have seen internal MOI figures in late spring estimating over 2 million had crossed the border. The economic burden of hosting so many refugees -- an addition of nearly ten percent to the population in Syria -- is generating much Syrian grumbling. Spiralling real estate prices, rising food costs, increased crime and prostitution, and a summer of electricity cuts and water rationing are routinely attributed to the refugee presence. Bitter jokes are common about the transformation of Damascus neighborhoods into little corners of Iraq. Renewed SARG discussion of the need to lift fuel subsidies (septel) has become intertwined with the refugee debate, as many Syrians interpret the government's decision as a by-product of the cost of supporting the refugees. ¶8. (C) Contacts have also noted SARG uneasiness about its relative lack of insight into the make-up and activities of the refugee population. The security issues raised by the refugee presence appear to overlap with Iraqi government concerns, though we have heard conflicting assessments of whether Iraqi prime minister Nuri al-Maliki asked for the restrictions or simply acquiesced to the Syrian plan. Reuters correspondent, Khalid Oweis, told us a few days before the public announcement that Syria's assistant vice president, Muhammad Nassif Khayrbik, informed Maliki of the policy change during his August 20-22 visit to Damascus. Iraq's SCIRI representative in Damascus, Mohammad Said, protrayed it as a request from Maliki to prevent Sunni insurgent and extremist elements from leaving Iraq. The picture was further muddled by a press exchange on September DAMASCUS 00000933 003 OF 003 7, in which the Iraqi government announced Syria's cancellation of the policy after contacts between Maliki's office and the SARG. An unnamed Syrian foreign ministry source subsequently reiterated Syrian intentions to implement the restrictions on September 10. ¶9. (C) WILL IT LAST? Al-Watan, a quasi-independent, Syrian political daily known to very careful about getting clearance from the security services regarding its reporting on sensitive topics, reported September 13 that the SARG decided to delay implementation of the visa requirement until October 1, in response to pleas from Iraq, UNHCR, and other NGOs. The article stressed, however, that the postponement did not indicate a change in government intentions to impose the visa requirement. UNHCR in Damascus subsequently told us that it had been notified of the postponement by both the MOI and the ministry of foreign affairs and that the extension would be effective until October 15. The postponement could precipitate a surge in border traffic, though UNHCR linked the decision to a desire to resolve the cases of Iraqis already located at the border. ¶10. (C) Although our contacts are taking seriously the SARG's stated commitment to new visa regime, Gunther and others have speculated that its true intention may be to jolt the international community into action, either in the form of increased assistance to Syria or invigorated attempts to address the problem from within Iraq's borders. (Note: The SARG took similiar action in February 2007 to restrict Iraqis to a 15-day stay in Syria, only to rescind the measure two weeks later, reported in Ref B.) Speaking to the BBC on September 10, Syria's deputy foreign minister, Faisal Miqdad, dismissed U.S. contributions to support refugees, claiming that the money the United States has pledged thus far was merely "pocket change" in comparison to what the U.S. government was spending in Iraq. Miqdad also raised the spectre of moving Iraqi refugees to camps along the border, noting that the magnitude of the problem in Syria necessitated serious SARG consideration of this option. ¶11. (C) COMMENT. After years of offering an open door to refugees -- combined with earlier instances of announced changes to entry procedures that never fully materialized -- Syrian enforcement of the current restrictions generated genuine concern among Embassy contacts in Damascus. Whether the SARG intends to enforce the restrictions over the longer term remains an open question. The on-again, off-again character of this and prior Syrian attempts to impose greater control over the refugee flow highlights the conflicting forces at play within the SARG. Domestic pressure to stem the refugee tide and its economic effects is offset by both practical and political considerations. Practically, Syria does not appear equipped to process large numbers of visas in Baghdad. Politically, the SARG has reaped some benefit with the international community from its generosity toward the refugees. The SARG can claim tangible proof of its commitment to its Arab (and especially Sunni) brethren, in contrast to some of Iraq's other neighbors. Damascus is also able to assert its increased relevance to discussions over the future of Iraq. Sunni pressure to continue to allow this escape valve, coupled with international clamor, may trump security concerns as the SARG wrangles internally about how to deal with the Iraqi refugee situation. At this point it is too early to say where the SARG will come out. CORBIN