SMOULDERING SYRIAN-SAUDI TENSIONS FLARE AT AN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000873

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV
SUBJECT: SMOULDERING SYRIAN-SAUDI TENSIONS FLARE AT AN
INOPPORTUNE MOMENT FOR BASHAR

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Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Michael H. Corbin for reason 1.4 b/d

1.(C) SUMMARY. Syrian vice president Farouq al-Shara'a
triggered considerable Saudi anger with his August 14
comments on Saudi Arabia's "paralysis" on regional issues.
The speech sparked more than a week of escalated rhetoric and
widespread media speculation, though no official statements
have been issued since August 18. Criticism of Damascus has
emanated from parties sympathetic to Saudi Arabia,
particularly in Lebanon, and has also raised questions about
Syrian subservience to Iran. The reactions of Embassy
contacts to Shara'a's speech range from dismissal of a
free-lancing vice-president to musings on whether Shara'a was
articulating a coordinated Syrian stance. In either case,
Shara'a's remarks reflected real SARG displeasure with Riyadh
over a number of issues, including: the Saudi absence from
the Iraq Border Security Working Group in early August;
frustration with Riyadh's stance on Arab-Israeli issues; and
the continued clash of interests over Lebanon. President
Asad will probably seek to prevent the row from escalating
further, in order to smooth the way for Syria to host the
2008 Arab League summit in Damascus. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) SHARA'A IGNITES A WAR OF WORDS. Syrian Vice President
Farouq al-Shara'a sparked a week of escalated rhetoric and
widespread media speculation on a renewed Syrian-Saudi rift
with his remarks on August 14 to Syrian media on Saudi
Arabia's role as a regional leader. Shara'a described the
Saudi government as "paralyzed" in its ability to lead on
regional issues. He cited the collapse of the February 2007
Mecca Agreement between Fatah and Hamas, asserting that it
was brokered in Damascus but transferred to Riyadh, to
accommodate the Saudi desire to announce the agreement and
assume the lead on its fulfillment. Shara'a also criticized
Riyadh's absence from the early August meeting in Damascus of
the Iraq Border Security Working Group (BSWG),noting that
Riyadh could have sent a "low-rank embassy employee" if it
had reservations but instead deliberately chose to leave its
seat vacant.


3. (U) Saudi Arabia responded sharply to Shara'a's comments.
An August 16 statement carried by the Saudi Press Agency
quoted an unnamed Saudi official rejecting the "lies and
contradictions" of Shara'a's "repugnant" remarks and accusing
Damascus of fomenting "chaos" in the region. The Saudis
issued their riposte despite an unsuccessful attempt to
defuse tensions by Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem. In
an August 15 interview with Dubai-based satellite television
station, Al-Arabiyah, Muallem asserted the strength of Syrian
ties with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, noting
recurrent state visits, including Syrian participation in the
March 2007 Arab League summit in Riyadh (Note: There have
been no high-level, official Saudi visits to Damascus since
late 2005. End note). Official public exchanges on the issue
ended on August 18, with a Syrian statement reported by the
Syrian Arab News Agency expressing "regret" for the Saudi
"distortion" of Shara'a's remarks.


4. (U) The official silence since August 18 has been filled
by widespread media commentary and barbs traded among
regional actors sympathetic to each side, particularly from
Saudi supporters. In Lebanon, politicians affiliated with
the anti-Syrian governing coalition -- including March 14
leader Sa'ad Hariri -- criticized Shara'a's "lies and
offenses" and accused elements of the opposition of pursuing
a SARG-orchestrated effort to undermine Saudi reconciliation
efforts in Lebanon. The Saudi-owned, London-based daily,
Al-Sharq al-Awsat, reported August 25 on security threats to
the Saudi Ambassador in Lebanon that prompted his temporary
recall to Riyadh. The report did not explicitly point a
finger at Syria, but noted comments from Saudi officials that
it is "easy to guess the scheming quarters" responsible for
the threats. Subsequent reporting from Dubai-based
al-Arabiyah television included quotes from Saudi officials
positing the involvement of SARG proxies. Saudi pique over
Shara'a's remarks also was evident in news coverage of Syrian
opposition elements known to irritate the SARG. Saudi paper,
Abha al-Watan, ran interviews criticizing Shara'a and the
Syrian regime with former Syrian Vice President Abd al-Halim
Khaddam and Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leader Ali Sadr al-Din
al-Bayanuni, including extensive discussion by Bayanuni of
the need for regime change in Damascus.


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5. (U) INSINUATING SYRIAN ALLEGIANCE TO IRAN. Criticism of
Damascus also has been infused with allegations of the SARG's
questionable commitment to Arab unity and its true allegiance
to Iran. An August 21 article in Al-Sharq al-Awsat derided
Syrian claims to be the "beating heart of pan-Arabism,"
instead cataloguing the various ways in which President
Bashar al-Asad has become "subservient" to Iranian interests.
More generally, the theme of Syrian-Saudi tension as a
manifestation of a broader struggle between Iran and the
United States has been posited by a range of observers.
Andrew Tabler, editor of the English-language monthly, Syria
Today, described the Syria-Saudi row to the Associated Press
as a "war by proxy" between the United States and Iran,
noting the potential for spillover into Lebanon -- where
Syria and Saudi Arabia are already at odds -- and Iraq, where
their support of Sunni interests should otherwise generate
common ground.


6. (C) A CALCULATED JAB AT RIYADH? The reactions of Embassy
contacts to Shara'a's remarks range from dismissal of a
free-lancing vice president to musings over whether Shara'a
was articulating a coordinated SARG stance. Shara'a is known
to stray "off message," noted a Western diplomatic colleague,
who asserted that he appears less frequently at public events
than favored regime speakers, such as Information Minister
Mohsen Bilal, Foreign Minister Walid Muallem, and Expatriates
Minister Buthayna Sha'aban. (Note. Shara'a delivered his
remarks at the Arab Cultural Center in Mezzeh in an annual
address to celebrate Journalists Day. End note.) One Arab
journalist based in Damascus, shrugged off any lasting impact
from the speech, though he mused that the vice president's
ability to speak so freely might signal a temporary increase
in his stature within the regime.


7. (C) Other observers of the regime offer contrary
assessments of Shara'a's standing. A well-connected Syrian
oil-industry contact -- who has acted as an informal conduit
between the SARG and Iraq -- theorized that Shara'a launched
the diatribe against Riyadh to insulate himself against
possible removal during an expected cabinet shuffle. Shara'a
is using the vehement Saudi response to frame the feud as a
Saudi attack on the regime, he added. If public criticism of
Damascus continues, pressure will increase on Bashar to show
that he can parry Saudi accusations, and Shara'a will again
be preserved in his position into the future. Al-Hayat
correspondent, Ibrahim Hamidi, also posited that Shara'a may
be losing influence, noting that the SARG's recent opening to
Iraq reflected Muallem's efforts. However, Hamidi did not
link Shara'a's political fortunes to the speech. Though
Shara'a may have crossed some boundaries in his rhetoric,
Hamidi explained, he appeared to be sending a calculated
message to Riyadh on Lebanon and Iraq as well as on regime
concerns about Saudi meddling among Syria's Sunnis. Shara'a
was telegraphing the SARG message that "we can make things
difficult" in Lebanon if our interests are not met, asserted
Hamidi.


8. (C) WHAT SET SHARA'A OFF? Syria and Saudi Arabia have been
at odds, over Lebanon in particular, since the 2005
assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri.
Friction between the two states escalated markedly following
the summer 2006 conflict in Lebanon, especially after Bashar
publicly labeled unnamed Arab leaders "half-men." The
tension ebbed briefly with Saudi King Abdullah's public
embrace of Bashar at the Arab League summit in March, though
their private meeting failed to generate lasting coordination
on Lebanon. Hamidi recalled SARG frustration over Saudi
rebuff of three separate invitations proffered by the SARG to
Saudi foreign minister Saud al-Faisal. In late May, Muallem
publicly demurred on the issue of improved bilateral
coordination, noting that he still awaited "practical steps
in this direction." In a further sign of deteriorating
relations, Egypt's ambassador to Syria told the Charge weeks
before Shara'a's comments that Syrian-Saudi relations were
"awful" and the previously active Saudi ambassador in
Damascus reportedly had stopped engaging the SARG during the
last two months. We likewise have heard that the SARG has
worked to limit Saudi access among Syrians.


9. (C) Though Lebanon remains the core issue of contention
between the two states -- and over which disagreement is
likely to deepen as the Lebanese presidential election nears
-- the proximate cause of Shara'a's outburst appears to have

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been Saudi absence from the SARG-hosted Iraq BSWG in early
August. Embassy contacts observe that the Saudi decision
could have been attributed as much to distrust of
multi-lateral dealings with the Iraqi government and their
antipathy to Maliki as to anger at the SARG, as evidenced by
the lack of Saudi participation in two prior Iraq working
groups on energy and refugees. Most contacts interpreted the
Saudi move as an expression of displeasure with both Syria
and Iraq. The SARG nevertheless took umbrage at the
diplomatic slight, and bristled at being left to bear the
brunt of accusations about the movement of foreign fighters
into Iraq when Damascus perceives Saudi responsibility for
exporting jihadists.


10. (C) Shara'a's jab at Riyadh over Saudi leadership on the
Palestinian issue also reflected SARG irritation with
Riyadh's stance on Arab-Israeli issues. The SARG dissented
during July 30 discussions among Arab League foreign
ministers of a U.S. peace initiative. Though Syria's public
comments highlighted their belief that Arab leaders should
focus on healing the intra-Palestinian rift first, Damascus
is also worried that it will be left out of any
U.S.-sponsored gathering. The SARG was particularly incensed
over Faisal's subsequent comments welcoming an international
conference. SARG concerns may be alleviated somewhat by the
August 24 interview of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in
Egyptian weekly, Al-Akhbar al-Yom, in which he asserted that
all Arab parties must be included in any peace conference.
Damascus will be looking to translate Mubarak's comment into
strong Arab backing at a September 5 meeting of the Arab
League committee formed to pursue the peace initiative (and
reportedly chaired by Faisal) to ensure the Saudis sign on to
a coordinated Arab position that supports Syria's view the
process.


11. (C) COMMENT: Though it would be nothing new for Shara'a
to exceed his brief in criticizing the Saudis so openly, his
remarks nonetheless reflect tangible SARG displeasure with
Riyadh and a real deterioration in the bilateral
relationship. But SARG silence on the issue since its
official statement on August 18 suggests the Syrian president
probably seeks to prevent the row from escalating further.
The SARG is strongly motivated to calm tempers in order to
smooth the way for its scheduled hosting in Damascus of the
2008 Arab League summit. (Ironically, Shara'a opened his
August 14 speech with his hope for the success of next year's
summit to "correct the course of Arab-Arab relations.") The
summit is of critical importance to Bashar's attempts to
reduce Syria's isolation and portray himself as an
influential Arab leader. Hosting the Arab League in Damascus
would also reaffirm Syria's place as "the beating heart of
pan-Arabism," and increase Bashar's room to maneuver as he
continues to tread a fine line between allegiance to Arab
interests and Syria's close relationship with Iran. Yet, if
the more conspiratorial theories of Shara'a's maneuvering
prove correct, it will be hard for Bashar to let Shara'a go
or back down from direct attacks against him.
CORBIN