SARG REPORTS ON BORDER SECURITY EFFORTS DURING

S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000836 SIPDIS SIPDIS NEA/ELA; NSC FOR MARCHESE E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2017 TAGS: PINS PREL PTER SY SUBJECT: SARG REPORTS ON BORDER SECURITY EFFORTS DURING IRAQ BORDER SECURITY WORKING GROUP REF: DAMASCUS 814 Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Michael Corbin for reasons 1.4b/d ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Syrian Interior Ministry hosted the Border Security Working Group (BSWG) of Iraqi Neighbors in Damascus August 8-9 (Reftel). Although official Syrian commentary during the two-day meeting was limited, Syria's Interior Minister Bassam Abdel Majid provided opening remarks and Major General Mohammed Mansoura, head of the Syrian Political Security Department (PSD),detailed Syrian actions to improve border security. Syria was the only neighboring country to offer a picture of its actions, no doubt because of the SARG's hosting of the BSWG and its need to address the continued transit of foreign fighters through Syria to Iraq. Post notes that Mansoura's description of specific physical improvements to the border largely reiterated earlier SARG statements on the topic, likely because the SARG completed many of these improvements in 2005. The new aspect of the SARG commentary was that it placed a greater emphasis on the internal threat Syria now faces from extremists and how this threat is a direct repercussion of SARG actions to secure its borders. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) INTERIOR MINISTER DESCRIBES SARG ACTIONS ALONG THE BORDER: Syria's Interior Minister Bassam Abdel Majid opened the meeting of the Border Security Working Group of Iraq's Neighbors held in Damascus August 8-9, 2007. In his remarks, which were widely reported in the local and international press, Majid claimed that Syria had taken all necessary steps to control its border with Iraq. He described a broad range of Syrian actions to improve border security, including: increased mobile patrols and fixed checkpoints; tightened entry procedures for persons less than thirty years old; individual screening and deportation of suspect persons entering the country; and arrest and interrogation of individuals trying to illegally cross into Iraq. Majid also highlighted earlier promises to Syria of night-vision goggles to assist with its efforts that had not been fulfilled. (NOTE: President Asad and other SARG officials have repeatedly raised the issue of a 2004 U.S. discussion of border assistance to Syria with visitors from Western capitals since then. END NOTE.) ¶3. (C) PSD CHIEF MANSOURA OFFERS FURTHER DETAILS: On the second day of the conference Major-General Mohammed Mansoura, head of the Political Security Department, spoke for a half hour on SARG border efforts. He addressed a closed session, though a portion of his speech was leaked to local media sources. Mansoura noted the increase in smuggling along Syria's border with Iraq since 2003 and listed various actions the SARG has taken to address border security, including: -- Increasing the number of checkpoints to 570, with a distance of one to three kilometers between each checkpoint; -- Maintaining 7000 border guard forces, with each checkpoint staffed by 10 people; -- Reinforcing sand berms, including increasing the height of the berms to four meters in many areas; -- Utilizing cement barriers with iron columns connected by barbed wire in areas not protected by sand berms; -- Digging trenches with obstacles to prevent people and vehicles from crossing; -- Installing three rows of barbed wire near Abu Kamal; -- Constructing a lighting network in the northeastern triangle border area; -- Tracking terrorism suspects throughout Syria, not just along the border; -- Screening the names of people entering the country; and -- Detaining and interrogating individuals headed to Iraq. He said Syria had arrested 1250 individuals, presumably meaning fighters, en route to Iraq. He also said Syria had repatriated an unspecified number of detainees to their respective countries. ¶4. (C) Mansoura claimed that SARG efforts to improve border security had utilized 25,000 man-hours and cost USD 10 billion. He said these efforts had reduced illegal daytime movement, but that terrorists were still crossing the border )- especially at night. He mentioned a 2005 SARG-sponsored trip for 30 diplomats and journalists to view the border and highlighted public comments at that time by the British Defense Attach on the difficulty of controlling the 650 km-long border. Echoing the Syrian interior minister, Mansoura also recalled the Attach's public statements regarding negotiations to provide night-vision goggles to Syria but noted that these never materialized. ¶5. (C) SARG RE-STATING PREVIOUSLY REPORTED EFFORTS ON BORDER SECURITY: The SARG has previously released much of the information Mansoura detailed on the SARG's improvements to the physical fortifications of the border. Mansoura's statement largely paralleled a July 2005 Ministry of Foreign Affairs memorandum detailing Syrian actions to prevent "illegal infiltration," probably because it completed most of its physical improvements along the border in 2005. There were a few new details. The SARG reportedly increased the number of border posts from 557 to 570 and upped manning from 5000 to 7000 soldiers. In addition, Mansoura cited 1250 arrests by the SARG of suspected fighters en route to Iraq, whereas the 2005 memorandum said the SARG had arrested 1240 extremists of different nationalities. In neither case, did the SARG clarify a timeframe for the arrests or whether these individuals were detained upon suspicion of extremist or criminal activity, such as smuggling. ¶6. (C) SARG ENTRY PROCEDURES REMAIN QUESTIONABLE: DAO notes that many of the physical upgrades mentioned by Mansoura have been observed along the border, for example, an increased number of border checkpoints and higher sand berms. SARG assertions regarding improved screening of individuals entering the country are more difficult to verify. Since the first press reports in late 2005 of tightened restrictions on Arab males under age thirty, neither the Embassy nor diplomatic contacts have observed a significant change in procedures at major ports of entry. On August 12, Emboff observed that young men arriving on several flights from Gulf countries did not appear to receive greater scrutiny than other passengers at Damascus International airport. Nevertheless, there may be security service resources being utilized that are not readily visible -- on an earlier occasion in May, another Emboff noticed several young Arab men being detained by security services when arriving on flights to Damascus International airport. ¶7. (C) SARG PUTS NEW EMPHASIS ON INTERNAL THREAT FROM EXTREMISTS: The most notable element in Mansoura's presentation was the increased emphasis on the internal threat Syria now faces from extremists and the assertion that this threat is a direct repercussion of SARG actions to secure its borders. Mansoura said that, as a result of its efforts, the SARG had clashed with terrorists on the border and throughout Syria. He said that in addition to the known attacks -- such as the one against the American Embassy in Damascus in September 2006 -- the SARG had exposed many terrorist cells, confiscating weapons and explosive belts. He cited more than 100 attacks on Syrian border guards by "armed people from Iraqi lands," which killed six soldiers and wounded 17 (NOTE: This is one of the first instances of a SARG official directly linking the death of Syrian soldiers to armed assailants from Iraqi territory. END NOTE). Despite these losses, Mansoura asserted Syrian willingness to further cooperate with Iraq on security. He asserted Syrian readiness to extradite persons through Interpol in accordance with the 1983 Riyadh agreement to exchange wanted persons and in support of prior agreements among Iraq's neighbors. (NOTE: Although not specifically addressed at the conference, regional press linked Mansoura's comment on extradition to Iraq's assertions that the SARG is harboring Iraqi Baathists. END NOTE.) ¶8. (S) COMMENT: Apart from the Iraqi delegation's presentation on security, Syria was the only neighboring country at the conference to offer a detailed picture of its actions along the border, no doubt due to the SARG's role as host of the BSWG and its need to address the continued transit of foreign fighters through Syria to Iraq. The greater level of concern expressed by the SARG about extremist activity within its borders reflects the government's increased focus on this threat for more than one year, and has been borne out by anecdotal, media, and other reporting of Syrian counter-terror efforts. The SARG emphasis on the link between the domestic threat and its actions to secure the border with Iraq also is new, though perhaps deliberately played up given the venue of the presentation at the BSWG. CORBIN