SARG USES AHMEDINEJAD VISIT TO SIGNAL STRENGTH OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000774

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2017
TAGS: PREL SY IR IS
SUBJECT: SARG USES AHMEDINEJAD VISIT TO SIGNAL STRENGTH OF
SYRIA-IRAN ALLIANCE AND PROJECT EQUAL STATUS

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Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Michael H. Corbin for reasons
1.4 b/d


1. (C) Summary: The scheduling of Iranian president Mahmud
Ahmedinejad's visit to Damascus two days after president
Bashar al-Asad took his second oath of office prompted
observers of Syrian politics to interpret the visit in terms
of the most notable element of Asad's inauguration speech:
his comments on resuming peace negotiations with Israel.
Embassy contacts averred that the SARG intended the visit to
signal that Syria can negotiate with Israel from a position
of power and demonstrate that Damascus will not sacrifice its
"sovereign" prerogative to manage its own foreign relations.
Arab ambassadors also noted that the SARG sought to
demonstrate, through scheduling and protocol decisions, its
equal status with Iran in the relationship. A joint
communique issued at the end of the visit was the first such
formal statement after a meeting of the two leaders,
according to one contact, and a probable attempt to
demonstrate unity of vision across regional issues on which
most observers discern growing daylight between the two
states. End summary.


2. (C) The visit and its message to Israel. Iranian president
Mahmud Ahmedinejad arrived in Damascus on July 19 for a
day-long state visit with a delegation that included Iran's
ministers for foreign affairs and for housing and urban
development. The SARG appears to have employed some
scheduling and protocol decisions to signal to Tehran that
their bilateral relationship is one of equals. The UAE
ambassador told the Charge that, at UAE request, the SARG had
postponed the Ahmedinejad visit a few days to allow space
between the Iranian visit and that of the UAE president
Shaykh Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan, which concluded on July

16. Another Arab Ambassador thought it notable that Asad had
chosen not to greet Ahmedinejad upon his arrival at the
airport.


3. (C) Though a joint communique issued at the conclusion of
the summit focused on Palestinian unity, Lebanon, and Iraq,
Embassy contacts viewed the underlying message of the meeting
as directed toward Israel. Ahmedinejad arrived in Damascus
on the heels of Asad's inauguration speech before parliament
on July 17, deemed most noteworthy for the president's
response to Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert's comments on
peace negotiations. Economist and informal government
advisor, Riad Abrash, as well as al-Hayat correspondent,
Ibrahim Hamidi, described the visit as a counterpoint to
Asad's stated willingness to open talks with Israel provided
Syria obtained guarantees on the full return of the Golan.
Amid SARG perceptions that Israel raised the issue of
negotiations primarily out of concern over Iran,
Ahmedinejad's arrival was intended to signal that Syria would
not mortgage its relationship with Tehran, according to
Abrash. Both contacts also noted the visit's usefulness in
demonstrating to Israel (and the U.S.) that Syria could
negotiate from a position of power. Hamidi further observed
that the proximity of the visit to Asad's comments about
Israel compelled Iran to offer explicit -- though carefully
worded -- support for a Syrian decision to negotiate with
Israel (the joint communique cites Iran "expressed its
support for the Syrian Arab people's right to regain the
occupied Syrian Golan to the 4 June 1967 border).


3. (C) Diplomatic contacts likewise speculated on the link
between the visit and Asad's speech, though with an eye
toward regional concerns over the possibility of conflict
with Israel. One contact cited rumors that Iran's defense
minister and ARMY chief of staff had quietly accompanied
Ahmedinejad to Damascus, perhaps to discuss armament deals
and Iranian financing of Syrian weapons purchases. (Note. A
July 21 Sharq al-Awsat article outlined an agreement for Iran
to finance Syrian purchase of Russian weapons, supply the
SARG with Iranian weaponry, and build weapons factories
inside Syria. The next day, Iran's news agency reported an
Iranian government denial that a secret arms deal existed.
End note.)


4. (C) Growing distance on regional issues? In a news
conference following their meeting, Asad stated that Iraq,
the Palestinian territories, and Lebanon dominated the
discussions. The joint communique also repeated familiar
calls for dialogue among the Palestinians, national unity in
Lebanon and Iraq, withdrawal of "occupation forces" from
Iraq, condemnation of Israeli aggression, and support for

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Iran's right to peaceful nuclear energy development. The
affirmation of a common vision belies a growing, if still
quite manageable, divergence on regional issues, note Embassy
contacts. Samir al-Taqi, director of a Syrian think-tank who
is close to the Syrian Foreign Minister, averred that the
meeting was organized at Iran's behest due to concern in
Tehran over Syrian thinking on Iraq and Lebanon. He
perceived Asad as less convinced of the need for a summit.
Hamidi posited that fundamental differences in the national
interests of each state created natural distance between
them. For Iran, the "fruit is Iraq" and for Syria "the fruit
is Lebanon," he observed. As a result, Damascus may
demonstrate greater flexibility to the West on Iraq-related
issues, while Tehran might be more willing to broker
compromise in Lebanon.


5. (C) Hamidi also discerned distance between Syria and Iran
on the Palestinian issue. In the current split between Hamas
and Fatah, "Syria lost and Iran won," he argued. Hamidi
perceived SARG dismay over Hamas's confrontation with Fatah,
which essentially left the group -- and by extension, Syria
-- out of the loop on determining Palestinian dealings with
the West and Israel. Iran, meanwhile, remained interested in
preventing Hamas from compromising its resistance role.
Hamidi's al-Hayat reporting of the Iranian president's
meetings with Palestinian factions in Damascus noted
Ahmedinejad's urgings for continued Palestinian "resistance"
along with his calls for dialogue. (Note. Ahmedinejad also
met with Hizballah Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah while in
Damascus; Asad did not attend these gatherings. End note.)


6. (C) Comment: Though the timing of Ahmedinejad's visit was
no doubt useful to President Asad as a means of signaling to
Israel and the U.S. that he retains room to maneuver,
diplomatic protocol likely also figured into its scheduling.
Asad was the first head of state to visit Ahmedinejad upon
his inauguration in 2005 (though he was preceded by
Nasrallah). Moreover, Asad's allusion in the joint press
conference to the "quick and urgent changing of
circumstances" that "distinguished" the current meeting,
echoed his inauguration speech and illustrates the Syrian
president's interest in comparing notes -- and deconflicting
policy -- on regional issues with the SARG's most important
ally. The shared vision for Iraq, Lebanon, and the
Palestinians expressed in the joint communique no doubt
reflects a concerted effort to project unity in the face of
the shared threat from the United States. However,
underlying differences in each state's core concerns will
likely continue to color their relationship and shape
Damascus's attempts to project itself as an equal partner
with Tehran.
CORBIN