SARG USES AHMEDINEJAD VISIT TO SIGNAL STRENGTH OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000774 SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D C O P Y SIPDIS NEA/ELA, DUBAI FOR JBURNS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2017 TAGS: PREL SY IR IS SUBJECT: SARG USES AHMEDINEJAD VISIT TO SIGNAL STRENGTH OF SYRIA-IRAN ALLIANCE AND PROJECT EQUAL STATUS DAMASCUS 00000774 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Michael H. Corbin for reasons 1.4 b/d ¶1. (C) Summary: The scheduling of Iranian president Mahmud Ahmedinejad's visit to Damascus two days after president Bashar al-Asad took his second oath of office prompted observers of Syrian politics to interpret the visit in terms of the most notable element of Asad's inauguration speech: his comments on resuming peace negotiations with Israel. Embassy contacts averred that the SARG intended the visit to signal that Syria can negotiate with Israel from a position of power and demonstrate that Damascus will not sacrifice its "sovereign" prerogative to manage its own foreign relations. Arab ambassadors also noted that the SARG sought to demonstrate, through scheduling and protocol decisions, its equal status with Iran in the relationship. A joint communique issued at the end of the visit was the first such formal statement after a meeting of the two leaders, according to one contact, and a probable attempt to demonstrate unity of vision across regional issues on which most observers discern growing daylight between the two states. End summary. ¶2. (C) The visit and its message to Israel. Iranian president Mahmud Ahmedinejad arrived in Damascus on July 19 for a day-long state visit with a delegation that included Iran's ministers for foreign affairs and for housing and urban development. The SARG appears to have employed some scheduling and protocol decisions to signal to Tehran that their bilateral relationship is one of equals. The UAE ambassador told the Charge that, at UAE request, the SARG had postponed the Ahmedinejad visit a few days to allow space between the Iranian visit and that of the UAE president Shaykh Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan, which concluded on July ¶16. Another Arab Ambassador thought it notable that Asad had chosen not to greet Ahmedinejad upon his arrival at the airport. ¶3. (C) Though a joint communique issued at the conclusion of the summit focused on Palestinian unity, Lebanon, and Iraq, Embassy contacts viewed the underlying message of the meeting as directed toward Israel. Ahmedinejad arrived in Damascus on the heels of Asad's inauguration speech before parliament on July 17, deemed most noteworthy for the president's response to Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert's comments on peace negotiations. Economist and informal government advisor, Riad Abrash, as well as al-Hayat correspondent, Ibrahim Hamidi, described the visit as a counterpoint to Asad's stated willingness to open talks with Israel provided Syria obtained guarantees on the full return of the Golan. Amid SARG perceptions that Israel raised the issue of negotiations primarily out of concern over Iran, Ahmedinejad's arrival was intended to signal that Syria would not mortgage its relationship with Tehran, according to Abrash. Both contacts also noted the visit's usefulness in demonstrating to Israel (and the U.S.) that Syria could negotiate from a position of power. Hamidi further observed that the proximity of the visit to Asad's comments about Israel compelled Iran to offer explicit -- though carefully worded -- support for a Syrian decision to negotiate with Israel (the joint communique cites Iran "expressed its support for the Syrian Arab people's right to regain the occupied Syrian Golan to the 4 June 1967 border). ¶3. (C) Diplomatic contacts likewise speculated on the link between the visit and Asad's speech, though with an eye toward regional concerns over the possibility of conflict with Israel. One contact cited rumors that Iran's defense minister and army chief of staff had quietly accompanied Ahmedinejad to Damascus, perhaps to discuss armament deals and Iranian financing of Syrian weapons purchases. (Note. A July 21 Sharq al-Awsat article outlined an agreement for Iran to finance Syrian purchase of Russian weapons, supply the SARG with Iranian weaponry, and build weapons factories inside Syria. The next day, Iran's news agency reported an Iranian government denial that a secret arms deal existed. End note.) ¶4. (C) Growing distance on regional issues? In a news conference following their meeting, Asad stated that Iraq, the Palestinian territories, and Lebanon dominated the discussions. The joint communique also repeated familiar calls for dialogue among the Palestinians, national unity in Lebanon and Iraq, withdrawal of "occupation forces" from Iraq, condemnation of Israeli aggression, and support for DAMASCUS 00000774 002.3 OF 002 Iran's right to peaceful nuclear energy development. The affirmation of a common vision belies a growing, if still quite manageable, divergence on regional issues, note Embassy contacts. Samir al-Taqi, director of a Syrian think-tank who is close to the Syrian Foreign Minister, averred that the meeting was organized at Iran's behest due to concern in Tehran over Syrian thinking on Iraq and Lebanon. He perceived Asad as less convinced of the need for a summit. Hamidi posited that fundamental differences in the national interests of each state created natural distance between them. For Iran, the "fruit is Iraq" and for Syria "the fruit is Lebanon," he observed. As a result, Damascus may demonstrate greater flexibility to the West on Iraq-related issues, while Tehran might be more willing to broker compromise in Lebanon. ¶5. (C) Hamidi also discerned distance between Syria and Iran on the Palestinian issue. In the current split between Hamas and Fatah, "Syria lost and Iran won," he argued. Hamidi perceived SARG dismay over Hamas's confrontation with Fatah, which essentially left the group -- and by extension, Syria -- out of the loop on determining Palestinian dealings with the West and Israel. Iran, meanwhile, remained interested in preventing Hamas from compromising its resistance role. Hamidi's al-Hayat reporting of the Iranian president's meetings with Palestinian factions in Damascus noted Ahmedinejad's urgings for continued Palestinian "resistance" along with his calls for dialogue. (Note. Ahmedinejad also met with Hizballah Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah while in Damascus; Asad did not attend these gatherings. End note.) ¶6. (C) Comment: Though the timing of Ahmedinejad's visit was no doubt useful to President Asad as a means of signaling to Israel and the U.S. that he retains room to maneuver, diplomatic protocol likely also figured into its scheduling. Asad was the first head of state to visit Ahmedinejad upon his inauguration in 2005 (though he was preceded by Nasrallah). Moreover, Asad's allusion in the joint press conference to the "quick and urgent changing of circumstances" that "distinguished" the current meeting, echoed his inauguration speech and illustrates the Syrian president's interest in comparing notes -- and deconflicting policy -- on regional issues with the SARG's most important ally. The shared vision for Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinians expressed in the joint communique no doubt reflects a concerted effort to project unity in the face of the shared threat from the United States. However, underlying differences in each state's core concerns will likely continue to color their relationship and shape Damascus's attempts to project itself as an equal partner with Tehran. CORBIN