MOVEMENT ON SYRIA-IRAQ RELATIONS?

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000756 SIPDIS SIPDIS PARIS FOR JORDAN, LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ SY SUBJECT: MOVEMENT ON SYRIA-IRAQ RELATIONS? Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael H. Corbin for reasons 1.4 b/d 1.(C) Summary: Signs of movement in Syrian-Iraqi relations following the release of two Syrian military detainees by Iraq include apparent agreement by Syria to host the long-stalled border security Iraq neighbor's group, preparations for the visit of Iraqi VP Abdel Mehdi, cancellation of an Iraqi opposition conference including Ba'athists and former Iraq regime loyalists, and more cordial diplomatic contacts. The up-tick in relations reflects Syrian attempts to work all angles. Engagement may be favored over obstructionism at present to ensure that Damascus remains relevant on Iraq, particularly in light of the Iraq-Iran-U.S. tripartite meeting. By showing a friendlier face to Baghdad -- while simultaneously demonstrating that it can turn off and on opposition activities -- Damascus seeks to demonstrate that it remains an indispensable regional player. End Summary. ¶2. (C) In a July 23 conversation with Charge, Iraqi Charge Hasan Abdul Aziz said that he met that morning with Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Faisal Mikdad to follow up on Iraqi FM Zebari's July 22 phone call to Syrian FM Muallim on the neighbors' group meetings. Abdul Aziz said the Syrians confirmed that they would host the border security working group meeting in Damascus "on or about August 7" (subsequent Syrian press indicates that Zebari and Muallim agreed to hold the conference on August 8-9). Abdul Aziz said the Syrians had also confirmed their attendance at the July 26 refugee meeting in Amman. He characterized his meeting with Mikdad as very positive (something he has not said about previous conversations with Syrian officials). ¶3. (C) The Iraqi Charge said the border security meeting would be a little bit later than originally planned, to allow for the visit to Damascus of Iraqi VP Abdel Mehdi which he said would take place during the "first week of August." While there have been no official reports of the VP visit, some rumors suggest the visit could occur as early as July 29. ¶4. (C) Separately, the Syrians announced shortly after the time it was to have opened on July 23 that a conference of Iraqi "opposition" figures including Ba'athists, Islamists, tribal leaders and others would be postponed. Arab journalists who follow the situation closely speculated that the postponement was either a gesture to the GOI as the result of improved Syrian-Iraqi relations or the result of Iranian displeasure that Syria would host such a meeting. The Iraqi Charge was clear that he had not protested the conference but said the Syrians might be waiting to see what comes out of the neighbors' meetings and the Iraqi VP visit before embarking on such confrontational exercises. Another source told us that the Ba'athists had started fighting the night before the conference and that the Syrians were divided over whether to back Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri or Muhammad Yunis al-Ahmad, and that neither was giving Syria much advantage. ¶5. (C) Comment: The recent up-tick in relations reflects Syria's usual modus operandi of working all angles. Engagement may be favored over obstructionism at present to ensure that Damascus remains relevant on Iraq, particularly in light of the Iraq-Iran-US tripartite meeting. Syria's exclusion from such meetings no doubt piques the SARG leadership. By showing a friendlier face to Baghdad -- while simultaneously demonstrating that it wields the power to turn off and on opposition activities -- Damascus seeks to demonstrate that it remains an indispensable regional player. CORBIN