HAMAS LEADERS IN SYRIA,SARG OFFICIALS EXPRESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000636

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR WALLER; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PREL KPAL KWBG SY
SUBJECT: HAMAS LEADERS IN SYRIA,SARG OFFICIALS EXPRESS
DIFFERENCES OVER POST-GAZA FALLOUT

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Corbin, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: SARG officials and the Damascus-based
leaders of Hamas are offering divergent views in their
assessments about the necessity and impact of the Hamas
takeover in Gaza, with the SARG MFA officials expressing
concern and Hamas leaders here -- after some initial
uncertainty -- projecting confidence that it can manage the
crisis. Some SARG leaders believe Hamas may have
overreached, and they are seeking a "political umbrella,"
with the Saudis or the Egyptians, to help Hamas reconcile
with Abu Mazen and Fatah. Abu Mazen envoy Abbas Zaki has
visited Damascus twice in the past ten days, soliciting
Syrian and Iranian views on the situation. Damascus-based
Hamas leaders, most often repeated demand, according
contacts who have met regularly with its leaders since the
Gaza crisis erupted, is that Abu Mazen get rid of Gaza
security chief Mohammed Dahlan. For now, Syria's somewhat
limited ability to influence events in the territories, at
least in the short term, with Israel not at center stage,
seems to have SARG officials frustrated and concerned. End
Summary.


2. (C) AGREEING TO DISAGREE: Syrian MFA officials and the
Damascus-based Hamas leadership appear to disagree about the
current situation in the wake of the Hamas takeover in Gaza,
according to contacts who have met with the two sides. SARG
officials seem troubled by the recent developments, worried
that Hamas overreacted to events in Gaza and has lurched into
a dangerous political situation. Dr. Samir al-Taki, an
informal advisor to the MFA (and a protg of FM Mu'allim)
told A/DCM that Hamas "made a huge mistake and they will pay
for it." He saw few benefits for Hamas in the action,
assessing that the group "took itself out of the game" and
"overplayed their hand." Al-Taki also noted that Hamas had
projected to the entire Arab world that Islamists "would
never share power," but would insist on monopolizing it, a
view extremely damaging for the political prospects of
Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.


3. (C) Palestinian-American academic Muhammed Muslih, who
has met with a range of Syrian officials in Damascus over the
past two weeks, offered a similar assessment of the SARG
view. He described the Syrians (and the Iranians) as worried
that Hamas had made a mistake that could devalue a prized
asset. Syrian officials are now looking for a "political
umbrella," a compromise formula that could be worked out
between Abu Mazen (with Fatah) and Hamas and be endorsed by a
third party (with credibility in the West that the Syrians
lack) such as the Saudis or the Egyptians. Such an effort
would take time, noted Muslih. FM Mu'allim June 25 publicly
laid stress on the importance of containing the deterioration
in the territories and stopping the fighting among the
"Palestinian brothers." Al-Hayat journalist Ibrahim Hamidi
offered a different take, insisting that while FM Mu'allim
and the MFA are concerned, some hard-liners in the SARG, led
by VP Shara'a, remain confident that Hamas's powerful -- and
rising -- influence in the territories, will allow it to
emerge unscathed from the current crisis.


4. (C) According to Muslih, Abu Mazen has "not closed the
door," despite his tough rhetoric in public. His envoy from
Lebanon, Abbas Zaki (who represents PLO and Fatah in the
Palestinian camps and is used by Abu Mazen to pass messages
to the Syrians and others in the region),has been to Syria
twice since the Hamas takeover, initially to talk to the
Syrians, and more recently (June 23-24) to meet with Syrian
and Iranian officials visiting Damascus. Zaki and an
accompanying delegation met with Syrian VP Farouk Shara'a
June 24 and twice with Iranian officials, including Assistant
FM Mohammed Reza Baqri, "to see what they want," said Muslih.
(Note: Baqri met with VP Shara'a and Mu'allim June 24.)
Iranian officials for their part have been talking to all the
Palestinian factions in Damascus as they, like the Syrians,
grapple with the situation.


5. (C) ABU MAZEN WILL FAIL IN EFFORTS TO ISOLATE HAMAS:
Hamas leaders here recognize they are confronting a crisis,
but they are projecting confidence that they can manage it
successfully and will not let Abu Mazen dictate conditions to
them, according to Muslih, who has met on several occasions
in the past ten days with senior Hamas leaders in Damascus,
including Khalid Mishal. Especially in the first few days
after the takeover in Gaza, and to a lesser degree more

DAMASCUS 00000636 002 OF 003


recently, Khalid Mishal and others in Hamas here privately
expressed some reservations about what the Hamas military
wing had done, according to Damascus-based diplomatic
contacts who met with them. Pointing to the need for
patience, Hamas leaders insist that in the intermediate and
longer term, Abu Mazen will fail with his current effort
because "the Israelis will give him nothing and the Americans
will only offer money," reported Muslih, describing their
views. That will leave Abu Mazen without any "political
horizon," which will become increasingly evident in the
coming months, and perhaps even in the wake of the June 25
Sharm meeting between Abu Mazen and the leaders of Egypt,
Jordan, and Israel. For now, Hamas leaders here acknowledge
that Abu Mazen has (literally) refused to return their phone
calls, and they have stopped trying to make contact for the
moment.


6. (C) Visiting Fatah official Hani al-Hassan, in Damascus
June 15-17 to confer with the Syrians (he saw VP advisor and
former security chief Mohammed Nassif Khairbek and was
attempting to arrange a meeting with Mu'allim) endorsed the
view that Abu Mazen (and Fatah) needed to seek a modus
vivendi with Hamas. Speaking to A/DCM June 16, before Abu
Mazen unveiled his hard-line public posture, al-Hassan saw
the need for reprisals and confrontation to stop and for
"politics to take over." He added bitterly that Gaza
security chief (and Abu Mazen advisor) Mohammed Dahlan -- and
the small group that surrounded him -- had "no support" in
Fatah, which explained why Fatah security forces had not
fought vigorously in Gaza (and why Abu Mazen needed to dump
Dahlan).


7. (C) Hamas plans to be patient and will not attack Israel
or try to trigger a conflict with Fatah in the West Bank,
said Muslih. According to Muslih, however, Hamas leaders
also warned that if violent reprisals in the West Bank
continued and reached beyond a level Hamas felt could -- or
should -- be absorbed, Hamas would defend itself in various
ways, including targeting senior leaders in Abu Mazen's inner
circle in Ramallah. Hamas leaders are also confident that
their power and influence in the West Bank have been
seriously underrated (and Fatah's overrated),reported
Muslih. This assessment of Hamas's West Bank strength (and
of Fatah's underlying weakness there) was shared by former
Palestinian security chief Ghazi Jabali, now resident in
Damascus. He told A/DCM June 20 that the situation in Gaza,
where Fatah-aligned security forces in essence had "refused
to fight for Dahlan" would be replicated in the West Bank --
with weak leaders like Haj Ismail and Tawfik Tirawi -- if a
confrontation developed with Hamas. Jabali assessed that
Hamas has disguised and hidden its strength in the West Bank,
using a sleeper cell and other strategies, to avoid
confrontation with the Israeli military.


8. (C) HAMAS DEMANDS: According to Muslih, Hamas leaders
also have a list of demands that mirror what Hamas
characterizes as Abu Mazen's "extreme" list:

-- Remove Mohammed Dahlan and his group from positions of
influence (and put them "on trial;" according to Muslih
Hamas has discovered extremely embarrassing information in
the files they confiscated during the Gaza takeover,
including evidence of sexual escapades and collaborating with
Israel, which could presumably be used in such trials, or
more likely, as political leverage);

-- Return to the Mecca Agreement and the national unity
government;

-- Begin serious negotiations for re-structuring the PLO; and

-- Rebuild the Palestinian security forces, while accepting
control by independents acceptable to Abu Mazen (as long as
they do not include Dahlan and his group, whom Hamas believes
was collaborating with Israel).


9. (C) UNAVOIDABLE FIGHT OR A TRAP: Unlike SARG MFA
officials, Hamas leaders here insist that the conflict in
Gaza was forced upon them. According to this assessment,
Hamas leaders in Gaza believed Mohammed Dahlan was planning
to use security forces under his control to attack and
dismantle Hamas' security forces and military wing. While
Syrian officials share this extremely negative view of
Dahlan, they question whether Hamas needed to take such

DAMASCUS 00000636 003 OF 003


drastic action. A recent al-Hayat piece by Damascus-based
correspondent Hamidi, with good contacts in the MFA and the
Syrian security services, described Syrian officials as
worried that Hamas had "fallen into a trap" in Gaza.


10. (C) COMMENT: Obviously Hamas leaders here are spinning
furiously to portray the Gaza takeover as a manageable
crisis. Syrian officials -- especially in the moderate camp
led by Mu'allim -- seem more worried about developments at a
critical time, with one of their most prized cards, which
seemed to be steadily appreciating in value, having seen a
sudden erosion in value. Syrian hard-liners, sharing Hamas'
assessment, seem more confident that in the longer term,
Hamas's residual strength in the territories, vis a vis
Fatah, will prevail, leaving the value of Syria's card
intact.




CORBIN