ASAD INSISTS ON NEED FOR AMBASSADOR TO RETURN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000597

SIPDIS

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PARIS FOR WALLER; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: ASAD INSISTS ON NEED FOR AMBASSADOR TO RETURN

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Corbin, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: In a one-on-one with his American
biographer, President Bashar al-Asad May 30 underscored the
need for the return of the U.S. ambassador to Damascus,
according to the biographer, David Lesch. Asad discounted
the importance of the May 3 Sharm meeting between FM Mu'allim
and the Secretary. He expressed interest in peace
negotiations with the Israelis, if the USG participated as a
broker, but questioned whether the Olmert government was
strong enough to proceed. Asad was aware that his views
would be probably be shared with the USG and likely offered
these points to try to influence U.S. policy-makers. End
Summary.


2. (C) ASAD ASKS FOR RETURN OF U.S. AMBASSADOR: In a
one-on-one in early June with his American biographer, David
Lesch, President Bashar al-Asad emphasized the need for the
return to post of the U.S. Ambassador, according to Lesch in
a readout to A/DCM. Asad noted that return as a key first
step, with little engagement likely without it. Asad ruled
out any cooperation, for example, on
counter-terrorism/security cooperation (i.e., intelligence
sharing),an area where he believed the two sides had a
common interest, if the U.S. did not return its ambassador to
Damascus, said Lesch. The return of an ambassador would
signal that the USG was interested in political engagement,
or "broader dialogue," Asad insisted. If such a dialogue
began, Syria was in a position to contribute to political
stability in Iraq and Lebanon and also offer assistance on
Palestinian issues, as Asad claimed it did on the Mecca
agreement, supporting negotiations in Damascus that had
developed into a full-flown agreement in Saudi Arabia.


3. (C) RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.: According to Lesch, Asad
dismissed of the May 3 Sharm meeting between the Secretary
and FM Mu'allim as not significant. Asad also expressed
exasperation, saying the U.S. insisted on restricting the
talks to the Iraq border issue: "How long have we been
talking about that one issue?" Asad asked rhetorically.
According to Lesch, Asad also discounted the importance of
the Sharm talks because of his assessment that the USG is
divided about proceeding with any dialogue with Syria. Asad
claimed that he had heard this message directly from more
than one Arab foreign minister, who had stated to him that
the visit to the region by the U.S. Vice-President in the
same general time-frame as the Sharm meeting, as well as
statements made by USG officials, publicly and privately,
were indicative of these differences. According to Lesch,
Asad reported that he has "given up" on the Administration,
believing that it will not take any significant steps to
decrease the isolation of Syria or re-engage with it.


4. (C) FATAH AL-ISLAM AND THE TRIBUNAL: Asad denied any
Syrian link with Fatah al-Islam and insisted the SARG is
happy to see the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) taking on what
he described as an Al-Qaida-linked enemy of Syria. However,
Asad cautioned that the LAF needed to avoid "the trap" of
entering Nahar al-Barid camp and getting bogged down, a move
that could spark unrest in other Palestinian refugee camps in
Lebanon. Regarding the formation of the Lebanon tribunal,
Asad repeated standard SARG points, noting that the tribunal
is strictly a Lebanese affair and that Syrian sovereignty
trumps any such proceeding.


5. (C) RELATIONS WITH THE SAUDIS: Regarding other foreign
policy issues, Asad noted that relations with the Saudis had
improved somewhat, but only at the very top, with King
Abdullah. nearly all Saudi officials below Abdullah,
including key princes, remained anti-Syrian, Asad indicated,
to underline that the improvement in relations was not nearly
as significant as some people thought.


6. (C) NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS: On the prospect of
negotiations with the Israelis on the Golan, Asad denied any
back-channel negotiations and also insisted that Syria did
not want to move forward with the Israelis without the U.S.
as a broker for the two sides. He also described PM Olmert
as too weak -- and Israel too divided -- for forward movement
on negotiations with Syria, although Israel remained united
and strong enough to make war with Syria, added Asad. He
also underlined the importance Syria attached to getting the
occupied Golan Heights back. Asad noted that Syria had
"learned a lot" about how to handle Israel's army by watching
the way Hizballah fought last summer in Lebanon. When asked

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why Syria was cooperating so closely with Iran, Asad claimed
that Iran was supporting Syria in its struggle to get back
its land. If other countries helped Syria on this key
national interest, Syria would cooperate and develop good
relations with them.


7. (C) BASHAR'S MOOD: Lesch described Asad as buoyant after
his referendum "victory" and what Asad had described as an
invigorating but exhausting run-up to the vote. Asad
acknowledged the artificiality of the exercise to an extent,
saying that he knew people would not vote "no." The real
no-votes were cast by those who chose not to vote, Asad told
Lesch.


8. (C) COMMENT: Lesch is a professor of Middle Eastern
studies at Trinity College in San Antonio, Texas. He has
visited Syria, and met with the Asad, at least once a year
since Asad granted him an initial audience in the spring of
2004 and agreed to cooperate on the biography Lesch was then
planning to write. Asad was aware that his views would be
probably be shared with the USG and likely offered these
points to try to influence U.S. policy-makers. We have heard
these this SARG view about the importance of the return of
the ambassador to post from a variety of our Syrian
interlocutors. It was also raised during recent visits by
U.S. members of Congress.


ROEBUCK