IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE OF REFERENDUM QUICKLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000558 SIPDIS SIPDIS PARIS FOR WALLER; LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL SY LE SUBJECT: IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE OF REFERENDUM QUICKLY STIFLED: WHAT NEXT FOR BASHAR? CLASSIFIED BY: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES MICHAEL CORBIN, PER 1.4 B,D. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: NOW THAT BASHAR'S IMPOSED RE-ELECTION IS A FAIT ACCOMPLI, THE REGIME HAS SENT FIRM SIGNALS THAT THE TIME FOR ALL THE HOOPLA AND LETTING OFF STEAM THAT IT ALLOWED DURING THE THREE-WEEK RUN-UP IS NOW FINISHED. LIFE IN SYRIA HAS RETURNED TO ITS CALMER, REPRESSIVE RHYTHMS. WHILE BASHAR FACES TWO FUNDAMENTAL CHOICES -- LEAN ON THE HARD-LINERS AND TRY TO WAIT OUT THE ADMINISTRATION OR EMPOWER THE MODERATES AND SEEK A WAY OUT OF ISOLATION -- HE IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO SEEK A MUDDLED MIDDLE COURSE THAT ALLOWS SCANT PROSPECT FOR ANY SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC REFORM OR EASING OF REPRESSION. HE MAY OFFER A CABINET SHAKE-UP OR A NEW GOVERNMENT AS A WAY TO CHANGE THE SUBJECT, BUT LITTLE IS LIKELY TO CHANGE. BASHAR HAS SET HIMSELF UP AS SYRIA'S LEADER TOWARDS "PROGRESS AND DEVELOPMENT;" HE MAY HAVE TO PRODUCE SOME RESULTS FOR HIS PEOPLE, OR TURN TO INCREASINGLY HARSH REPRESSION TO KEEP THE LID ON. THE ISSUE OF LEBANON IS LIKELY TO OVERSHADOW OTHER ISSUES IN THE COMING MONTHS AND CAST A PALL OVER ANY PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE AS THE REALITY OF THE TRIBUNAL HITS HOME AND THE REGIME SEEKS WAYS BOTH TO DELEGITIMIZE IT AT HOME AND IN THE ARAB WORLD, AND TO SUBVERT IT, BY FOMENTING INSTABILITY AND POLITICAL DIVISION IN LEBANON. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) WITH BASHAR AL-ASAD RE-ELECTED TO A SECOND SEVEN-YEAR TERM BY -- ACCORDING TO SARG ESTIMATES -- 97 PERCENT OF SYRIAN VOTERS, THE COUNTRY HAS JUST GONE THROUGH A WEIRDLY FESTIVE THREE-WEEK PERIOD IN WHICH THE NORMALLY OPPRESSIVE GRIP OF THE SECURITY SERVICES AND POLICE SIGNIFICANTLY EASED UP AND THE GOVERNMENT PRACTICALLY SHUT DOWN. WITH GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGEMENT, PEOPLE PARTICIPATED ACTIVELY IN A DISCONCERTING, QUEASINESS-INDUCING BAATHIST VERSION OF A "CARNIVAL" ATMOSPHERE, WITH DEMONSTRATIONS, PARADES, LARGELY ORCHESTRATED OUTDOOR PARTIES, AND YOUTHS SETTING OFF NORMALLY FORBIDDEN FIREWORKS AND RACING CARS -- BEDECKED WITH SYRIAN FLAGS AND BASHAR POSTERS -- UP AND DOWN STREETS IN NICER NEIGHBORHOODS OF DAMASCUS. ¶3. (C) WITHIN DAYS OF BASHAR'S MAY 27 RE-ELECTION, THE GLUT OF CAMPAIGN POSTERS AND BANNERS CAME DOWN, AND LIFE HAS RETURNED TO ITS CALMER, REPRESSIVE RHYTHMS. BASHARS NEW TERM OF OFFICE BEGINS IN MID-JULY AT WHICH TIME HE IS EXPECTED TO DELIVER AN INAUGURAL SPEECH THAT WILL OFFER CLEARER PUBLIC SIGNALS ON THE DIRECTION HE INTENDS TO TAKE THE COUNTRY. BASHAR HAS TWO FUNDAMENTAL CHOICES OF DIRECTION BEFORE HIM. HE CAN TAKE THE ADVICE OF HIS SECURITY SERVICES AND OTHER HARD-LINERS, WHO ADVOCATE WAITING OUT THE ADMINISTRATION AND OFFER NOTHING IN TERMS OF CONCESSIONS THAT COULD MOVE FORWARD BILATERAL DIALOGUE ON ISSUES LIKE IRAQI BORDER SECURITY AND REFUGEES OR COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION. THIS COURSE WOULD REQUIRE BASHAR TO ACCEPT THE REMAINING, SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION THAT HIS REGIME, AND SYRIANS IN GENERAL, HAVE SO RESENTED. IN TANDEM WITH SUCH AN APPROACH, THE SARG IS LIKELY TO RETAIN ITS IRON FIST INTERNALLY, AND LAUNCH FURTHER CRACKDOWNS AGAINST THE WEAK INTERNAL OPPOSITION AND MAKE NO STEPS ON ECONOMIC REFORM. ¶4. (C) IN THE ALTERNATIVE, BASHAR CAN MOVE TO STRENGTHEN MODERATES LIKE FM WALID MUALLIM AND DPM ABDULLAH DARDARI, SEEKING ENGAGEMENT WITH THE U.S. ON ISSUES WITH OVERLAPPING INTERESTS, PRIMARILY IRAQ-RELATED (AND IN FIGHTING AL-QAIDA), WHILE AVOIDING PROVOKING MORE INSTABILITY IN LEBANON OR INSISTING THAT IT BE A FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENT OF ANY DIALOGUE WITH THE U.S. ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE, IF BASHAR CHOOSES THIS ROUTE, HE IS LIKELY TO PUT SOME ENERGY INTO HIS CLAIMED DESIRE TO INTRODUCE SERIOUS ECONOMIC REFORM TO SYRIA AND EMPOWER HIS ANOINTED ECONOMIC REFORM GURU DARDARI TO EMBARK ON A SERIES OF MODERATELY MORE AMBITIOUS REFORMS THAT COULD LIBERALIZE THE SYRIAN ECONOMY, AS THE COUNTRY STRUGGLES TO CONFRONT THE NEAR-TERM CHALLENGE OF CUTTING EXPENSIVE FUEL SUBSIDIES AND THE DILEMMA OF DECLINING OIL REVENUES. ¶5. (C) AT THE MOMENT, BOTH CONSERVATIVES AND MODERATES CAN CLAIM SOME VICTORIES AND INSIST THEIR WAY IS THE PATH FOR SYRIA OUT OF ITS CURRENT PROBLEMS. THE SECURITY SERVICES AND THE HARD-LINE BAATHISTS CAN CLAIM THEY MOUNTED A HUGELY SUCCESSFUL REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN THAT, DESPITE A BIT OF REPRESSED CARPING ABOUT EXPENSE AND LACK OF CHOICE, STIRRED UP SOME GENUINE NATIONALIST SENTIMENT WHILE RE-LEGITIMIZING THE ASAD PRESIDENCY AND EXTENDING IT FOR ANOTHER SEVEN YEARS. THEY CAN ALSO ARGUE THAT THEIR HARD-LINE POLICIES HAVE PROVEN THEMSELVES AND HELPED THE REGIME SURVIVE ONE OF THE MORE DANGEROUS PERIODS IN ITS HISTORY. THE MODERATES WILL ARGUE THAT NOW IS THE TIME TO REAP THE BENEFITS OF THAT PREVIOUS STEADFASTNESS AND THAT THE TIME IS RIPE TO TRY TO MAKE "DEALS" WITH THE WEST; MU'ALLIM WILL BE CAREFUL TO AVOID ANY HINT THAT MUCH OF THE DANGER THE REGIME ENCOUNTERED IN THE PAST FEW YEARS WAS CAUSED BY THE HARD-LINE POLICY CHOICES OF HIS ADVERSARIES IN THE REGIME. ¶6. (C) BASHAR MAY DO THE POLITICAL EQUIVALENT OF RUNNING IN PLACE BY OFFERING A CABINET SHAKE-UP OR EVEN A NEW GOVERNMENT. MANY PREVIOUS ITERATIONS OF THIS GAMBIT MAKE IT CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT IT WILL CHANGE ALMOST NOTHING. WE HEAR THE USUAL MIX OF RUMORS ABOUT WHO IS IN AND WHO IS OUT: MINISTER OF INFORMATION MOHSIN BILAL HAS FAILED TO SPRUCE UP SYRIA'S IMAGE AND WILL BE DROPPED (OR NOT); MINISTER OF EXPATRIATES BUTHEINA SHA'ABAN AND MINISTER OF LABOR AND SOCIAL WELFARE DIALLA HAJ AREF HAVE SHOWN THEMSELVES TO BE STRIDENT, INEFFECTIVE BA'ATHIST HACKS WHO SHOULD BE REMOVED (OR NOT); AND SO ON. THE TRUTH IS THAT THE CABINET, LIKE THE PARLIAMENT TO AN EVEN GREATER DEGREE, IS LARGELY WINDOW DRESSING FOR A REGIME RUN BY THE PRESIDENT, HIS SECURITY SERVICES, AND SENIOR BA'ATHIST ELEMENTS IN THE REGIONAL COMMAND (SOME OF THEM FORMER HEADS OF SECURITY SERVICES). ¶7. (C) ALTHOUGH BASHAR HAS SET HIMSELF UP, WITH GREAT REFERENDUM FANFARE, AS SYRIAS LEADER TOWARDS "PROGRESS AND DEVELOPMENT," HE MAY FIND HIMSELF UNABLE -- OR CHOOSE NOT -- TO PRODUCE ANY REFORMS THAT WOULD BENEFIT SYRIANS. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, HE IS LIKELY TO TURN TO INCREASINGLY HARSH REPRESSION TO KEEP THE LID ON. A SECOND TERM DEFINED PRIMARILY BY REPRESSION WILL MAKE IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR ASAD TO CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CREDIBLE REMNANTS OF HIS ORIGINAL IMAGE AS A SINCERE ECONOMIC REFORMER. ¶8. (C) BASHAR IS ALSO LIKELY TO CONTINUE EXPLORING WAYS TO RE-START PEACE TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS, BOTH TO GET BACK THE GOLAN AND IN AN ATTEMPT TO EASE SYRIA'S INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION. WHILE THE INDICATIONS ARE THAT HE WOULD WELCOME A PEACE DEAL, IT IS NOT CLEAR HE WOULD HAVE THE INFLUENCE TO OVERCOME HARD-LINE RESISTANCE AND LEAD A MINORITY REGIME TO MAKE PEACE WITH ISRAEL. ¶9. (C) THE ISSUE OF LEBANON IS LIKELY TO OVERSHADOW OTHER ISSUES IN THE COMING MONTHS AND CAST A PALL OVER ANY PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE AS THE REALITY OF THE TRIBUNAL HITS HOME AND THE REGIME SEEKS WAYS BOTH TO DELEGITIMIZE IT HERE AND IN THE ARAB WORLD, AND TO SUBVERT IT, BY FOMENTING INSTABILITY AND POLITICAL DIVISION IN LEBANON. THE CURRENT BLOODY FIGHT BETWEEN THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES AND FATAH AL-ISLAM SHOWS THE POWERFUL MIX OF AMBIGUITY, VIOLENCE, PROXIES AND LEVERS, AND INTIMATE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SECTARIAN AND POLITICAL BACKDROP IN LEBANON THAT THE SYRIAN REGIME WILL ACTIVELY USE OR AT LEAST SEEK TO BENEFIT FROM AS IT STRUGGLES TO DIMINISH THE THREAT THAT THE TRIBUNAL POSES. ¶10. (C) WHILE MU'ALLIM AT THE MFA WILL LIKELY PUSH FOR FLEXIBILITY ON IRAQ, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE INCREASING DIMENSIONS OF THE IRAQI REFUGEE PROBLEM IN SYRIA, HARD-LINERS WILL PRESS FOR STICKING IT OUT TO BEAT THE ISOLATION AND OUTLAST THE ADMINISTRATION. NONETHELESS, THIS REGIME, DESPITE ITS OSSIFIED, SOMETIMES INFLEXIBLE CHARACTERISTICS, HAS PROVEN ITSELF ONE OF THE MOST DURABLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AS IT HAS ADAPTED OVER FOUR DECADES OF MOMENTOUS CHANGES. THE JURY IS STILL OUT ON WHETHER BASHAR HAS PROVEN HIMSELF TO BE A DISASTROUSLY UNQUALIFIED PRESIDENT WHO HAS SQUANDERED HIS FATHER'S DOMINANT POLITICAL LEGACY IN A MERE SEVEN YEARS OF BUNGLING, OR WHETHER HE IS TEACHING HIMSELF AS HE GOES AND IS DEVELOPING INTO A MORE CLEVER, POSSIBLY BRUTAL, POLITICAL OPPORTUNIST -- AND A CLOSET ECONOMIC REFORMER -- WHO COULD BE AROUND FOR SEVERAL MORE UNOPPOSED REFERENDA, AS HE SEEKS TO IMPOSE HIS OWN LEGACY ON SYRIA. FOR THE MOMENT, HE IS LIKELY TO MAINTAIN A MESSY MIDDLE COURSE. DEALING WITH BASHAR AT THIS TIME WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT BUT THE MODERATES MAY PROVIDE SOME OPPORTUNITIES. AS BASHAR SURVEYS THE THREATS THAT THE REGIME FACES, LEBANON AND THE TRIBUNAL WILL CLEARLY LOOM -- TO A DEGREE THAT SURPASSES A RATIONAL ASSESSMENT -- AS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT. CORBIN