SARG NOT CAPITALIZING ON THE POTENTIAL OF SYRIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000544 SIPDIS SIPDIS NEA/ELA, NSC FOR MARCHESE, E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SY SUBJECT: SARG NOT CAPITALIZING ON THE POTENTIAL OF SYRIAN EXPATRIATES REF: A. DAMASCUS 00450 ¶B. DAMASCUS 00068 Classified By: CDA Michael Corbin, for reasons 1.4 b/d ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: A recent SARG-sponsored conference for expatriates highlighted their potential benefit to the Syrian economy, but also revealed how little the regime has done or appears willing to do to capitalize on their potential. Syrian expatriates currently provide important remittance revenues to Syria, and the SARG has publicly acknowledged that the estimated fifteen million Syrian expatriates worldwide could be an important resource for much-needed skilled labor and foreign direct investment (FDI). Over the past two years Syria has also enjoyed one of its periodic upticks in expatriates returning, with a small number tentatively seeking investment opportunities. Nevertheless, beyond its propaganda, the SARG has taken little meaningful action to court this prospective economic goldmine - in part due to its own suspicions of the political and economic influence of expatriate investors. The SARG distrust of the expat community was reflected in the strident tones of keynote speakers and panel discussion leaders at the conference, which often used Baathist propaganda to harangue and play to a "non-conference" hardline audience in the regime, rather than persuade expatriate participants that the regime understands them and seeks to harner their skills and assets. End Summary. ¶2. (C) SARG'S SECOND EXPATRIATES CONFERENCE: On May 12-13, the SARG hosted a second expatriates conference, with an estimated 900 Syrian expatriates from around the world in attendance. The first expatriates conference was held two and a half years ago, with contacts linking the delay between the two conferences to regional political tensions. As before, President Asad was the patron of the conference, but unlike the last conference, he did not attend. (Note: The first conference took place just after the passage of UNSCR 1559). Contacts suggested that this was because he had delivered a major policy speech at the Parliament only a few days before (ref A). The keynote speaker, Syrian Vice-President Najah al-Attar, used the opportunity to echo Asad's recent message to Parliament, praising Asad for his leadership and victory over international isolation. While the overarching theme of the event was "investing in Syria," this was often overshadowed by the stridently conservative, Baathist tone of officials speeches, which focused on why expatriates must return to the "bosom of the homeland." Buthaina Shabaan, Minister of Expatriates - a cabinet member who in the past two and a half years has re-tooled herself as a militantly outspoken Baathist and regime hard-liner - used her speech to deliver a blistering tirade against the United States and Israel, who she alleged were conspiring to destroy all Arab nations and were actively targeting Syrian expats for recruitment. Several high-level regime members, including Vice-President Farouk al-Shar'a and Foreign Minister Walid Mu'allim, made appearances in the course of the conference. ¶3. (C) POTENTIAL ECONOMIC ROLE OF SYRIAN EXPATRIATES: Regardless of the high-level officials in attendance, however, the conference's regressive tone and tired Baathist rhetoric left most expats we talked with shaking their heads and wondering when the SARG would pay more than lip service to the significant economic contribution they are making to Syria. Syrian expatriates ) especially those working in the Gulf States - provide a significant amount of worker remittances to Syria each year. (Note: The 2006 Joint Arab Economic Report estimates that approximately 65 percent of worker transfers to Syria came from other Arab states). In 2006, the SARG only reported receiving 750 million USD in worker remittances, but independent sources assert that as funds are often transferred through unofficial channels, the real amount is probably closer to several billion dollars. Furthermore, Syrian economists acknowledge expatriate remittances are an important component of Syria's GDP growth. ¶4. (C) The prospective economic impact of Syrian expatriates is underscored by a United Nations Development Program (UNDP) report that estimates up to 15 million Syrians live outside the country ) comparable to Syria's current population of roughly 19 million. Businessmen regularly assert that one of Syria's critical economic challenges is a lack of skilled workers and lament the loss of Syrian workers overseas. They also assert Syrian expats are uniquely positioned to transfer critical knowledge to key Syrian economic sectors, especially DAMASCUS 00000544 002 OF 002 in finance, management, and technology (Note: The 2004 Arab Human Development Report states that just one out of five Syrian graduates studying abroad return to Syria). In 2006, the government-owned paper Al Thawra also estimated that Syrian expatriates have up to USD 80 billion in resources for potential investment in the country. ¶5. (C) EXPATRIATE INTEREST TEMPERED BY LACK OF SARG REFORM: Over the past year, business contacts have reported a modest increase in the number of expats expressing interest in returning to Syria or inquiring about potential investment opportunities. Even if much of this interest is regime-hype as suggested by some contacts, at the very least Syrian businessmen are not actively seeking opportunities to leave the country as they were just two years ago. In fact, there are now several million-dollar expatriate investments in various sectors, including real estate and tourism. Regardless of the increased interest, however, expats currently investing in Syria tell us they are leaving their options open and are carefully guarding their ability to leave (with minimal expense of their assets) if the political situation suddenly deteriorates. Additionally, expats privately relate that concerns about security service interference and rampant corruption, as well as the ongoing regional tensions - which they assert the SARG has done almost nothing to address - continue to make them hesitant to make significant long-term investments. ¶6. (C) REGIME ACTIONS TO ATTRACT EXPATS HINDERED BY ITS OWN CONCERN ABOUT EXPATRIATE INFLUENCE: On occasion, the SARG has tried to highlight its "pro-expat" policies, including: encouraging officially sanctioned local NGOs that develop expatriate business ties (the Syrian Young Entrepreneurs Association and the recently approved Syrian Business Council); ratifying a new investment law in February 2007 (ref B); and liberalizing the military service obligation in April 2007. (Note: The new law reduces by about 50 percent the amount that expatriates pay in return for exemption from military service and reduces the maximum military reserve age from 52 to 42). Nonetheless, most contacts we spoke with said that these actions might look good on paper, but are not meaningful responses to expatriate concerns. Contacts assert that while moderate regime members, such as Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Abdullah Dardari, may speak about a new market economy, conservative regime members continue to maintain a tight control on economic opportunities - often scaring off potential expatriate investors. Additionally, contacts believe the regime is actively concerned about how Syrians who live abroad may influence the local population, possibly making it more skeptical of the regime. Certainly the message of the May 12 conference was about Syrians returning to the "last stronghold of Arab solidarity," rather than encouraging expatriates to bring their own ideas with them. ¶7. (C) COMMENT: The regime used the expatriates conference as an opportunity to pound the nationalist drums in the run-up to the recent presidential referendum, exalting Asad for his "global leadership," and assuring expatriates that Syria has prevailed over international isolation. This approach underscored the SARG's determination that expatriates return on SARG terms. While cognizant of the economic benefits associated with expatriate remittances, human resources, and investment, the center-stage afforded the old Baathist ideology made clear that security, and not economic liberalization, remains the regime's preoccupation. End Comment. CORBIN