Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07DAMASCUS494
2007-05-23 13:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:
SYRIAN REGIME CRITIC RIAD SEIF ON STEPS TO
VZCZCXRO4024 OO RUEHAG RUEHROV DE RUEHDM #0494/01 1431305 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 231305Z MAY 07 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3530 INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0438 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000494
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
PARIS FOR WALLER, LONDON FOR TSOU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SY
SUBJECT: SYRIAN REGIME CRITIC RIAD SEIF ON STEPS TO
INVIGORATE OPPOSITION
Classified By: A/DCM William Roebuck for reasons 1.4 b/d
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000494
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
PARIS FOR WALLER, LONDON FOR TSOU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SY
SUBJECT: SYRIAN REGIME CRITIC RIAD SEIF ON STEPS TO
INVIGORATE OPPOSITION
Classified By: A/DCM William Roebuck for reasons 1.4 b/d
1. (C) Summary: Prominent Syrian opposition leader Riad
Seif discussed on May 18 intensified preparations for the
expansion of the Damascus Declaration (DD) group into an
opposition National Congress, and also touched on the
upcoming presidential referendum, and relations between the
USG and critics of the Syrian regime. Repeating a common
theme of his, Seif stated his belief that the Syrian
opposition needed to develop a more positive, nuanced
relationship with the U.S. The DD was boycotting the
presidential referendum but was not asking the general public
to do so because it understood that a large percentage of
potential voters felt compelled to vote in order to avoid
future trouble with security services, Seif said. When asked
what the USG could do in the run-up to or after the
referendum, Seif suggested the USG criticize the referendum
as completely divorced from any democratic process but avoid
giving it too much attention. Seif said that the USG and
others could make a significant difference to the internal
opposition by finding ways to provide financial support to
the families of political prisoners. End Summary.
2. (C) EXPANDING THE DAMASCUS DECLARATION: In a meeting in
his downtown Damascus office with A/DCM and Poloff, Seif
described his intensified efforts to expand the current DD
group, which he leads with a steering committee of 34 people,
into a National Congress with 120 members from across Syria.
The new members would include well-known political activists
from across Syria, as well as tribal and Kurdish leaders, a
wide spectrum of religious leaders (including moderate
Islamists),and respected academics and writers, Seif said.
3. (C) The DD hopes that the Congress can hold its first
meeting in two months at which time it would announce its
formation publicly, Seif said. The Congress would seek to
gain the Syrian people's recognition as a liberal secular
group. It also has sought members who each have enough
prominence and clout in their own communities that the regime
would not be able to disassemble the organization by
arresting the top five to ten persons, which Seif viewed as a
real possibility. The Congress would supplement the DD and
seek to implement the group's goals announced in October
2005, which called for major political and legal reforms in
Syria. The Congress would also serve as a potential source
of alternative leadership, in the event that a political
vacuum occurred in Syria, asserted Seif, who in the past has
voiced a belief that the formation of an international
tribunal in Lebanon could lead to some sort of undefined
leadership change in Syria.
4. (C) The DD is working hard to keep the idea for the
Congress a secret, despite increased pressure from security
services to monitor his personal activities, Seif said. If
the Congress is formed, next steps will include the formation
of committees that deal with a wide range of issues,
including foreign relations, Seif said.
5. (C) Returning to a common theme voiced in regular
discussions with A/DCM over the past 18 months, Seif stated
his belief that the Syrian opposition needed to be more
realistic in its understanding of the West's Middle East
policies and in particular needed to develop a better
relationship with the U.S. Several influential DD members
are pan-Arab nationalists, with ideologies that have
traditionally expressed hostility towards the U.S. and the
West. Seif expressed hope that as DD members gained more
exposure to the U.S., this "complex" would be abandoned. He
added that his meetings with recent U.S. CODELs, led by
Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and members Frank Wolf and
Darrell Issa, had broken the ice for some members of the
internal opposition, who had previously said there was no
possibility of dialogue with the United States. Now, Seif
said, the challenge was for the opposition to work on common
goals with the U.S. and Europe, in ways that would not allow
the regime to characterize such efforts as treasonous or
counter to Syria's interests. Seif also emphasized the need
for the USG, for its part, to adopt a more even-handed
approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
6. (C) Turning to the May 27 presidential referendum, Seif
noted that the DD had announced its intention to boycott the
referendum, as it is "not the right way to the right
president." At the same time, the DD had decided not to risk
its credibility by asking the general public to boycott a
referendum in which voters felt obligated to vote to avoid
DAMASCUS 00000494 002 OF 003
future trouble with security services, Seif said. "When they
see that saying yes means nothing, and saying no means
trouble, people will vote even if they hate the President."
Seif added that in 1998, 100 percent of the workers in his
factory had gone out to vote for Hafez al-Asad to avoid
trouble with security services and police.
7. (C) In the run-up to the vote, the regime was devoting
significant effort and money to transform Syrian President
Bashar al-Asad into the symbol of Syria and Syrians. They
want to make him into an untouchable personality, in the
style of former President Hafez al-Asad, Seif asserted,
although Bashar has no charisma or discernible political
skills. The referendum serves as a good catalyst for this
transformation, which is also linked to the regime's fear
that Asad will be held accountable by Lebanon's international
tribunal, and to the regime's conviction that Syrians will be
more apt to rise to his and the regime's defense if Bashar
has made himself such a symbol of Syria that any effort to
hold him accountable will be seen as an attack on the dignity
of Syria, Seif indicated.
8. (C) When asked about the self-declared candidacy of
Syrian lawyer Abdullah al-Khalil, who is from the
northeastern city of Raqqah, Seif said the Khalil was a
legitimate member of the opposition, and even a proposed
candidate for Seif,s National Congress, but was not
well-known nationally and was unlikely to influence the
referendum process. Seif added that the security services
would never have been so tolerant of a publicly proposed
candidacy by a more well-known regime critic. "The regime
strategy since Hafez al-Asad has been to prevent any real
leaders from coming up," said Seif. Khalil had made public
his desire to seek the presidency and then left for Turkey,
noted Seif, who was unaware if Khalil had come under any
pressure by the security services.
9. (C) When asked what the USG could do in the run-up to, or
after, the referendum, Seif asserted that it would not have
much impact for the USG to take an extremely tough, insistent
stance on the referendum, since "every Syrian knows already
the voting won,t change anything." In the event of a
statement, Seif suggested the USG could say that the
referendum has nothing to do with the democratic process and
that the USG looks forward to the day when Syria will choose
its president in a democratic way.
10. (C) Returning to another common theme, Seif said that
the USG and others could make a significant difference to the
internal opposition by providing financial support to the
families of political prisoners. "We need to encourage
political activists in a good way not to be afraid of the
regime, and to demonstrate that even if they are jailed,
their families will be taken care of," he stated. A few
hundred thousand dollars, a million dollars would do a lot,"
he added. Seif noted that the wife of detained human rights
lawyer Anwar al-Bunni had recently been fired from her civil
service job, and the wife of Kamal Labwani had been pressured
and harassed into quitting hers. The DD continues to support
the families of some political prisoners but not adequately
and lacks the means to do a comprehensive effort, said Seif,
noting that the group does not support the Labwani family
because DD member and Socialist Union chief Hassan
AbdulAzeem, with his particular Nasserist, pan-Arab
nationalist prism, sees Labwani as " traitor for the
Americans." DD recently paid for an operation for the son of
imprisoned civil society activist Riad al-Drar, while the son
of political prisoner Mahmoud Issa still needs an operation,
reported Seif.
11. (C) Currently, DD members raise money among themselves
for such contributions, which are collected by three trusted
members of the group and distributed to prisoners' families,
said Seif. Syrian businessmen are afraid to contribute
because the regime would not tolerate it, said Seif, citing
the case of a former prisoner who spent 20 years in jail for
his connections with the Muslim Brotherhood and then was
re-arrested for providing aid to the family of a prisoner in
Aleppo. Seif said that after the formation of the National
Congress, he hoped to find a channel, via Europe, to finance
payments to the families of political prisoners, noting wryly
that it would be the best form of foreign investment in
Syria. Still, the great difficulty, he acknowledged, lies in
finding a channel for funds, which is non-transparent, with
the least amount of bureaucracy possible.
DAMASCUS 00000494 003 OF 003
12. (C) COMMENT: Seif seemed focused almost single-mindedly
in this meeting on the emergence of the National Congress,
which would represent both a personal achievement and a
possible catalyst for the internal Syrian opposition. He
downplayed the likelihood that the Syrian security services
would be able to able to shut down the Congress, given its
long list of respected figures, unless they were able to
launch a pre-emptive campaign of intimidation and arrests
before Seif stands up the organization and gets it publicly
launched. We suspect that Seif, a relentless optimist, may
be miscalculating to a degree the capabilities of the
security services and the amount of pressure and intimidation
the regime is likely to bring to bear to stop any launch of
the DD-affiliated Congress. While Seif has shown remarkable
courage and demonstrated his willingness to go to jail for a
sustained period to defy the regime, it remains to be seen
whether the enlarged group of cohorts he has recruited will
stand firm enough to launch this enterprise and then
withstand the pressure to back away and stay silent or face
threats of imprisonment and of harm to family members. To
some degree, success may depend on timing. The SARG did not
respond to the launching of the Damascus Declaration group,
when the regime was on its heels after the release of the
first Mehlis report in the fall of 2005, but then, apparently
feeling more confident (and perhaps also more threatened
because of the inclusion of the Lebanon issue),the regime
took extremely aggressive action after the launch of the
Beirut-Damascus Declaration six months later. It is also
possible, if the Congress keeps as low a profile as the DD
has in the past year, that the regime may choose to ignore
it.
CORBIN
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
PARIS FOR WALLER, LONDON FOR TSOU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SY
SUBJECT: SYRIAN REGIME CRITIC RIAD SEIF ON STEPS TO
INVIGORATE OPPOSITION
Classified By: A/DCM William Roebuck for reasons 1.4 b/d
1. (C) Summary: Prominent Syrian opposition leader Riad
Seif discussed on May 18 intensified preparations for the
expansion of the Damascus Declaration (DD) group into an
opposition National Congress, and also touched on the
upcoming presidential referendum, and relations between the
USG and critics of the Syrian regime. Repeating a common
theme of his, Seif stated his belief that the Syrian
opposition needed to develop a more positive, nuanced
relationship with the U.S. The DD was boycotting the
presidential referendum but was not asking the general public
to do so because it understood that a large percentage of
potential voters felt compelled to vote in order to avoid
future trouble with security services, Seif said. When asked
what the USG could do in the run-up to or after the
referendum, Seif suggested the USG criticize the referendum
as completely divorced from any democratic process but avoid
giving it too much attention. Seif said that the USG and
others could make a significant difference to the internal
opposition by finding ways to provide financial support to
the families of political prisoners. End Summary.
2. (C) EXPANDING THE DAMASCUS DECLARATION: In a meeting in
his downtown Damascus office with A/DCM and Poloff, Seif
described his intensified efforts to expand the current DD
group, which he leads with a steering committee of 34 people,
into a National Congress with 120 members from across Syria.
The new members would include well-known political activists
from across Syria, as well as tribal and Kurdish leaders, a
wide spectrum of religious leaders (including moderate
Islamists),and respected academics and writers, Seif said.
3. (C) The DD hopes that the Congress can hold its first
meeting in two months at which time it would announce its
formation publicly, Seif said. The Congress would seek to
gain the Syrian people's recognition as a liberal secular
group. It also has sought members who each have enough
prominence and clout in their own communities that the regime
would not be able to disassemble the organization by
arresting the top five to ten persons, which Seif viewed as a
real possibility. The Congress would supplement the DD and
seek to implement the group's goals announced in October
2005, which called for major political and legal reforms in
Syria. The Congress would also serve as a potential source
of alternative leadership, in the event that a political
vacuum occurred in Syria, asserted Seif, who in the past has
voiced a belief that the formation of an international
tribunal in Lebanon could lead to some sort of undefined
leadership change in Syria.
4. (C) The DD is working hard to keep the idea for the
Congress a secret, despite increased pressure from security
services to monitor his personal activities, Seif said. If
the Congress is formed, next steps will include the formation
of committees that deal with a wide range of issues,
including foreign relations, Seif said.
5. (C) Returning to a common theme voiced in regular
discussions with A/DCM over the past 18 months, Seif stated
his belief that the Syrian opposition needed to be more
realistic in its understanding of the West's Middle East
policies and in particular needed to develop a better
relationship with the U.S. Several influential DD members
are pan-Arab nationalists, with ideologies that have
traditionally expressed hostility towards the U.S. and the
West. Seif expressed hope that as DD members gained more
exposure to the U.S., this "complex" would be abandoned. He
added that his meetings with recent U.S. CODELs, led by
Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and members Frank Wolf and
Darrell Issa, had broken the ice for some members of the
internal opposition, who had previously said there was no
possibility of dialogue with the United States. Now, Seif
said, the challenge was for the opposition to work on common
goals with the U.S. and Europe, in ways that would not allow
the regime to characterize such efforts as treasonous or
counter to Syria's interests. Seif also emphasized the need
for the USG, for its part, to adopt a more even-handed
approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
6. (C) Turning to the May 27 presidential referendum, Seif
noted that the DD had announced its intention to boycott the
referendum, as it is "not the right way to the right
president." At the same time, the DD had decided not to risk
its credibility by asking the general public to boycott a
referendum in which voters felt obligated to vote to avoid
DAMASCUS 00000494 002 OF 003
future trouble with security services, Seif said. "When they
see that saying yes means nothing, and saying no means
trouble, people will vote even if they hate the President."
Seif added that in 1998, 100 percent of the workers in his
factory had gone out to vote for Hafez al-Asad to avoid
trouble with security services and police.
7. (C) In the run-up to the vote, the regime was devoting
significant effort and money to transform Syrian President
Bashar al-Asad into the symbol of Syria and Syrians. They
want to make him into an untouchable personality, in the
style of former President Hafez al-Asad, Seif asserted,
although Bashar has no charisma or discernible political
skills. The referendum serves as a good catalyst for this
transformation, which is also linked to the regime's fear
that Asad will be held accountable by Lebanon's international
tribunal, and to the regime's conviction that Syrians will be
more apt to rise to his and the regime's defense if Bashar
has made himself such a symbol of Syria that any effort to
hold him accountable will be seen as an attack on the dignity
of Syria, Seif indicated.
8. (C) When asked about the self-declared candidacy of
Syrian lawyer Abdullah al-Khalil, who is from the
northeastern city of Raqqah, Seif said the Khalil was a
legitimate member of the opposition, and even a proposed
candidate for Seif,s National Congress, but was not
well-known nationally and was unlikely to influence the
referendum process. Seif added that the security services
would never have been so tolerant of a publicly proposed
candidacy by a more well-known regime critic. "The regime
strategy since Hafez al-Asad has been to prevent any real
leaders from coming up," said Seif. Khalil had made public
his desire to seek the presidency and then left for Turkey,
noted Seif, who was unaware if Khalil had come under any
pressure by the security services.
9. (C) When asked what the USG could do in the run-up to, or
after, the referendum, Seif asserted that it would not have
much impact for the USG to take an extremely tough, insistent
stance on the referendum, since "every Syrian knows already
the voting won,t change anything." In the event of a
statement, Seif suggested the USG could say that the
referendum has nothing to do with the democratic process and
that the USG looks forward to the day when Syria will choose
its president in a democratic way.
10. (C) Returning to another common theme, Seif said that
the USG and others could make a significant difference to the
internal opposition by providing financial support to the
families of political prisoners. "We need to encourage
political activists in a good way not to be afraid of the
regime, and to demonstrate that even if they are jailed,
their families will be taken care of," he stated. A few
hundred thousand dollars, a million dollars would do a lot,"
he added. Seif noted that the wife of detained human rights
lawyer Anwar al-Bunni had recently been fired from her civil
service job, and the wife of Kamal Labwani had been pressured
and harassed into quitting hers. The DD continues to support
the families of some political prisoners but not adequately
and lacks the means to do a comprehensive effort, said Seif,
noting that the group does not support the Labwani family
because DD member and Socialist Union chief Hassan
AbdulAzeem, with his particular Nasserist, pan-Arab
nationalist prism, sees Labwani as " traitor for the
Americans." DD recently paid for an operation for the son of
imprisoned civil society activist Riad al-Drar, while the son
of political prisoner Mahmoud Issa still needs an operation,
reported Seif.
11. (C) Currently, DD members raise money among themselves
for such contributions, which are collected by three trusted
members of the group and distributed to prisoners' families,
said Seif. Syrian businessmen are afraid to contribute
because the regime would not tolerate it, said Seif, citing
the case of a former prisoner who spent 20 years in jail for
his connections with the Muslim Brotherhood and then was
re-arrested for providing aid to the family of a prisoner in
Aleppo. Seif said that after the formation of the National
Congress, he hoped to find a channel, via Europe, to finance
payments to the families of political prisoners, noting wryly
that it would be the best form of foreign investment in
Syria. Still, the great difficulty, he acknowledged, lies in
finding a channel for funds, which is non-transparent, with
the least amount of bureaucracy possible.
DAMASCUS 00000494 003 OF 003
12. (C) COMMENT: Seif seemed focused almost single-mindedly
in this meeting on the emergence of the National Congress,
which would represent both a personal achievement and a
possible catalyst for the internal Syrian opposition. He
downplayed the likelihood that the Syrian security services
would be able to able to shut down the Congress, given its
long list of respected figures, unless they were able to
launch a pre-emptive campaign of intimidation and arrests
before Seif stands up the organization and gets it publicly
launched. We suspect that Seif, a relentless optimist, may
be miscalculating to a degree the capabilities of the
security services and the amount of pressure and intimidation
the regime is likely to bring to bear to stop any launch of
the DD-affiliated Congress. While Seif has shown remarkable
courage and demonstrated his willingness to go to jail for a
sustained period to defy the regime, it remains to be seen
whether the enlarged group of cohorts he has recruited will
stand firm enough to launch this enterprise and then
withstand the pressure to back away and stay silent or face
threats of imprisonment and of harm to family members. To
some degree, success may depend on timing. The SARG did not
respond to the launching of the Damascus Declaration group,
when the regime was on its heels after the release of the
first Mehlis report in the fall of 2005, but then, apparently
feeling more confident (and perhaps also more threatened
because of the inclusion of the Lebanon issue),the regime
took extremely aggressive action after the launch of the
Beirut-Damascus Declaration six months later. It is also
possible, if the Congress keeps as low a profile as the DD
has in the past year, that the regime may choose to ignore
it.
CORBIN