CODEL ISSA VISIT TO SYRIA APRIL 5: MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000392 SIPDIS H PASS SIPDIS NEA/ELA, NSC FOR MARCHESE, H FOR CODEL ISSA E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SY SUBJECT: CODEL ISSA VISIT TO SYRIA APRIL 5: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ASAD Classified By: CDA Michael Corbin, for reasons 1.4 b/d ¶1. (C) Summary: Congressman Darrell Issa met with Syrian President Bashar al-Asad for 40 minutes on April 5. Asad stated he had no conflict of interest with the U.S. on Iraq and was not weaker because of U.S. attempts to isolate him. Asad expressed no willingness to reopen an intelligence channel with the U.S., stating intelligence cooperation could not be separated from political cooperation and gave him no benefits. On Lebanon, Asad said the state of relations was so bad that even if he had an embassy there, he would now close it. He also said that he would support UN demarcation of the border surrounding Shebaa Farms, but only after Israeli withdrawal, and that he believed the way forward in Lebanon was a national unity government that gave the opposition veto power and 11 cabinet seats. End Summary. ¶2. (C) On April 5, Congressman Darrell Issa (R-CA) and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence staff members, David Abruzzino and Jeremy Bash, met with President Bashar al-Asad, Foreign Minister Mu'allim and Syrian Ambassador to the U.S., Imad Moustapha, for approximately 40 minutes. At Congressman Issa's request, Charge d'Affaires and Emboff (notetaker) accompanied the CODEL. ¶3. (C) IRAQ: Asad said he had warned the U.S. before the 2003 invasion of Iraq about what would happen. He said thankfully, the last stage of his concerns, a broader regional conflict, had not yet started. Asad said the U.S. was spending billions in Iraq and getting nothing for this. He added that the U.S. had tried to isolate Syria and failed. Asad asked, "am I weaker because of this? No, I'm not." He said he didn't expect President Bush to change his policies towards Syria, but the visits from Congress and other states showed that Syria was not isolated, that in fact, as was stated in a recent Economist article, it was President Bush who was "besieged." Asad said the U.S. and Syria wanted the same goal by different means. Asad said people question his motivations in Iraq, but his answer was that he was serious about improving Iraq because Syria was paying such a price. He pointed to the 1.3 billion Iraqi refugees in Syria as a huge burden. He said Syria had no conflict of interest with the U.S. on Iraq and supports Iraqi unity, stability, and a secure border. The problem, Asad said, was that he was losing hope that he could establish a direct dialogue with the U.S. Administration to work together on these issues. ¶4. (C) OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENGAGEMENT: Issa suggested that there were some opportunities to work together with the United States, including encouraging the Syrian and U.S. embassies to have more interaction in the respective countries and for President Asad to continue receiving Congressional delegations. Issa said the U.S. Charge D'Affaires in Damascus should be allowed to do more outreach activities in Syria. Imad Moustapha interrupted to say that the United States needed an ambassador to Syria and that a Charge was not sufficient for conducting policy. Issa responded that even if the President appointed someone, his nominee would be subject to a Senate confirmation process that could be difficult. Moustapha argued that some Senators had told him that they were supportive of appointing a new U.S. ambassador in Syria. ¶5. (C) INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION: Issa encouraged Asad to restart intelligence cooperation with the U.S., saying that this was not political. Issa said the U.S. and Syria are threatened by extremist groups and had a common purpose in fighting Islamic radicalism. Asad responded that he had started intelligence cooperation, against his better judgment, when the relationship with the U.S. administration wasn't good, and the result had not been positive. Issa interjected that there had been some appreciation for Syria's cooperation on intelligence. Asad responded, "in politics, appreciation is results." Asad said in his experience one cannot separate intelligence from politics and that Syria lost many things during its previous intelligence cooperation. He said the U.S. had professional intelligence expertise, but no experience with terrorism, and had made some mistakes. Asad said Syria had cooperation on intelligence with Saudi and others indirectly. Asad commented that he didn't think intelligence cooperation with the U.S. would be effective in saving Syrian lives - Syrians could do it better - and that the U.S. only sought information to protect Americans. DAMASCUS 00000392 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) LEBANON: Issa said a SARG change in policy towards Lebanon, including Asad establishing a relationship with PM Siniora and how Syria dealt with the Lebanese presidential elections, could be positive signs to the international community. Asad replied that there could be no stronger signal than Syria's decision to withdraw its military from Lebanon, a decision he claimed he had made by himself, without consulting any of his advisors. Asad complained that others kept alternating pleas for Syria to intervene with demands that Syria not go near Lebanon. He said that Lebanon was important to Syria, but that Syria could no longer play the role that it had in the past as a broker - that Syria's reputation had gotten sullied through the process. He said that this was especially true when speaking about Siniora or the "leader behind the leader," Saad Hariri. Nevertheless, he said that although the relationship had gotten worse he was ready to meet with Siniora. He said he invited Siniora and Hariri to visit and hold discussions, as long as agendas for the meetings could be set in advance, but they had refused. Asad said this bad relationship was becoming more problematic because of the broader Sunni and Shi'a divide and that the Lebanon situation was more complicated than ever. He commented that he had discussed opening a Syrian embassy in Lebanon with President Lahoud in March 2005, when relations had not been so bad. He said, however, that relations were so bad now that even if he had an embassy in Lebanon, he would close it and withdraw the Ambassador. "When the atmosphere is correct," I will reopen an embassy, Asad stated. As an aside, Asad also brought up Michel Aoun, saying Aoun was not an enemy nor a friend, but that Asad had good relations with him, despite his ambitions. ¶7. (C) Asad said Syria was working to control the border with Lebanon in the north, but because Shebaa Farms was occupied by Israel he could not cooperate with the Lebanese in the south. He said he would support UN demarcation of the border in this area, but only after Israel's withdrawal, which was the priority. He emphasized, however, that Shebaa was a bilateral issue between Lebanon and Syria. More broadly, Asad said the way forward in Lebanon had to be a constitutional solution. He said one option was to go to early elections, but after assessment he believed this could lead to conflict. He said the other option was to create a national unity government with eleven opposition members having cabinet seats, and an ability to veto. He said that if the Lebanese government didn't take this option, the situation would get worse. Asad went on to comment that France is interfering terribly in the situation, especially President Chirac, even to the extent of vetoing an agreement the Syrians had worked out with the Saudis. Asad said he had discussed the situation in Lebanon with visiting Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan during the latter's April 3 visit to Syria, and the two had reviewed the possibility of Turkey playing a role in contacts between Syria and Saad Hariri. Asad, however, believed that Hariri was not in a position to deliver much towards a solution in Lebanon. ¶8. (U) This cable was cleared by CODEL Issa after the CODEL's departure from Syria. CORBIN