2007 SYRIAN ELECTIONS (C-NE7-00184)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000359 SIPDIS SIPDIS NOFORN PARIS FOR WALLER, LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2017 TAGS: PGOV PINR SY SUBJECT: 2007 SYRIAN ELECTIONS (C-NE7-00184) REF: A. SECSTATE 29963 ¶B. DAMASCUS 0046 ¶C. DAMASCUS 0317 ¶D. DAMASCUS 0308 Classified By: A/DCM William Roebuck for reasons 1.4 b/c/d ¶1. (S/NF) This cable is a response to INR tasker (C-NE7-00184) on Syrian elections. Our answers are keyed to ref A,s numbering: ¶2. (C) A/B. The Damascus Declaration (DD) group decided in the past two months to boycott the Syrian parliamentary elections. The group,s leader Riad Seif commented to us that SARG security restrictions would prevent DD candidates from being approved to run or, any self-declared DD candidates from raising any significant political issues in a totally controlled campaign environment. The majority opposition/DD position was that under Emergency Law regulations, with powerful security services enforcing them, the opposition/DD group candidates could have been arrested for any election statements, raising political issues, holding election meetings, or even hosting gatherings of supporters in private apartments. Under those conditions, opposition elements considered that any participation would be a sham and lend some legitimacy to a completely flawed process. There was some disagreement over the boycott from head of the Democratic Arab Socialist Union and pan-Arabist Hassan Abdul Azeem (ref B) and some Kurdish parties. In the end, however, the pro-boycott voices won out. A March 16 interview by Reuters with the exiled leader of Syria's Muslim Brotherhood, Ali Bayanouni, reported that opposition parties like his were boycotting the parliamentary elections, which, according to Bayanouni, were regarded as mere &window dressing.8 ¶C. (C). Although Damascus and most other urban areas in Syria are plastered with campaign signs and banners, Syrians in general have taken little interest in the elections. On April 10, the government-run daily Tishreen, somewhat unexpectedly, ran an editorial that stated, ¬hing indicates that Syrians are excited about the forthcoming legislative elections.8 On April 11, another government-run daily al-Thawra, in an attempt to explain low public expectations, quoted one university professor who said, "the citizen feels that he does not have an effective role in electing a real representative." Echoing the published reports above, one Embassy contact in the Kurdish Future Party only half-jokingly remarked that the campaign banners appear to be the same ones used four years ago. A handful of &independent8 candidates, including Ihsan Sankar (ref C) have said however that their candidacy was based on a belief that the UNIIIC investigation into the assassination of former Lebanese PM Rafik Hariri will force a change in the top level of the Syrian regime, paving the way for wider political reforms in Syria. (Note: All candidates, including independents, are vetted by the security services and most have a relationship with one or another of the intelligence services. Prominent independent Adnan Shamaa, for instance, was recently banned from running. End Note.) ¶D. (C) The spokesman of the Kurdish Future Movement Machal Tammo criticized the DD,s decision in a March 28 conversation with Poloffs and wondered aloud why DD officials (including Riad Seif) chose to boycott this election on the grounds it was based on &falsifying and forgery8 but had participated in earlier elections which were equally flawed (as reported ref D). Because of the DD's boycott, the Kurdish Future Movement will only field candidates in Syria's northeastern areas, Tammo said. (Note. The Future Movement had planned to align itself with DD candidates all over the country. End Note.) Future Movement officials are using the parliamentary elections to educate Syria's Kurdish population on the balloting process and the importance of the vote by holding small, grassroots meetings on a daily basis in areas around the country where there is a strong Kurdish presence (such as Aleppo, Qamishli, and Damascus). Aside from the Kurdish Future party, all other Kurdish parties have boycotted the elections. The Sunni Muslim Brotherhood is banned and its members, if caught, still face the death penalty for belonging to an illegal organization. There are no other ethnic or sectarian based parties. All the independents run as individuals, not as representatives DAMASCUS 00000359 002 OF 002 of any political parties or other organizations, and they are not allowed to raise substantive political issues during the campaign. Essentially, minority representation is guaranteed in the People,s Assembly for two reasons. First, the governing National Progressive Front (NPF),which is a Ba'ath party dominated coalition of several parties, has made a concerted effort to represent all of Syria,s ethnic and sectarian groups within its umbrella organization. Since the NPF is guaranteed a majority of seats, the different ethnic and sectarian groups will receive some representation within the People,s Assembly. The same is true for even smaller groups such as the Shiites or Circassian Christians. Second, to a large extent, ethnic and sectarian minorities are concentrated in certain districts: for example, Druze in Suweida and Alawites in the Lattakia area. Due to the fact that each district receives a certain amount of seats in the People,s Assembly, the geographically concentrated ethnic and sectarian minorities are represented. ¶E. (C) The regime has so far turned down local and international offers of election monitoring. It has for decades, however, used the controlled elections as one of its props of legitimacy. Several editorials in official Syrian newspapers have called for an improvement in the quality of candidates (although not a move to a system that would permit truly independent ones). Early on, many well-known and respected names were circulated as possible candidates in an apparent effort to raise the profile and interest in the parliamentary elections (and indirectly boost the credibility of those candidates who did decide to run). It is important to note that none of those individuals ended up running for parliament. Post will report septel in greater detail on what the regime and candidates are seeking by holding/participating in these elections. ¶F. (C) Based on the quantity of campaign materials posted in the streets, the regime is apparently permitting sanctioned candidates to campaign extensively although limiting such efforts to street materials and pro forma campaign rhetoric where little of substance is discussed. The regime is also urging all eligible Syrian voters to participate in the parliamentary vote. For example, a sign at a local gas station in Damascus urges all Syrian "brothers and sisters" to participate in their duties as citizens and obtain a voter identification card. The regime will likely brush aside accusations by its critics that the process of becoming a candidate is flawed and instead point to high turnout (real or manufactured) and the number of candidates as key indicators of success. CORBIN