CODEL WOLF DISCUSSES BAKER-HAMILTON WITH ASAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000331 SIPDIS CODEL SIPDIS NEA/ELA, NSC FOR MARCHESE E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2017 TAGS: OVIP PGOV PREL SY SUBJECT: CODEL WOLF DISCUSSES BAKER-HAMILTON WITH ASAD Classified By: CDA Michael Corbin, for reasons 1.4 b/d ¶1. (C) Summary. As the initiator of the Iraq Study Group, Congressman Wolf told Syrian President Asad and Foreign Minister Mu,allim that his delegation was interested in exploring the possibility of dialogue with Syria, but was not in Syria to negotiate. Congressmen Wolf, Pitts and Aderholt expressed to President Asad their "serious and substantial concerns8 on issues such as Syria allowing foreign fighters to infiltrate into Iraq; SARG support for Hamas and Hizbollah; the need to respect Israel,s right to exist in peace and security with its neighbors; and Syrian interference in Lebanon. The CODEL emphasized its support for President Bush, Secretary Rice and the U.S. policy regarding Iraq. They added that they would report on their discussions in Syria to the Bush administration on their return to Washington. The Congressmen called for Asad to make a concrete gesture, such as stopping the flow of foreign fighters entering Iraq from Syria. Asad responded that his government supported a united and stable Iraq and that a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq should be planned and not precipitous. He added that despite disagreements on many issues, dialogue between the SARG and the USG is important and should be pursued. Asad also cited instances where the SARG,s overtures to the U.S. had previously been rebuffed. Throughout the meeting, Asad seemed focused on delivering the message that he was in control of SARG decisions and would act in his own interests, not those of the USG. The Congressmen suggested that if the SARG felt uncomfortable approaching the Bush administration, the SARG should approach an individual such as Ambassador Djerijian in order to explain what the SARG was going to do to permit dialogue. End Summary. ¶2. (C) On April 1, Congressmen Frank Wolf (R-VA),Joseph Pitts (R-PA) and Robert Aderholt (R-AL) met with Asad and Mu,allim for approximately 35 minutes. Asad was accompanied by an unidentified aide and a notetaker. CODEL Wolf was accompanied by Charge and an Embassy notetaker. Asad opened the meeting by saying he was suffering from sinusitis. Wolf, in his opening remarks, described his part in the formation of the Iraq Study Group, which among other things recommended dialogue with Syria. The delegation was not here to 
negotiate, Wolf added, but to listen and learn, and to explore for themselves whether the Baker-Hamilton recommendation for dialogue was a realistic opportunity. Asad countered by providing a brief synopsis of his perspective on U.S.-Syrian relations since 2001, in which he cited several instances of supposed goodwill gestures made by his government that were rebuffed by the U.S. Nonetheless, Asad requested the Congressmen go back and convince the Bush administration that Syria is interested in friendlier relations with the U.S., that even friends sometimes disagree, and that Syria is vital to ensuring stability in the region. -------------- IRAQ -------------- ¶3. (C) All three Congressmen expressed serious concerns about insurgents transiting Syria en route to Iraq. The SARG should act to stop the flow of foreign fighters who transit Syria and kill U.S. soldiers and innocent Iraqis, they said. Such a vital step would demonstrate that the Baker-Hamilton report recommendation on dialogue was sound. Congressman Wolf added that the opportunity provided by the Baker-Hamilton report for dialogue was short-lived and would require clear and positive action by the SARG if it was not to be missed. Wolf suggested that if the SARG wasn,t comfortable contacting the Bush administration directly they should contact Ambassador Djerijian, who would make a good intermediary. Congressman Pitts noted the friendship that all three of the members have with President Bush and Secretary Rice, and that they support the policy of the SIPDIS President and Secretary. He reiterated the importance of Syria taking a step to show their willingness to move forward. ¶4. (C) Asad repeated more forcefully the position he has taken with previous CODELs, that the SARG is working towards a more stable Iraq not because the U.S. insists upon it but because it is in Syria,s best interest to have a stable neighbor. Asad commented that he was not, therefore, calling for a precipitous U.S. withdrawal, but rather a planned departure. Asad commented that if security in Iraq is ignored, there will be a domino effect from the Mediterranean DAMASCUS 00000331 002 OF 002 to Russia, and the entire region would be affected; therefore, Syria will do its part but it needs support. ¶5. (C) The 1.3 million Iraqi refugees currently in Syria mean Syria lives with this problem daily, and the U.S. is responsible for the problem and should therefore fix it, Asad said. Several gestures of goodwill by the SARG since 2001 have been rebuffed, and Asad insisted he would not listen to "someone" telling him he must do something. -------------- HAMAS, HIZBOLLAH, LEBANON -------------- ¶6. (C) The delegation also raised their grave concern over Asad,s support of Hamas and Hizbollah, and the need for an independent and stable government in Lebanon. Asad deflected the criticism and instead asserted that Syria is also a target of terrorism, citing recent domestic incidents, in addition to the September 2006 attack on the U.S. Embassy, as proof Syria was also a victim. -------------- TRYING TO TALK -------------- ¶7. (C) Asad made a point of listing the efforts Syria has made in the past to open a dialogue with the U.S. ) efforts, he said, which have been repeatedly rebuffed. These gestures, according to Asad, included a letter of cooperation against Al Qaeda after September 11; information passed to Bahrain in 2002 which saved American lives (an incident which Asad claims is well known to former CIA Director George Tenet); offers of military escort to the Syrian-Iraq border in 2004 to study security measures; and a Syrian delegation sent in 2005 to Iraq to work towards opening embassies in their respective capitals, which failed because no one on the Iraqi side would meet with the delegation. All of this, Asad said, shows Syria has done its part and cannot be blamed for being suspicious of calls for renewed engagement. ¶8. (C) In closing, Pitts asked that Asad respond positively to Embassy Damascus, requests for greater security in response to the September 2006 attack on the Embassy. Asad said that steps were being taken to secure the Embassy, and the Embassy can move to the new diplomatic quarter. ¶9. (C) CODEL Wolf cleared on this cable. CORBIN