SYRIAN CONFIDENCE WAVERING?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000196 SIPDIS SIPDIS PARIS FOR WALLER; LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV SY IR IZ LE SUBJECT: SYRIAN CONFIDENCE WAVERING? Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Corbin, per 1.4 b,d. ¶1. (C) Summary: In the aftermath of a visit to Tehran clouded by growing differences over Iraq and Lebanon, Bashar al-Asad's self-confidence stemming from foreign policy positions he believed were paying dividends may now be eroding. Disappointments over the frictions with Iran, the apparent weakening of its allies in Lebanon, and the prospect of what it views as a military escalation in Iraq rather than a Baker-Hamilton-led diplomatic breakthrough, have left the Syrian regime a bit uncertain about where things are headed. The upcoming Arab summit, unfolding events in Lebanon in the coming months, and how they manage increasing problems for Syria from Iraq will provide tests for the Syrians that will help determine whether their confidence continues to falter or the regime rights itself and emerges emboldened once again. Given its inherent cautiousness, the SARG is likely to maintain a confident public posture and avoid any sudden shifts in policy, regardless of how events play out, with the perhaps mistaken impression that time is on its side. End Summary. ¶2. (C) DIFFERENCES EMERGING WITH IRAN: The February 17-18 Bashar al-Asad visit to Tehran came at a pivotal time for Syria, raising questions about the apparently increasing areas of disagreement or at least differing emphases between the two countries, and at a sensitive time for Syria's relations with its neighbors in the region. While Syria and Iran attempted to communicate a joint front during the visit, it seems clear that differences are emerging more than they have in the past year, in ways that are raising questions about whether Syria's regional position has weakened to some degree in the past five or six months. ¶3. (C) IRAQ MORE OF A PROBLEM THAN EXPECTED: While Iran seems relatively satisfied with its close relations with the now-powerful Shiites in Iraq, it seems clear that for Syria, Iraq is becoming more of a problem than it expected. Iraqi refugees, the presence in Syria of extremists supporting the Iraqi insurgency and harboring anti-Syrian regime sentiments, ascendant Shiite (and Iranian) power next door provoking a Sunni backlash in Syria, are all threats for the SARG. At the same time, the SARG's efforts to work with the Ba'ath Party and to cultivate Iraqi tribal leaders (and other Sunni elements) have not brought much comfort to Bashar or met with great success. The SARG also seems a bit frustrated that its re-embrace of Iraq -- with the opening of diplomatic relations and high-level discussions -- seems to have stalled. The SARG finds itself in an increasingly difficult position with the Arab (and Sunni) world as it tries to proclaim its "Arabness" while appearing to be complicit in the expansion of Shiite and Iranian power in Iraq. The SARG is also palpably disappointed that Baker-Hamilton did not lead, as it initially anticipated, to a great push for U.S. re-engagement with Syria, but rather towards what they view as a policy of military escalation in Iraq. ¶4. (C) DIVERGENT VIEWS ON LEBANON: An even greater point of friction between the Syrians and Iranians is Lebanon. Bashar worries that the Iranians and the Saudis will succeed in reaching a deal in Lebanon that undermines his so far inflexible position opposing the establishment of an international tribunal (and supporting the downfall of the Siniora government). The Syrians seem concerned that the Iranian leadership does not share their paranoid fears about the tribunal. (Comment: Iran would likely view the Syrian position more sympathetically if it assessed that the UNIIIC investigation and the Hariri tribunal posed a threat to Hizballah.) Syria views Hizballah as an instrument to be used to achieve SARG strategic aims and does not mind seeing it weakened internally if it helps Syria stop or significantly delay the tribunal and weakens the Siniora government. Iran sees Hizballah as an instrument to project Shiite power in Lebanon and throughout the region and does not want to see it damaged to accomplish essentially parochial Syrian objectives such as stopping the tribunal, according to contacts. With regard to the current impasse in Lebanon, Syria wants it to continue while Iran seems to be looking for ways to end a protest that has become increasingly unpopular in Lebanon -- and that it fears is being increasingly viewed as an essentially Shiite crusade -- in order to protect the political interests and future legitimacy of Hizballah (and preserve it for later use in its own disputes with the U.S.). ¶5. (C) The Syrians also view Hizballah as an instrument to maintain pressure on Israel with the objective of eventually DAMASCUS 00000196 002 OF 003 regaining the Golan. Once that objective is met, the Syrian view is that Hizballah is expendable. The Iranians do not share that view, seeing Hizballah's long-term, ascendant presence in Lebanon as essential to helping them project regional Iranian power and maintaining a critical role for itself in the Israeli-Arab conflict. While that divergent view on Lebanon and Hizballah has long been present in Syrian-Iranian calculations, disagreements over the tribunal increase the irritation factor. ¶6. (C) OTHER CHALLENGES IN THE REGION: Apart from its Iranian alliance, the SARG, while publicly boasting that it is beating isolation, faces a minefield in its relations with others in the region. Desperately seeking to rejoin the Arab world, the SARG still faces hostility from the Saudis (although Bashar did receive this week an invitation from King Abdullah to attend the late March Arab summit) and dismissiveness from the Egyptians, only heightened as an "anti-Iran" front gathers steam in the Arab world. The SARG seems to have been initially troubled by the success of King Abdullah in wooing Hamas with the Mecca Agreement, although the diplomatic aftermath does not seem to have harmed longer-term Syrian interests in the Palestinian issue or changed the SARG's fundamental calculations, which may explain Syria's cautiously supportive reaction once the agreement was announced. Also, at this stage, Syria would like to see some movement on any track of the peace process. On the other side of the ledger, relations with Turkey are good. In addition, Bashar's gambit with Israel seems to be paying off, with Bashar seeing himself as having firmly batted the ball into the Israeli court. ¶7. (C) EROSION IN SYRIA'S REGIONAL POSITION?: At present it remains unclear to what degree Syria's regional position has eroded in the past five months. Disappointment over the lack of any U.S. effort, post-Baker-Hamilton, to re-engage diplomatically on Iraq, emerging frictions with Iran, and fears that its hard-line position in Lebanon is being eroded by weakened allies there, all are raising the level of anxiety here, especially given the tremendous regime confidence in December and January that things were going their way in the all-important test of wills in Lebanon. There are several testing events in the coming few months that will make more clear whether Syria is emerging buoyed by the success of its intact hang-tough position, or if it has faltered and will seek to adopt more flexible positions as it adapts to evolving circumstances. The Arab summit offers a good test for assessing how Syria's regional position has fared in the past six months. If Bashar attends and is relatively warmly welcomed back into the Arab fold, the SARG will certainly feel vindicated. ¶8. (C) SYRIANS STILL BELIEVE TIME ON THEIR SIDE: More significantly, if the SARG manages in these coming months to maintain the festering instability in Lebanon, it will likely feel bolstered. (However, if that situation shows overly promising signs of improvement, the Syrians may administer "deniable" doses of political violence, to prevent any return to stability.) On the other hand, any significant progress towards the establishment of the tribunal or publication of UNIIIC investigation results further implicating the regime will deeply rattle the regime. If the U.S. military surge in Iraq in the coming months continues to face significant levels of violence, and the Malki government fails to establish a more effective presence, then Bashar is likely to feel that he can play "hard to get" on cooperation with the U.S. or the Malki government. The more difficult relationship they are experiencing with the Iranians, who seem to have the upper hand at present, comes at a time when an anti-Iranian front is gathering steam in the Arab world (a world in which the Syrians see themselves a leader). In the end, the Syrians remain confident that their assets -- key strategic location, ideological and political leadership of the pan-Arab and Palestinian rejectionist causes, and a valuable "Iraq card" that they believe can be played to forge a better relationship with the U.S. -- will eventually prove their value and allow them to re-calibrate the relationship with Iran in ways more favorable to their interests. For now, despite any momentary doubts, the Syrians do not seem to have fundamentally changed any of their basic calculations and continue to believe, perhaps mistakenly, that time is on their side. DAMASCUS 00000196 003 OF 003 CORBIN