DEMOCRATIC REFORM STRATEGY SYRIA - 2007

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 001193 SIPDIS SIPDIS PARIS FOR JORDAN; LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2017 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SY IS SUBJECT: DEMOCRATIC REFORM STRATEGY SYRIA - 2007 Classified By: CDA Todd Holmstrom for reasons 1.4 b and d ¶1. (C) Summary: Since the development of Post,s 2005 democratic reform strategy there has been a substantial and on-going government crackdown on what little democratic reform had been taking place. Many of the democratic reformers and human rights advocates who were key Embassy contacts in 2005 are now in prison. Many who are or were involved in political opposition, human rights, and/or civil society development have been banned from leaving the country, thereby making external training problematic for many of the most promising reformers. In addition, the Syrian Arab Republic government (SARG) makes it all but impossible for local NGOs, opposition parties and individual reformers to receive funding from non-Syrian sources. Finally, international NGOs that aim to engage in any political activity are forbidden from operating in the country. ¶2. (C) Given Syria,s restrictive political environment, Post advocates: 1) supporting political prisoners and dissidents and helping their families; 2) helping political opposition and civil society to spread their message and develop internally; and 3) providing assistance to Syrian opposition contacts outside the country who have the trust of opposition leaders inside the country. Post believes it can effectively support Washington,s objectives by serving as a platform of communication and as a resource of information about activities and direction of the internal opposition. End Summary. PRIORITY ONE: SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS, OTHER DISSIDENTS AND THEIR FAMILIES ¶3. (C) Since 2005, a number of high profile political reformers, human rights defenders and civil society activists were arrested, tried and sentenced to lengthy prison terms: Kamal Labwani for 12 years; Anwar al-Bunni for five years; and Michel Kilo for three years. In addition, the government prevented many connected to the political reform movement, human rights organizations or civil society from traveling abroad: Riad Seif who requires medical attention not available in Syria or Haithem al-Maleh whose wife is ill in the U.S. ¶4. (C) Both the White House and the State Department have issued numerous public statements condemning both the politically based trials and the harsh sentences for regime critics. Post has worked closely with like-minded embassies in Damascus to coordinate public statements and share information. Some visiting CODELS broached the subject of political detainees in the meetings with President Asad and other SARG officials. ¶5. (C) Yet, a consistent refrain of Post,s opposition contacts is that the Embassy and USG should do more to support the opposition. Of particular concern are the families of prisoners of conscience who have no other means to support themselves. Unofficially, there are approximately 100 to 150 individuals who need some sort of assistance. In many cases, when the primary bread winner is sent to prison, the spouses are also forced out of jobs by the security services, who also work to isolate them from society at large so far as ensuring the children are shunned from school. XXXXXXXXXXXX. ¶6. (C) Strategies for Post support for prisoners of conscience, their families and their movements: -- Department adopts a more public posture calling for SARG release of political prisoners. -- Closely monitor/report on political repression cases, and suggest press guidance highlighting the abuses. -- Use the U.S. annual human rights report on Syria as a point of discussion for programming with civil society activists, journalists, and academics. -- Use high-level visits, including CODELS, to urge SARG to DAMASCUS 00001193 002 OF 004 release political prisoners as a demonstration of the government,s desire to improve bilateral relations and as a way to enhance its image. -- Post is developing a detailed list of the family members of prisoners of conscience that lists the types of assistance they need/want. -- Use of DRL,s Human Rights Defenders Fund and MEPI funds to support, through international NGOs (possibly Freedom House),the families of prisoners of conscience. ¶7. (C) Resource Needs: Initially, Post plans to depend largely on DRL,s Human Rights Defenders Fund. Eventually, Post envisions working with MEPI to develop specifically tailored programs as Post develops a more sophisticated understanding of how best to assist family members of political prisoners. PRIORITY TWO: ENCOURAGE SYRIA-BASED HUMAN RIGHTS NGOS, OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS AND YOUNG JOURNALISTS TO USE MASS COMMUNICATIONS MORE EFFECTIVELY ¶8. (C) The Syrian government tightly controls all media and maintains ownership of most news outlets in Syria. The government has allowed the founding of some semi-independent publications, which are privately owned by regime allies. Journalists are harassed by the security services and sometimes jailed for publication of news or opinion offensive to the regime. Satellite television is available almost everywhere in the country and is relatively unregulated. However, locally-based correspondents for Arab media (al-Sharq al-Awsat, al-Hayat, al-Jazeera, al-Arabiya) refrain from running stories critical of the Syrian regime. Self-censorship and knowing where the government's red-lines are job survival skills for all journalists operating in Syria. The internet is rapidly growing as a source of information for Syrians, although websites are monitored and some are periodically blocked. ¶9. (C) In 2006, the Ministry of Information completed drafting a new Publications Law. Early hopes that the draft law would be quickly ratified and adopted have now evaporated as the Ministry has yet to pass the draft law to the People,s Assembly for debate. Local observers do not expect the draft law to be passed anytime soon. ¶10. (C) The Embassy,s priority is to encourage and support local human rights NGOs and opposition movements (such as the recently formed National Council) to circulate their message both inside the country and out. Internal and external pressure on the regime will increase as more people know the truth about the methods it employs to stay in power. ¶11. (C) It is equally important that Syrian journalists and those interested in journalism receive the requisite skills to produce high quality media products that will allow them to disseminate their viewpoints as effectively as possible. As such, journalist trainings and exchanges remain vitally important. ¶12. (C) Strategies for Support: -- Encourage reputable Syrian reporters by allowing them access to embassy staff in PAS-monitored backgrounders and including them in representational events. -- Continue to send journalists to the US through IVPs and other Embassy sponsored exchanges to better understand the roles and responsibilities of journalists in a free media. -- Support journalist training and capacity building workshops, especially in the area of &new8, i.e. electronic, media. -- Identify and facilitate budding sites of a free press here, such as websites and periodicals with investigative news, and develop creative strategies, with input from NDI, IRI, NED, Freedom House, Internews and others, to identify ways to fund these future pillars of a free press. -- Provide training for journalists in human rights reporting. DAMASCUS 00001193 003 OF 004 -- Assist local NGOs with translating and printing their publications, statements, websites and pamphlets. -- Support the proposed European office of the Damascus Declaration,s National Council, which will be used as a platform to spread their message. -- Assist the Damascus Declaration,s National Council to broadcast a news show on Syria once or twice a week on satellite television. -- Encourage al-Hurra to focus on the human rights situation in the Middle East with ONE or two hours of programming per week ) some of which could include the situation in Syria. -- Provide technical advice on and/or directly host opposition/human rights websites. -- PD section to increase scope and depth of its contacts among local journalists with an eye to send more for training/exchanges. -- Encourage NSC/Commerce to apply greater flexibility to the review of export licenses under U.S. sanctions to allow, where possible and where it serves U.S. interests, for the more rapid spread of the internet in Syria. ¶13. (C) Resource Needs: PD is already undertaking some journalist training; additional training could build on these programs. MEPI funds are already supporting websites and could be expanded. We should also give consideration to the National Council's request for funding for satellite broadcasts. Washington could explore supporting the use of American satellite TV programs that provide truthful, accurate information about the regime. Other strategies proposed can be undertaken at post with existing staffing and assets. MEPI small grants funds could be used to assist local NGOs with translating and printing. PRIORITY THREE: AID THE DEVELOPMENT OF A ROBUST CIVIL SOCIETY ¶14. (C) The SARG allows a very few licensed, non-political civil society organizations to operate. The SARG carefully funds and controls these organizations. Independent NGO's are not authorized to operate in the country and have been increasingly policed and shut down since 2005 including the 2006 closing of AMIDEAST, which had successfully operated in Syria for 27 years. Additionally, The SARG has completely closed a number of civil society organizations that focused on reform and human rights. Security services routinely disrupt the meetings of human rights organizations, harass their leaders and prevent their members from leaving the country. ¶15. (C) Post,s priority is to provide opportunities for civil society organizations to develop themselves internally and cultivate their relations with other civil society organizations both within Syria and abroad. ONE possible area of focus is the legal sector where the ABA is already actively exploring some programs. ¶16. (C) Strategies for Assistance: -- Using MEPI to enhance existing English programs, increasing, for example, the micro-scholarship program to two years for each participant for up to 20 at the American Language Center, subject to availability of additional funding. Other English language schools could also be used to provide language instruction. -- MEPI funding for additional training (including English) at private schools in Damascus. -- Expand the number of IV's available to Syrians who can travel in the field of democratization and related fields. -- Identify and approach non-traditional partners (i.e. churches) who may be able to provide cover for civil society development projects, such as NGO training. DAMASCUS 00001193 004 OF 004 -- Develop on associations of western-trained lawyers, possibly through the ABA. -- Through the ABA, create training programs for Syrian lawyers focusing on legal advocacy and legal drafting. -- Create a forum for people-to-people discussion of the issue with legal scholars speaking on respect for human rights in different legal systems. -- Embassy hosts monthly DVCs where some local human rights activists could communicate with U.S. or regional counterparts. -- Develop medium and long term relationships with NGOs working in areas that are not sensitive to the regime such as the environment or health. -- Help local NGOs and other civil society organizations improve computer literacy among their members. ¶17. (C) Resource Needs: MEPI and/or DRL funds will provide an ideal source for enhanced funding for civil society/NGO activity. There will be a critical need for flexibility and creativity in identifying funding programs, sources of funding and ways to deliver these resources to groups. ONE option, for both civil society and human rights activists, is to identify recipients for cash "prizes," awarded by recognized foundations and private organizations in the U.S. or Europe. ¶18. (C) EVALUATING THE CONSEQUENCES AND PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS: In the wake of the ongoing crackdown, and the current tense regional environment, the SARG remains wary of USG intentions toward the regime. The SARG is unlikely to allow many of these suggested programming initiatives to go forward, and can be expected to block the more ambitious ones, either directly or by threatening potential participants. Conversely, the lack of USG programming and financial support to political dissidents, human rights activists, and civil society organizers has led some in the opposition to question whether the U.S. is truly committed to democracy in Syria. ¶19. (S) ONE way to increase the pressure for democratization in Syria is to strongly encourage any official visitors to Syria to reiterate the U.S. commitment to democracy and human rights. This assumes the SARG would grant the officials visas -- which is by no means guaranteed. Visiting CODELs could be persuaded to raise internal reform, as they often receive much higher access to the regime than Executive Branch officials. In addition, a visit by the Assistant Secretary for Democracy Rights and Labor, for example, could help us advance our democratization agenda by focusing public attention on our support for human rights and civil society. ¶20. (C) In Syrian, however, ratcheting up U.S. and international attention to Syria's human rights record will likely result in a negative response by the SARG against those we support. Post might also experience increased SARG interference in its programming, and efforts to further restrict contacts with organizations and individuals. Indeed, the SARG,s closure of AMIDEAST in 2006 serves as a reminder of how far the regime can and will go to curtail Post,s operations. Finally, existing PD programs are vulnerable to SARG disruption. Future PD programs will be vulnerable to government disruption especially as the profile of Post,s support of political reform rises. ¶21. (S) It remains imperative to focus on the &doable.8 In that regard, we must seek to identify how to respond positively to the requests of Syrian advocates of reform for political and material support by partnering with other countries and international organizations. At some point, the USG needs to decide how to overcome SARG barriers to USG funding of Syrian groups, activists and their families. The issue of providing direct support remains the most difficult obstacle and is a constant refrain of civil society contacts who complain the U.S. is not doing enough. HOLMSTROM