SARG-IRAQI CONSULTATIONS REFLECT SOME PROGRESS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 001181

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/I
PARIS FOR JORDAN; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV SY IZ
SUBJECT: SARG-IRAQI CONSULTATIONS REFLECT SOME PROGRESS ON
ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ISSUES

REF: DAMASCUS 1128

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Corbin, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: On the margins of a delegation headed by
Iraqi Finance Minister Bayan Jabr al Zabaida, Iraqi border
security officials met with their Syrian counterparts in
Damascus November 28-29 to discuss enhanced cooperation.
According to the Iraqi embassy here, al Zabaida handed over
15 million to the SARG for assisting refugees and won Syrian
agreement to establish a joint Iraqi-Syrian branch of the Al
Rafadain Bank. Separately, a delegation of Kurdish
Democratic Party reps sought to improve relations with
Damascus and win an invitation for Massoud Barzani to visit.
End Summary


-------------- --------------
Finance and Information Ministers Deal with Big Issues
-------------- --------------


2. (C) While media headlines focused on Iraqi Finance
Minister al Zabaida's agreement to establish a Syria-based
joint Iraqi-Syrian branch of the al-Rafadain bank in
Damascus, the GOI's decision to transfer 15 million USD
directly to the SARG was the main, unwritten point of the
visit, according to Iraqi Charge Hassan Abdul Azziz. Iraqi
government spokesman Ali al Dabbagh, who joined the
delegation, probed SARG counterparts relentlessly on the
possibility of sending a Syrian ambassador to Baghdad, but he
left with no concrete commitments. (Note: Iraqi Embassy
sources told us Dabbagh himself hopes to be appointed Iraqi
ambassador to Syria.)


3. (C) A Syrian banking source told us the al-Rafadain bank
would operate differently than other private banks in Syria
in that it would be a government-to-government joint venture
and would be designed principally to facilitate transfer of
funds for pensions to Iraqis in Syria. Additionally, Syrian
officials made another pitch to reopen the Kirkuk-Banyas oil
pipeline and build a gas-pipeline from the al-Akkas field,
and Iraqi officials responded favorably, reported Abdul
Azziz.


4. (C) Planned before but coinciding with the rush of
official visitors and post-Annapolis phone calls to Damascus,
the Finance Minister's visit demonstrated Syria's continuing
commitment to better bilateral relations with Iraq, according
to Samir al-Taki, a confidant of FM Mouallem. The SARG was
able to demonstrate publicly its desire for better economic
cooperation, while private meetings between the border
security experts focused on specific steps each side wanted
the other to take. In al Taki's view, the SARG's most
important message was that threats to Iraq's Western border
constituted a threat to Syria. He also said Syrians tried to
emphasize that the security and economic spheres were
integrally linked. "We just re-opened the border at Abu
Kamal" (al Qa'im on the Iraqi side),and both sides will
benefit from increased commercial flows between the two
countries. Effectively controlling the border "isn't just
important for containing terrorism, it's important for
economic growth."


5. (C) Syrian journalists told us privately the were
intrigued by PM Maliki's choice to send Dabbagh to accompany
the delegation and offered a host of conspiracy theories that
all suggested FM Zebari's marginalization. Dabbagh's close
relationship to the Syrian regime is one reason why Baghdad
might have sent him, suggested al Hayat's Ibrahim Hamidi.
Hamidi told us later that he had heard from Syrian MFA
sources hurriedly invited Zebari to visit the following week

to avoid any possibility of insulting Zebari and to further
bolster the optic of improving Syrian-Iraqi relations.

-------------- --------------
Border Security Commanders Meet in Formal Setting
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Abdul Azziz's readout of the border security
discussions (represented by four high-level Ministry of
Interior officers from each side) indicated that the Iraqi
side presented specific requests for creating direct
communications between sector chiefs, instituting regular
exchanges of information and regular meetings, and increased
SARG presence in the areas across from al-Sinjar,
particularly in tribal villages that fell on both sides of
the border.


7. (C) Abdul Azziz said the Syrian delegation appeared well
intentioned, but it responded with generalities. Syrian
officials said they were interested in direct communications
at the unit level and suggested this idea be discussed in
diplomatic channels between the two countries' security
liaisons. They claimed Syria lacked the technical means to
control the border as well as it wished. (Comment: Syrian
border security officials apparently have returned to this
talking point after getting laughed at by the Damascus
diplomatic community for saying they had all the equipment
they needed during an MFA-sponsored trip to the border,
reported reftel.)


8. (C) The Syrian side asserted that it built up border
security infrastructure, had re-opened the Abu Kamal border
crossing in response to Iraq's request, and was interested in
creating a secure environment to enhance trade relations.
Regarding Iraqi concerns about infiltrations through Sinjar,
the Syrian delegation recommended increased Iraqi patrols and
use of other security equipment (such as barbed wire) to
match actions on the Syrian side of the border and urged the
Iraqis to share specific information on infiltrators. The
Syrians said they would be willing to respond to specific
information and presented the Iraqi side with information
regarding its border security activities.


9. (C) According to Abdul Azziz, the meeting ended on a
positive note and maintained a technical focus throughout.
No follow-up discussion has been scheduled, he added.

--------------
Iraqi KDP Sends Delegation
--------------


10. (C) Triggered primarily by the increased alignment
between the Turkish and Syrian positions regarding the KGK,
KDP leader Massoud Barzani sent a delegation to Damascus in
early December seeking to pave the way for a possible
invitation to visit, confided Abdul Aziz. Abdul Aziz mused
that everyone, including the KDP, seems to want better
relations with Damascus these days because of its centrality
to so many regional issues. He had no information on whether
the KDP delegation succeeded in its aim of securing an
invitation for Barzani to visit.


11. (C) Comment: Some of our diplomatic and Syrian
contacts are saying this visit accomplished very little, and
what little it achieved was long over due. At the same time,
this latest round of Iraqi-Syrian engagement allowed both
sides to claim they are taking concrete, if modest steps, to
move their relationship forward. From the Syrian side, there
appears to be some recognition of common security interests,
but the test of this proposition will be whether the dialogue
continues and whether it is followed up by real cooperation

on the ground.

--------------
Post Script on Zebari Visit
--------------


12. (C) Iraqi FM Zebari's short-notice December 10-11 visit
offered more positive evidence of improving bilateral
relations. Concluding with a joint Zebari-Mouallem press
conference in which both ministers gushed about their
countries' deepening ties, Zebari's trip strengthened the
optic of progress on economic and security issues. Syrian
businessmen in particular viewed Zebari's announcement of an
agreement to reopen the Kirkuk-Banyas oil pipeline as a
positive signal. But most of our contacts believe that
securing and repairing the pipeline and enhancing
Syrian-Iraqi security cooperation will require sustained
engagement by both sides to overcome significant challenges.
CORBIN