Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07DAMASCUS1147
2007-12-03 05:34:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:
IDENT DATA ENTRY ERRORS AT PORTS OF ENTRY
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UNCLAS DAMASCUS 001147
SIPDIS
ATHENS FOR DHS
DEPT FOR INL/HSTC
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958
TAGS: CVIS ASEC KFRD SY
SUBJECT: IDENT DATA ENTRY ERRORS AT PORTS OF ENTRY
UNCLAS DAMASCUS 001147
SIPDIS
ATHENS FOR DHS
DEPT FOR INL/HSTC
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958
TAGS: CVIS ASEC KFRD SY
SUBJECT: IDENT DATA ENTRY ERRORS AT PORTS OF ENTRY
1. (SBU) Summary: CBP inspectors at US ports of entry are
apparently entering the terms "recidivist," "frequent traveler" and
"unknown" into IDENT in place of actual traveler names and bio-data.
Clearing these entries causes extra work for consular officers and
casts a negative light on legitimate passengers with repeat travel.
POE registration of photos without actual bio-data undermines the
purpose of NSEERS. End summary.
2. (SBU) Embassy Damascus sees, on average, one or two "recidivist"
hits daily in the IDENT system that have been entered by CBP
inspectors at ports of entry. However, these hits are nearly always
(over 95 percent of the time) entered for people who have diligently
registered with NSEERS, not the repeat offenders the word
"recidivist" would suggest.
3. (SBU) Recidivist hits, like Watchlist tags, are displayed
prominently in the system message box that remains open on the
background screen of the NIV application. While clearing individual
NSEERS registrants from the box is a minor annoyance, over time they
have a "boy who cried wolf" effect on the officers they are meant to
alert, especially in posts with large numbers of applicants for whom
NSEERS is mandatory.
4. (SBU) Another far more common problem is the frequency with
which CBP inspectors enter applicants' names with the filler text
"FREQUENTTRAVELER, FREQUENTTRAVELER" or "UNKNOWN," even on the
individual's first trip to the US. Given that the aim of the NSEERS
program is to verify the entry and exit of all designated
individuals into and out of the U.S., it would be very helpful to
both DHS and DOS to be able to confirm that the person bearing the
fingerprints used the same name at registration, especially since
photos are sometimes blurry or absent. Registering the traveler
without the actual name seems counterproductive.
5. (SBU) Finally, Post has seen a few instances of inappropriate
comments entered with applicants' IDENT data. Most recently, notes
for an elderly woman in a wheelchair indicated that she was
questioned specifically about whether she supports Al Qaeda, to
which she replied that she did not.
CORBIN
SIPDIS
ATHENS FOR DHS
DEPT FOR INL/HSTC
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958
TAGS: CVIS ASEC KFRD SY
SUBJECT: IDENT DATA ENTRY ERRORS AT PORTS OF ENTRY
1. (SBU) Summary: CBP inspectors at US ports of entry are
apparently entering the terms "recidivist," "frequent traveler" and
"unknown" into IDENT in place of actual traveler names and bio-data.
Clearing these entries causes extra work for consular officers and
casts a negative light on legitimate passengers with repeat travel.
POE registration of photos without actual bio-data undermines the
purpose of NSEERS. End summary.
2. (SBU) Embassy Damascus sees, on average, one or two "recidivist"
hits daily in the IDENT system that have been entered by CBP
inspectors at ports of entry. However, these hits are nearly always
(over 95 percent of the time) entered for people who have diligently
registered with NSEERS, not the repeat offenders the word
"recidivist" would suggest.
3. (SBU) Recidivist hits, like Watchlist tags, are displayed
prominently in the system message box that remains open on the
background screen of the NIV application. While clearing individual
NSEERS registrants from the box is a minor annoyance, over time they
have a "boy who cried wolf" effect on the officers they are meant to
alert, especially in posts with large numbers of applicants for whom
NSEERS is mandatory.
4. (SBU) Another far more common problem is the frequency with
which CBP inspectors enter applicants' names with the filler text
"FREQUENTTRAVELER, FREQUENTTRAVELER" or "UNKNOWN," even on the
individual's first trip to the US. Given that the aim of the NSEERS
program is to verify the entry and exit of all designated
individuals into and out of the U.S., it would be very helpful to
both DHS and DOS to be able to confirm that the person bearing the
fingerprints used the same name at registration, especially since
photos are sometimes blurry or absent. Registering the traveler
without the actual name seems counterproductive.
5. (SBU) Finally, Post has seen a few instances of inappropriate
comments entered with applicants' IDENT data. Most recently, notes
for an elderly woman in a wheelchair indicated that she was
questioned specifically about whether she supports Al Qaeda, to
which she replied that she did not.
CORBIN