COUNTER-NARCOTICS STRATEGY FOR GUINEA-BISSAU

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 000608 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR INL/AAE, AF/W, AF/RSA, INR/AA, INR/TNC AND IO/T ACCRA FOR USAID/WA PARIS FOR POL - D'ELIA LAGOS FOR DEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2017 TAGS: SNAR KCRM PGOV PREL EAIR PU SUBJECT: COUNTER-NARCOTICS STRATEGY FOR GUINEA-BISSAU REF: A. DAKAR 0381 ¶B. DAKAR 0124 Classified By: Ambassador Janice L. Jacobs for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) Embassy, press and intelligence reporting over the past year have highlighted the growing problem of drug trafficking in Guinea-Bissau (see refs). The international community watched and took no significant action as the GOGB lost sovereignty to drug traffickers. Now Guinea-Bissau is a haven of lawlessness where the state is rapidly losing its ability to govern, and drug cartels operate openly without fear of prosecution or interdiction. The open borders and lack of control over financial transactions that attract narcotics and human traffikers may also attract those engaged in other illicit activities such as arms smuggling and terrorism. Embassy lays out a proposed coordinated strategy and action request for assistance from the Department, DEA, FBI, DOD, DOJ and the UN in paragraph 11. END SUMMARY. BACKGROUND -------------- ¶2. (C) In the war on drugs a new front must be opened in Guinea-Bissau. By most estimates, the country receives the highest volume of cocaine traffic in all of West Africa because of the ease with which traffickers can operate. Intelligence and anecdotal reporting suggest processing may be happening in Guinea-Bissau as well. Intelligence analysts at the DEA and UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) are unable to say for certain what happens to the drugs after they are stored and broken down into smaller packages in Guinea-Bissau, but most agree they go to Europe. It is, however, possible that mules are using the three daily non-stop flights from Dakar to Atlanta, New York and Washington, respectively. Money from the transactions goes back to traffickers in Latin America to help fuel production. It is not yet known if those same funds are used to smuggle drugs into the United States or if they directly contribute to conflicts in Latin America through the purchase of arms and ammunition. ¶3. (U) Europe, which has been late to raise its defenses against cocaine trafficking from Africa, is now getting on board. According to press reports, a Maritime Analysis Operations Center based in Lisbon will be set up next month with law enforcement agencies from eight European countries. Navy, police, and customs officials will attempt to identify and interdict shipments. ¶4. (C) Fighting drug trafficking has replaced security sector reform as post,s top policy priority in Guinea-Bissau. No progress can be made toward achieving U.S. goals of peace and security, governing justly and democratically, and economic recovery and poverty reduction without a serious, sustained, and coordinated anti-narcotics trafficking program. This cable outlines our proposed strategy for assisting those elements in Guinea-Bissau that have not yet been corrupted and want to fight traffickers. STICKS -------------- ¶5. (C) Embassy, DEA Lagos, and UNODC officials have communicated concerns to the GOGB and the response is always the same: &We know we have a problem, give us materials, money and training to fight it.8 This was reiterated most recently by Prime Minister Aristides Gomes in a letter to the Ambassador dated February 13. It is accurate to say the GOGB has no capacity or resources to fight traffickers, but still there are steps the GOGB can take starting with appointing a focal point in the government and identifying "vetted" DAKAR 00000608 002 OF 003 individuals or units in the police, military, and judiciary. A legal review should be conducted to identify and study the laws which could be used in putting away traffickers and efforts should be made in conjunction with the National Popular Assembly to draft new legislation. Embassy will continue to reiterate these messages through diplomatic channels in coordination with allies and international organizations. ¶6. (C) There must be consequences for any GOGB failure to take appropriate steps, but USG assistance is small and so leverage is limited. The first step that post will implement immediately is the suspension of participation in programming by the African Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS),which sends high level military officers to regional trainings. Over the past year, ACSS has sponsored Bissau-Guinean civilian and military participants for courses in Atlanta, Algiers, and Addis Ababa. Persistent allegations of high-level military involvement in trafficking, including from some ministers, necessitate this step. The next step would be the loss of International Military Education and Training assistance geared toward mid and lower level officers. ¶7. (C) It is not clear at this time if there is enough information about the drug traffic to place Guinea-Bissau on the Major,s List as a transit country that &significantly affects the United States.8 Embassy, the Department and interagency groups should review the data through the annual reporting of the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report and make a determination. The stigma of being named to the list and possibly de-certified is a stain the GOGB does not want. LAW ENFORCEMENT -------------- ¶8. (S) There is not enough information about trafficking through Bissau to make arrests. Post's request for a law enforcement official seconded to the UNODC in Bissau (Ref A) will help provide more information and meanwhile send a message that the international community is taking action. DEA advises that if it had assets on the ground, it might be able to gain enough information for indictments under Title 21, Sections 959 and 960. Indicting a Latin American or Nigerian trafficker or a Bissau-Guinean government official would send a powerful message. Even if no extradition were possible, the indicted would not feel safe traveling outside the country; given the austere conditions of Bissau, this would be a significant punishment. ¶9. (C) Embassy will coordinate with EUCOM to request U.S. military ships that navigate near Guinea-Bissau as part of their scheduled itinerary to linger off the coast for an additional length of time. This will send a strong message to traffickers and the GOGB. Such action may also generate telephone based intelligence as contacts communicate to change course or suspend shipments. Embassy has provided to DEA Lagos cell phone numbers of reputed drug kingpins Minister of Defense Helder Proenca and the Chief of the Navy Jose Americo Bubu Na Tchuto. CARROTS -------------- ¶10. (C) Embassy has requested INL funds but has been told that none are available. In any event, UNODC Chief Antonio Mazzitelli does not recommend training in the current environment, which he says is like a vacuum. Trained agents would not have the equipment, political support, or personal security guarantee to make any difference. A more robust program carried out in coordination with other donors and possibly under the auspices of the UN is required. DAKAR 00000608 003 OF 003 COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST -------------- ¶11. (C) Embassy requests that the Department identify alternative sources of funding such as the UN Democracy Fund or earmarked contributions to the United Nations to address Guinea-Bissau's grave narcotics problem. We will continue to coordinate diplomatic efforts with allies and international organizations, but diplomacy without well-funded, concrete action will yield few results. END COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST. JACOBS