DETERIORATION IN THE CASAMANCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DAKAR 000275 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, INR/AA AND PM/WRA ACCRA ALSO FOR USAID/WA PARIS FOR POL - D,ELIA E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2017 TAGS: PINS ASEC CASC SOCI PGOV PINR SG GA PU SUBJECT: DETERIORATION IN THE CASAMANCE REF: A. 06 DAKAR 3016 ¶B. 06 DAKAR 2597 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROY L. WHITAKER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Senegalese Army reoccupation of the Casamance, initially somewhat successful, has proved unable to thwart rebel activity. Violence, while still largely concentrated in a northern triangle bordering on The Gambia, is becoming increasingly significant in the key city of Bignona, and rebel forces in the south, once seen as moderates, have twice confronted Senegalese troops working with Moroccan deminers. The death of Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor has further diminished the influence of the rebel political wing over its maquisards, and assassination of an elected leader has left the Government with even fewer means of applying leverage. While most Casamancais appear to want peace, the Government lacks a coherent strategy to achieve it, and U.S. support has not yet been able to move the process forward faster than President Wade is prepared to move ahead. END SUMMARY. GAUGING THE DECLINE -------------- ¶2. (C) In recent weeks, the Ambassador, DCM, EmbOffs and PADCO representative Yinka Oyinlola have met with most of the government and Movement of Democratic Forces of the Casamance (MFDC) officials involved in the Casamance peace process. When the Ambassador saw Mbaye Jacques Diop, the President of the Council of the Republic for Economic and Social Affairs, he confidently predicted that peace talks would resume in early 2007. On January 24, Minister of Interior Ousmane Ngom told the Ambassador that the peace process &has been more difficult than expected.8 ¶3. (C) On January 8, DCM, AGATT, AIDOff, and PADCO representative met with Minister of Agriculture Farba Senghor, the new &Mr. Casamance,8 and informed him of U.S. efforts to support the Casamance peace process. Minister Senghor, a Serere, had clearly been in contact with many MFDC and Casamance leaders since President Wade asked him to assist in the peace process in November. Senghor said the MFDC armed factions (Atika, Kassolol and the Movement for the Liberation of the Casamance People) are more united than they have been in some time. He stressed, however, that we should not infer that increased banditry in the Casamance and the attacks on deminers or on late Ziguinchor Regional Council President Oumar Lamine Badji were coordinated. THE FRAGILITY OF PEACE -------------- ¶4. (C) Senegalese Army reoccupation of the northern Casamance initially seemed successful, though the policy decision to apply force was criticized by some. Having removed hard-line Salif Sadio,s Atika or MLPC faction of the MFDC from its Bissau-Guinean bases and driven it into Gambian refuge, the military appeared then to have limited Sadio's capacity to mount significant attacks in the northern part of the region as well. As of our last visit to The Casamance in late October, we found that while Sadio retained the capacity for small-scale attacks and banditry, there was reason to hope that violence would decrease (Ref B). ¶5. (C) In a January 22 trip to Ziguinchor and Bignona, however, visiting AF/W Desk Officer Dorsey Lockhart and Embassy Officers found what Regional Governor Leopold Wade described as "a delicate period, in which we don't know the real causes of renewed violence and can't judge their significance for the peace process." Casamancais have been jolted by a sequence of violence, including: -- banditry that peaked in December and may have been driven by the confluence of three important holidays; -- the New Year's Eve assassination of Ziguinchor Regional Council President Oumar Lamine Badji. The case is still being investigated: the alleged perpetrator is said to be an MFDC member, but even Wade has said "the theory should not be given precedence," that it was ordered by the MFDC or related to the peace process. There are suspicions the crime was political. -- armed attacks on Senegalese deminers who were supporting 500 Moroccan deminers who departed Senegal last week: three Senegalese deminers were injured by a mine near Bignona on December 19, two Senegalese soldiers were killed and a dozen DAKAR 00000275 002 OF 004 wounded in an ambush on a truck convoy north of Bignona on December 20, and there were armed attacks on January 18 and 25 in the south of the region by the until recently moderate armed faction headed by Caesar Badiatte. ¶6. (C) Beyond these high-profile events, we found concern about a generalized climate of uncertainty. The Military Zone Commander, Colonel Sow, stressed to us that he was successful in keeping Ziguinchor and major routes open and safe. Human rights activist Emile Dieme and developmental worker Abdoulaye Diallo, in contrast, told us army troops in the region's second city, Bignona, declined to patrol at night, and that the city was completely open to rebel activity after dark. They said Salif Sadio had recently appointed younger fighters to replace older commanders whom Dakar had targeted as possibly open to compromise, and that he had redeployed into relatively remote forest areas for safe refuge. ABBE'S DEATH LEAVES LEADERSHIP VACUUM -------------- ¶7. (C) We called separately on Catholic Bishop Maixent Coly and Bertrand Diamacoune to deliver our condolences on the recent death of the aged MFDC leader, Father Diamacoune. The Bishop reminded us that the Catholic Church had not agreed with the Abbe on regional independence. Bertrand told us the MFDC would now adopt a collegial leadership rather than replace his brother with a single individual. Others doubt the feasibility of any leadership containing four or five competitors, including: -- Bertrand himself, a master politician known for his appreciation of government generosity but who apparently has little or no support among the MFDC maquisards; -- Ansoumana Badji, who was once enlisted and failed as the GOS' liaison with the maquisards and is seen as a Dakar-sponsored interloper; -- Jean Marie Francois Biagui, once the Abbe's most trusted deputy, retains the image of a young Parisian civil servant, though he did adopt a much more radical tone with us than he has ever done before; -- Separate from the first three, who form something of an alliance of convenience, is the Paris exile Nkrumah Sane, who has benefited in recent days after the incident with deminers, when Caesar Badiatte defended him as the Abbe's legitimate successor; and -- A dark horse, Abdoulaye Diedhiou, who despite or because of his fascist thug persona has managed to maintain links with both the diplomatic community and the maquisards. He is in The Gambia, by various accounts either taking refuge or seeking the release from jail of another moderate leader, Magne Dieme, who has been imprisoned by the Gambian Government. WHO CAN MEDIATE THIS CONFLICT? -------------- ¶8. (C) None of President Wade's designated negotiators, most recently Agriculture Minister and Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) apparatchik Senghor, has succeeded in establishing any personal influence in the Casamance. Bignona Mayor and ex-Minister of Defense Youba Sambou, believes the "Cadres Casamancais," a group of Casamance "executives" encouraged by Wade, and especially Cadres member Badji before his assassination, have been filling this gap to a limited degree. Sambou told Desk Officer Lockhart, though, that there is an "absence of clarity on the government's points of negotiation ... no precise mandate to carry out these negotiations and no roadmap (balisage) for proceeding." He said "negotiators have failed because working with the MFDC requires a sophisticated and deep knowledge of ethnic Diola sociology. The 'northerners' never talk to those with real power." ¶9. (C) The Government must, Sambou insists, do several things to achieve peace. First, Wade must abandon the notion that he can "force capitulation ... that shows he just doesn't understand the Jola." Wade and the Army must understand that operations such as the Moroccan-assisted demining are forcing moderates such as Caesar Badiatte to seek new accords with hardliner Sadio; future demining operations must be undertaken if at all only after consultations with the MFDC. Third, the best way to lower tensions is by building road infrastructure such as a new road to Cape Skirring or a ring road around Bignona. DAKAR 00000275 003 OF 004 Finally, Wade must turn to a Casamancais as mediator and negotiator, including especially Ziguinchor Mayor Robert Sagna, or Sambou himself. THE MILITARY ASSESSMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) Two days after MFDC President Diamacoune,s death in Paris on January 14, DCM, DATT and PADCO representative met with Armed Forces Chief of Staff (CHOD) Major General Abdoulaye Fall. We brought Fall up to date on U.S. efforts to promote peace, urged the Government to seize the opportunity presented by Diamacoune,s passing, and sought Fall,s views. Fall was frank with us in acknowledging that the GOS lacks a coherent Casamance strategy and that President Wade has a proclivity for assigning a new &Mr. Casamance8 every few months while delegating very little authority. Fall disagreed with Minister Senghor,s analysis and stressed that the MFDC is very factionalized at present, adding it would be easier to work with a unified movement. Fall asserted that even as The Gambia detains key MFDC Kassolol leaders, it says it is encouraging unity. Fall alleged that President Yahya Jammeh is also providing arms. As for recent attacks, with the exceptions of the ambushes of deminers and with the possible exception of the Badji assassination, the rebels have been committing economic rather than political crimes. ¶11. (C) We went straight from the CHOD,s office to Gendarme Commander Major General Abdoulaye Fall,s office. This General Abdoulaye Fall used to be &Mr. Casamance,8 but he was relieved of those duties when President Wade decided to stop providing the MFDC with monetary payments in favor of some food and medicine channeled through the Senegalese Red Cross/Red Crescent and then nothing in recent months, except provision of housing for a few MFDC leaders and very limited funds for Father Diamacoune,s funeral. This Fall echoed the other General Fall,s analysis. He said Diamacoune leaves no obvious successor. His brother, Bertrand, lacks his stature; after all his years in Paris, Nkrumah Sane is &French;8 former Secretary General Badji is &Portuguese8 after all his time in Portugal; and current Secretary General Jean-Marie Badji is not up to the task. Fall thought demining at this juncture could be a mistake, but his greater concern is the flow of arms through Guinea-Bissau. Both General Falls fear that if President Joao Bernardo &Nino8 Vieira is not vigilant, his former party, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC), could resume its historical support for the MFDC. ¶12. (C) Last but not least, we met with Brigadier General Ibrahima Gabar Diop, President Wade's personal military advisor and his intelligence chief. Diop, who graduated from the U.S. Army War College and retired from the military on January 25, agreed with our analysis that Father Diamacoune,s death could lead to either a protracted leadership battle or be an opportunity. Like every other GOS leader with whom we have met, Diop insisted that most Casamancais now want peace rather than independence. He said that the CHOD has been following through on the President,s desire to reestablish state authority and to end the MFDC,s narcotics growing and trafficking. He also underscored that The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau must be involved in the peace process for it to succeed. COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) The government's decision to reoccupy demilitarized zones of the Casamance, after some initial success, has failed to eliminate violence and in some cases may have provoked it. The effort to demine some areas with Moroccan assistance, undertaken without informing the MFDC in advance, seems to be driving a moderate faction of the maquisards into renewed communication with hardliners. The MFDC seems to have free rein of Bignona city by night, when army troops tend to hunker down, and the feeling of insecurity is deepening. ¶14. (C) At the same time, leadership on Casamance issues is in disarray at all levels. President Wade is accused of having abandoned the peace process in favor of pushing for rebel capitulation. Whether true or not, it is evident that none of his series of chief advisors and negotiators has achieved any real breakthrough. On the MFDC side, Abbe Diamacoune's death has left the civilian wing leaderless, and his would-be replacements are jockeying to replace him. Whoever succeeds will exercise even less influence than the Abbe over the several factions of MFDC maquisards. In the absence of leadership, real negotiations or investment, there DAKAR 00000275 004 OF 004 has been a rise in MFDC recruitment, banditry and general disenchantment with the peace process. ¶15. (C) President Wade probably had a brief window of opportunity some months ago, as hardliners were squeezed geographically and moderates seemed open to negotiation. The window was partially closed by the Abbe's death and by moderate maquisards' reaction to Moroccan deminers. It is also true, though, that Wade has been almost totally concentrated on re-election, and therefore appeared focused on achieving a military solution rather than on investing political and economic efforts in the region. The result is a return to violence and disarray approaching if not equal to that which preceded the beginning of the peace process in late 2003. END COMMENT. ¶16. (U) AF/W Desk Officer Lockhart did not have an opportunity to clear this cable prior to her departure. ¶17. (U) Visit Embassy Dakar's classified website at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/af/dakar. JACOBS