SENEGAL'S DONORS AGAIN GIVE IMF MISSION AN EARFUL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DAKAR 001515 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR EB/IFD, AF/EPS AND AF/W E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EFIN EAID ECON ETRD EINV SG SUBJECT: SENEGAL'S DONORS AGAIN GIVE IMF MISSION AN EARFUL REF: 06 DAKAR 2614 DAKAR 00001515 001.2 OF 002 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: At the beginning of a two-week mission to negotiate a new program with Senegal, IMF officials on July 12 received a non-stop stream of complaints and concerns by the country's traditional donors over the current state of public finance and governance. Senegal very much needs a new IMF program to revive donor confidence and assure follow-though on pledges. On July 26 the donors will learn the outcome of the negotiations. Even with a new program, the prospects for near-term sunshine on Senegal's budget expenditures and public contracts will likely remain dim. END SUMMARY. ANOTHER EARFUL -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Reftel highlighted the tough messages that donors delivered to a visiting IMF team last October. That session proved a mild preview to the meeting held on July 12 when Senegal's traditional donor community again gathered to highlight their concerns at the beginning of a two-week IMF mission, this one to negotiate a new IMF program. The "non-traditional" donors such as the Gulf States, Morocco, and China, who have been dominating the news in recent months due to their special partnerships with GOS ministries and agencies, were apparently invited but did not attend. While acknowledging that the donors were raising all the issues (and more) that the mission planned to address with the GOS, after an hour-plus of pointed concerns, complaints, and frustrations, the IMF Chief of Mission, Johannes Mueller, appeared a bit shell-shocked. Unlike other donor-IMF briefings, nobody at the table came to the GOS's defense; not France, not the EU, not the World Bank, not the UNDP. THE LAUNDRY LIST -- JUST AS DIRTY BUT EVEN TOUGHER -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The donors insisted that the IMF address a broad range of issues in its discussions with the GOS and that the donors' concerns form the basis of any new program's "commonly agreed reform measures" (read, "conditionality"). Most of the issues raised by the various donors have been well-reported by post, and none are particularly new. Collectively, the issues raised underscore the over-arching concern, namely, the GOS does not appear to have any specific and sound plan for improving its public finances and reviving the economy. President Wade, his spokesmen, Ministers and various agency heads all say, "trust us, we have a plan," but trust is in short supply these days in Dakar. ¶4. (SBU) More specifically, the donors raised, in part: -- Senegal's completely stove-piped decision-making, with a single point for all decisions (President Wade and his personal political advisors); -- lack of transparency in Senegal's public finances and procurement; -- not enough effort to offer fair and open tenders for public projects; -- no improvement in solving Senegal's energy-financing crisis; -- no effective GOS counterparts for donor thematic groups; -- no information on the source, control, or GOS requirements under agreements for the "Arab funds" (that is, the special, exclusive deals between the GOS various companies and entities from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE for infrastructure investments); -- a National Assembly that has no role providing checks and balances; -- an ineffective judiciary; -- inconsistent application of laws and regulations; -- diminishing budgets for development priorities, including health and education; -- lack of follow-through on debt forgiveness commitments; -- the unaccountable role of the "Agencies" set up to manage public investment; and -- zero movement on improving the business and investment climate, including no formal response, after two years, to the letter highlighting specific areas for improvement provided to the Prime Minister by the U.S.-chaired Private Sector Working Group. THE IMF'S ASSIGNMENT -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Mr. Mueller explained that he is beginning this mission with five goals for the negotiations: i) establish needed improvements in Senegal's macro-economic situation, including effective management of the national budget; ii) agree to much-needed transparency and governance reforms for public finances; iii) outline concrete steps for increasing economic growth; iv) establish a workable plan for improving the private sector business and investment climate; v) underline the importance of improving and modernizing Senegal's financial sector. DAKAR 00001515 002.2 OF 002 ¶6. (SBU) Mueller explained that the conditionality must be established as a first step, because it will be essentially the same whether the two sides agree to a new Policy Support Instrument (PSI) or a more traditional Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). He speculated that the reporting requirements of a PSI might be too strict for Senegal at this time. Another option is a PRGF with only a "symbolic" disbursement since once Senegal's budget deficit and public finances management are addressed the country does not really need a significant financial contribution from the IMF (assuming other donors continue their assistance). ¶7. (SBU) Senegal's IMF Resrep Alex Segura, promised that Meuller would brief the donors on the results of their negotiations on July ¶26. As for the timeframe for a new program, Mueller explained that if there is a general agreement by the end of this mission, the new program could be presented to the IMF board by early October. COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Senegal has much at stake in a successful conclusion to these negotiations -- not just a much-needed boost in credibility for securing donor project and budget support pledges, but also for agreeing to regularize its management of public finances. However, even with a new program we are not confident that Senegal's talented Finance Minister Abdoulaye Diop will be able to implement much-needed reforms in the near-term. That will probably have to wait until the opaque financing of projects for the proposed March 2008 OIC summit has run its course. It will also require winning difficult political battles with the entrenched political advisors surrounding President Wade who quite enjoy having their fingers in all the pies. END COMMENT. ¶9. (U) Visit Embassy Dakar's Intranet site at: http://dakar.state.gov/htdocs/section/econSec tion.aspx and Embassy Dakar's SIPRNET Web site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/af/dakar SMITH