DEEP CUTS IN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE WILL HARM SENEGAL'S

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 001035 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR F - ACTING DIRECTOR OF U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND ACTING USAID AMINISTRATOR HENRIETTA H. FORE FROM AMBASSADOR STATE ALSO FOR AF, E, EB, AF/EPS AND AF/W NSC FOR AF SENIOR DIRECTOR PITTMAN AID/W FOR AA/AFR WNORTH AND AFR/WA NFREEMAN MCC FOR JBLOOM TREASURY FOR OASIA - D. PETERS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID ECON PREL KMCA PGOV SG SUBJECT: DEEP CUTS IN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE WILL HARM SENEGAL'S POPULATION AND OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS DAKAR 00001035 001.2 OF 003 ¶1. (SBU) Having recently been apprised of possible significant cuts to USAID/Senegal's operating (OE) budget and development program, perhaps as early as the current fiscal year, I feel compelled to provide an initial reaction in the hope that there is still an opportunity for this Mission, as well as impacted embassies globally, to influence the decision-making process. As I understand the current discussion, USAID/Senegal stands to become a small mission with a scaled-back program in order to free up resources for the seven priority missions and regional offices. Part of reason lies in Senegal's eligibility for a Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) Compact. However, almost three years after Senegal submitted its MCA proposal to construct an industrial platform at Diamniadio, much more work remains to be done before a Compact can be signed. Therefore, I would like to make eight points that I hope will be fully considered before any final decision about USAID/Senegal's future is made. -- A. Senegal needs, receives and utilizes U.S. assistance across a wide range of programs. According to the 2006 UNDP Human Development Index, Senegal ranks 156 out of 177 countries. Adult illiteracy is high (60.7 percent) and the percentage of underweight children (ages 0 - 5) is over 23 percent. Furthermore, for the third straight year, Senegal's immunization rate is below the median for MCC countries. For the past three years, this mission's top strategic priority has been to encourage and support enhanced economic growth. Though viewed as a regional success story, Senegal has badly underperformed in GDP growth, job creation, productivity, private sector development, expanded trade, economic diversification, public procurement rules, property rights reform, environmental protection, and a wide range of related government transparency issues. Senegal is not going to escape from widespread poverty quickly or easily. With a growing population and a marked lack of engagements into 
globalized economic systems, one can understand how Senegal's positive example of a stable, tolerant, democratic, U.S. ally could be at risk without significant U.S. assistance towards fostering a growing and responsive economy. In the area of education, USAID and the Government of Senegal are just beginning to make significant inroads at providing children, especially girls, in rural areas with access to middle school education in recognition that a primary school education alone will not sufficiently prepare Senegalese youth to be productive members of society. In health, we have just launched the President's Malaria Initiative, which aims to reduce malaria infections by 50 percent over the next three years, and we continue to work with the Global Fund and other donors to keep Senegal's HIV sero-prevalence rate the lowest in Africa at 0.7 percent. -- B. Notwithstanding that Senegal is not among the seven priority counties, our assistance programs are effective in helping Senegal meet priority development goals in areas where the Senegalese Government cannot. For example, although Senegal ranks above the median on most of the ruling justly indicators used by the MCC, lack of good governance and transparency continue to undermine prospects for an improved investment environment and accelerated growth. If these issues are not addressed through development programs that support and pressure institutions and leaders to operate more transparently, the success of plans for accelerated growth, including the proposed MCC-financed industrial platform, could be in serious jeopardy. -- C. Tying a precipitous drop in other assistance efforts to a county's MCC eligibility could drastically hollow out our ability to help the country meet critical development needs. While Senegal's proposed MCA compact for a major new industrial platform -- and perhaps assistance with a much needed national toll road -- is squarely targeted to enhance economic opportunities and job creation, it is no substitute for a robust bilateral program that addresses other critical needs. The proposed MCA Compact will not touch on important economic growth requirements, including natural resources management, enhancing sanitary and phyto-sanitary capacity to increase agriculture and food exports under AGOA, commercial law reform, budget effectiveness, and many other areas where the U.S. can and should effectively engage. Nor will an MCA Compact address the country's pressing needs in other sectors such as health, education and conflict resolution. -- D. A "MCC connection" to any near-term reduction in other DAKAR 00001035 002.2 OF 003 official assistance, sends the wrong message about the MCC program and will likely put a significant strain on our bilateral relations. As you know, the requirements that must be fulfilled leading to the signing of an MCA Compact are detailed and rigorous, especially for a complex proposal like Senegal's -- essentially to build a new city. Though the Senegalese side has not always been responsive or thorough in its efforts to support the necessary due diligence, over the past two years we have frequently heard complaints that the compact process has entailed examples of "moving the goalposts," especially in relation to how the program was initially described during its launch in 2004. At the same time, senior Senegalese officials, including Senegal's Ambassador to the United States, have frequently requested and received assurance, based on their understanding of the President's vision for the MCA, that compact eligibility will reward responsible public policy and not disadvantage a country for the wider range of aid and partnership. I believe that Senegal would have chosen a different approach to its MCA proposal -- one to address immediate needs rather than a commitment to a long-term strategy of economic modernization -- if there was an understanding of the potential decrease in other economic growth assistance now being discussed. Working through the compact process can be a battle, but one where we can encourage, and at times prod, the host country to dedicate time, top technical experts, and their own budget resources, because of the MCA promise of a new avenue for significant and focused assistance. -- E. MCC compacts rest on a broad floor of assistance. In Senegal's case, maintaining eligibility by meeting increasingly stringent indicator standards is not a given. In fact, Senegal is at risk of losing MCA eligibility particularly because of poor performance under "Investing n People." Those education and health indicators benefit from the programs and training that are a part of USAID's programs. Other assistance under economic growth programs is vital for promoting the kind of private sector-led growth that will be a determining factor in the MCC's concept's long-term success or failure in Senegal. -- F. Our multi-sector assistance program keeps us at the donor roundtable, where we lead the discussions on governance, encouraging private-sector development, and the effective use of budget resources. Our robust economic growth program is the most effective in Senegal. I chair the donor-coordinating Private Sector Working Group because of our commitment to helping Senegal achieve economic growth. Through this forum we press the GOS on a range of governance and transparency issues that are key to effective implementation of donor assistance from other countries, international organizations and NGOS, and are critical to improving the country's private sector investment climate. -- G. The U.S. and Senegal enjoy one of Africa's most comprehensive and effective military cooperation partnerships -- to the tune of USD 8.2 million in FY-2007. Senegal welcomes a vast array of U.S. military training exercises and receives U.S. training for its soldiers to complement a range of military missions, including pre-deployment training for the country's 2,600-plus international peacekeepers. While I fully support this robust military engagement, I wonder if the United States wants to have mil-mil activities dominate the bilateral relationship with Senegal. This would not only create a public relations risk, but would also significantly reduce the scope of effective, professional contacts necessary to carry USG foreign policy priorities. -- H. In our battle to encourage good governance and public resources transparency, an increase or decrease in our funding levels could, perhaps, be a useful instrument. However, absorbing the significant OE cuts and accompanying reductions in program funding currently being discussed without first effectively engaging the GOS on its responsibilities in this equation seriously limits our ability to influence policy makers and public opinion. There is possibly room for additional "conditionality" in our assistance to Senegal. Unfortunately, the proposed cuts would effectively eliminate any opportunity to discuss the utility of such an approach. ¶2. (SBU) I am aware of the serious budget constraints underlying many of the painful decisions faced by both Washington and the field. My hope is that we can face this challenge together. DAKAR 00001035 003.2 OF 003 Ideally, decisions about where our precious assistance funds can effectively be utilized, both in terms of countries and priority sectors, can be developed with the active contribution of embassies and USAID missions, and with a view to achieving long-term U.S. foreign policy goals. I look forward to working with you and your staff on these issues. JACOBS