TFGV01: AMBASSADOR URGES PRESIDENTS OF NATIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CONAKRY 000191 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2017 TAGS: PINS PGOV PREL ASEC AEMR GV SUBJECT: TFGV01: AMBASSADOR URGES PRESIDENTS OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND SUPREME COURT TO REMOVE CONTE THROUGH ARTICLE 34 REF: CONAKRY 179 Classified By: Ambassador Jackson McDonald, Reason 1.4(b, d) -------------- SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION -------------- ¶1. (C) On February 16, the Ambassador lobbied hard for President of the National Assembly Aboubacar Sompare and President of the Supreme Court Lamine Sidime to deal head on with Guinea's leadership vacuum by invoking Article 34 of the constitution to remove President Lansana Conte, who is objectively no longer able to govern the country. ¶2. (C) National Assembly President Sompare, who would become interim President of the Republic, agreed that conditions warranted the use of Article 34. He is worried, however, about the reaction of the military, which must be brought on board in advance, he said. He also doubted that Supreme Court President Sidime would go along, as required by the constitution. ¶3. (C) Supreme Court President Sidime "took note" of the Ambassador's advice but insisted that the answer lies, instead, in political dialogue leading to a new prime minister and a government of broad national consensus. Sidime is blind to the real problem. He is a weak but pretentious man totally beholden to President Conte. End Summary. -------------- -- NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT SOMPARE 80% WILLING -------------- -- ¶4. (U) The Ambassador first met one-on-one with National Assembly President Aboubacar Sompare at the latter's office at the Palais du Peuple. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador repeated in extenso the same arguments used with Prime Minister Eugene Camara on February 14 (see reftel para. 4 to end). In short, President Conte is no longer up to the job; Guinea is leaderless; no government has been able to transform Guinea's great potential wealth into a minimally decent standard of living for the people; the crisis has become untenable; the people will not accept deprivation anymore and have taken to the streets; the country is under an official "state of siege; it is teetering on the edge; now is the time for bold action. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador said that the objective facts now warrant -- and have warranted for some time already -- the use of Article 34 of the constitution to declare the President of the Republic incapable of exercising his duties. Since Article 34 has not been implemented, the problem has festered; the people have rebelled against the government; and President Conte has invoked another constitutional provision to declare a state of siege, thereby conferring broad, exceptional powers on the military. ¶7. (C) The Ambassador argued that the state of siege might restore some public order for a brief period but it would undermine Guinea's fragile civilian institutions and would not/not resolve the underlying problem, i.e., President Conte is no longer up to the job and must be replaced. ¶8. (C) The Ambassador said that one way or another, President Conte will go: either by death, resignation, Article 34, or a coup d'etat. He said the U.S. strongly prefers that Conte be given a peaceful, dignified, constitutional way out. He appealed to Sompare to rise to the occasion and to invoke Article 34. If not, he warned, today's wave of popular discontent will grow into an insurrection of tsunami proportions, or, some colonel, captain, or "Sergeant Doe" will take over the country. ¶9. (C) The Ambassador said it was time for Sompare to reach deep down to find the political will and personal courage to invoke Article 34 for the good of Guinea. He said Sompare and Guinea could count on the support of the U.S., most of its neighbors in West Africa, and much of the international community. Most importantly, Sompare could count on the support of the majority of the Guinean people who are demanding change, who want Conte out, who want better governance, and who want hope for the future. ¶10. (C) Sompare agreed with the Ambassador's description of the situation and recognized that, objectively, President Conte is no longer up to the job. Sompare said that he has not invoked Article 34 for two reasons: he is concerned CONAKRY 00000191 002 OF 004 about the reaction of the army, and he has doubts that Supreme Court President Sidime will go along, as required by the constitution. ¶11. (C) The Ambassador acknowledged that these were real problems. Sompare said the army will have to be "in on this" before it can happen. ¶12. (C) The Ambassador recognized that the military is used to preferential treatment by a president who is also a general. He said that a Guinean colonel once told him that the military is afraid that they will be "thrown in the garbage" if there is a civilian president. Moreover, President Conte, who was raised in the military and remains intensely loyal to his "military family," also favors a military successor. Thus, it is necessary to find ways to reassure the military that Guinea will always need a strong, professional, well-paid, well-equipped army, even under a civilian president. ¶13. (C) The Ambassador said he was willing to consider raising the matter with General Kerfalla Camara, Chief of Defense Staff. Sompare commented that it would be necessary to convince the whole general staff. The Ambassador took the point. ¶14. (C) The Ambassador added, however, that the real problem was not that the armed forces are afraid of receiving fewer resources. Instead, senior officers are afraid that, under a civilian president, they will not be able to perpetuate their highly lucrative sweetheart deals on the side. Sompare agreed that many senior officers were motivated more by greed than by duty. -------------- A POSSIBLE SCENARIO -------------- ¶15. (C) Since Sompare did not reject out of hand the idea of invoking Article 34, the Ambassador outlined a possible scenario: President Conte is declared incapable of fulfilling his constitutional duties as head of state and head of government; Sompare, as President of the National Assembly, becomes interim President of the Republic, as provided by Article 34; Sompare immediately (simultaneously) confirms the recent presidential decree delegating substantial executive powers to a prime minister/head of government; Sompare and the prime minister, who must be a genuinely consensual figure, work expeditiously to form a transitional government of broad national consensus to administer the country until a presidential election is held, after which a permanent government could be formed. ¶16. (C) Sompare himself remarked that a transitional government should include members of the opposition political parties, labor unions, and civil society. The Ambassador concurred, adding that these groups should be given some important ministries in order to involve them deeply in the affairs of state, to make them partly responsible for administering the country, and to make them accountable for their performance. ¶17. (C) Warming the idea, Sompare recommended that the Ambassador also meet with Supreme Court President Sidime, without whose assent Article 34 is impossible to implement. ¶18. (C) The Ambassador said he planned to meet with Sidime as soon as possible. Sompare said he expected Sidime and President of the Economic and Social Council Michel Kamano to arrive any minute for a pre-arranged meeting about how to restart the political dialogue with the labor unions, political parties, civil society, religious leaders, etc. -------------- -------------- SUPREME COURT PRESIDENT SIDIME: THE WEAKEST LINK -------------- -------------- ¶19. (C) Supreme Court President Lamine Sidime and Economic and Social Council President Michel Kamano soon arrived at Sompare's office. ¶20. (C) The Ambassador then repeated at length the same arguments he had made to Sompare. He said it was time to face reality. Objectively, President Conte is no longer up to the job. There is a leadership vacuum at the very top. This dysfunctional state of affairs has been allowed to continue for so long that it is now endangering Guinea,s very existence as a bulwark of stability in West Africa. Guinea is already experiencing unprecedented civil strife; the crisis will worsen unless bold steps are taken now to CONAKRY 00000191 003 OF 004 stop it. ¶21. (C) He said it was time -- perhaps even past time -- for Sompare and Sidime to fulfill their constitutional duties by invoking Article 34, which represents the best way to remove President Conte in a peaceful, civilian, constitutional manner. ¶22. (C) Sidime replied that he would "take note" of the Ambassador's advice but that the government was now trying to restart the political dialogue in order to resolve the crisis. He asked the Ambassador to help convince the labor unions to end the strike. ¶23. (C) The Ambassador said that the U.S. supports political dialogue. He said the U.S. Embassy had worked hard and successfully to convince the union leaders to participate in the previous day's meeting aimed at resuming the political dialogue. He said he personally had requested General Kerfalla to guarantee the safety of the participants in the political dialogue. ¶24. (C) The Ambassador stressed, however, that the labor unions are not the problem. The general strike reflects much broader popular discontent. Even if the unions announced an end to the strike today, it is unlikely that the population would follow. The unions do not control the people, and the people want change. ¶25. (C) Comment: Sidime, like many senior government officials, seemed obsessed with the labor unions and oblivious to the real nature of the crisis. End comment. ¶26. (C) The Ambassador argued that political dialogue and Article 34 are not mutually exclusive. To the contrary, they are complementary. He said that political dialogue would be required to produce a consensual prime minister and a broad-based transitional government, both of which would be necessary during the period from Conte's removal under Article 34 until a new president could be elected. ¶27. (C) Sidime seemed unconvinced, unwilling or both. ¶28. (C) Economic and Social Council President Michel Kamano predicted that if Article 34 were invoked, there would be a coup d'etat. ¶29. (C) The Ambassador replied that one could not rule out that eventuality, but that if Article 34 was not invoked, there would also be a coup d'etat, a mass insurrection, or some other form of violent upheaval that would depose President Conte through extra-constitutional means. Moreover, he warned, Conte would not be the only person removed. ¶30. (C) At the end of the meeting, the Ambassador reiterated that the time has come for Sompare and Sidime to fulfill their constitutional responsibilities. He said that the fate of Guinea was, to a very large extent, in their hands. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶31. (C) We have now explicitly urged both Sompare and Sidime to address Guinea's leadership problem head on. We have emphasized that half measures and partial solutions will no longer suffice. We have made clear that Conte is the problem and that he must go. We have argued that Conte should be removed constitutionally. We have warned that if Conte is not removed constitutionally, then he will almost certainly be removed through violent, extra-constitutional means that will sweep away Conte and many others, including perhaps Sompare and Sidime themselves. ¶32. (C) National Assembly President Sompare is concerned about the reaction of the military. He could be risking his life by invoking Article 34. He will only invoke Article 34 if the military has been brought on board beforehand and if he thinks Sidime will go along. ¶33. (C) Supreme Court President Sidime is a weak but pretentious man. He is subservient to President Conte. (For example, he validated Conte's crooked election in 1993.) Without Conte, Sidime is nothing. Moreover, he, too, probably fears the reaction of the military. If somehow General Kerfalla and the military command can be convinced that it is in Guinea's interest to facilitate Conte's exit through Article 34, and that their private financial CONAKRY 00000191 004 OF 004 interests will not be trampled, then they could prevail on Sidime to concur. Sidime, who comes from a lower caste, would ultimately comply under such pressure. ¶34. (C) In sum, Sompare and Sidime will not use Article 34 unless the military is on board in advance. MCDONALD